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MANAGING THE BAY AREA'S
ENVIRONMENT: AN EXPERIMENT
IN COLlABORATIVE PLANNING
Ora Hut&
Research Asaoeiate
lmdtute of Gonmmear.U Studies

Introduction
The San Francisco Bay Area is mid-stream in a complicated process of planning for environmental protection
and considering the consequent sociai and economic
impactS. Paradoxically, the effort's principal hope for
success seems to rest on its complexity and its heroic
scale. Fuelled by federal funds, the coHaboration brings
together representatives of most of the governmental
bodies in the 9-county region who are concerned with
environmental matters.. as well as citizen participants
representing ''the pubiic. ·• The Bay Area's leadership is
in effect trying cooperation and innovative methods· to
accomplish effective environmental planning and pian
implementation.
Earlier planning efforts and growing environmental
awareness emphasized the many interconnections among
problems. Thus it became clear that environmental
quality depends on factors like land use and population
distribution; design and location of housing, industries
and businesses; and transportation methods and
movements. Also crucially important are preservation or
loss of nonintensive .. natural .. uses such as agriculture;
regional parks and open spaces; hills, mountains and
forests; and the Bay itself.
·
Confronted with these justifications for comprehensive
plans, the region's response was halting. The Association
of Bay Area Governments (ABAG)* tried its hand at
overall planning but lacked power to implement. Each of
the Bay Area's special purpose agencies had implementing power, but only for its own function and area.
The very names of major regional bodies emphasized
their functional scope and related limits:' Bay Area Air

Pollution Control District; San Francisco Bay Regional
Water Quality Control Board: Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC); and the San Francisco Bay
Conservation and Develooment Commission (BCDC).
Improved regional Iitachinery for comprehensive
environmental planning was sought many times in
Sacramento. So far, legislative efforts at such structural
reform have not succeeded. The most prominent
examples are the succession of regional "Knox bills" for
the Bay Area (introduced in the California Legislature by
Assemblyman John A. Knox of Richmond). The most
recent Knox proposal would have established a single 9county comprehensive regional agency for environmental
planning and policy implementation. Despite their
failure. these regional bills received substantial support
from the Bay Area leadership and several seemed on the
verge of passage. Although the measures fell short of
enactment there is growing agreement that federal-stateregional environmental. social and economic objectives
cannot be reached by ad hoc devices alone. In fact. some
observers see separate, single-purpose agencies as compounding difficulties by generating a second levei of
problems related to policy coordination and implementation.
Seeing the failure of the Knox bills. Bay Area leaders
explored other avenues. Meanwhile, state and federal
initiatives have encouraged and required new methods of
managing environmental problems. One of the most
significant for Bay Area planning is the federal "208..
program, made possible by new federal policies.
Recent Federal Laws: New Approaches
Growing public concern has brought greater sophistication in the federal government's approach to environmental protection. Thus several federal laws have sought
stronger environmental controls. especiaily the two most
important statutes. the Clean Air Amendments of 1970
and the Federal Water Pollution Controi Act Amend• Severa! of the acronyms most frequently used are listed at the end of
the paper.

ments of 1972. 2 Moreover, the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969 required a wide range of
impact studies and statements on major projects
affecting the environment. As for solid waste management. the progressive name changes of federal laws also
reflected new approaches: from simple waste disposal
(the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965), to recycling (the
Resource Recovery Act of 1970), to more general conservation of materials otherwise lost in solid waste (the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976).
Under these and other acts, the national goals ending water degradation by 1983 and providing cleaner
air as ..expeditiously.. as possible (an interpretation of
the 1977 deadline)- required the use of more stringent
regulation and higher standards for pollutants
discharged into the nation's air and water. For example,
earlier water pollution control laws were weakened by
using receiving water ("ambient" water) standards for
enforcement, rather than discharge standards. 3 Since
ambient standards specify a permissible quality level for
an entire body of water, it is hard to link violations to the
discharges of any one polluter.
Accordingly, the following are now required:
(1) controls over the quality of liquid wastes and
polluted water discharged from point sources (e.g.,
municipal and industrial treatment plants) as well as
nonpoint sources of water pollution (e.g., runoff from
farms and city streets), the principal focus of Sec. 208
planning; and
(2) control of air pollutants at the places they are
emitted (emission controls), and consideration of indirect
sources of air pollution (e.g., land uses such as highways,
shopping centers and other facilities that attract mobile
sources of pollntion).

The Feralenl "208" Prop-am: A Brief <neniew
In short, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
AmendmentS of 1972 provided an integrated program
that gave the federal government major regulatory
authority to control water pollution, a function
previously considered the principal responsibility of state
and local governments. Sec. 208 was by far the legislation's most important planning provision. Its purpose
was to develop programs and harness resources needed
to achieve a major water quality goal, i.e., "fishable and
swimmable" water by 1983. It also required the use of
land-use controls and other regulations in limiting pollution from point and nonpoint sources. Finally, 208 called
for broad regional analysis of pollution problems,
especially the study of future growth and its implications
for water quality.
Other important sections included, for example, Sec.
201, which mandated planning, economic and
engineering studies for construction of waste treatment
facilities. Sec. 303 provided for (a) basinwide planning
(covering a large area, e.g., a river basin drained by a
river and its tributaries), and (b) water quality control,
including regulating the quality of discharged wastewater. Sec. 402 required a permit system for wastewater
discharge.

The federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
issued guidelines and regulations to help the states select
areas whose water quality problems were most likely to
require Sec. 208 planning. In 1975, when California's
Governor named the State Water Resources Control
Board to administer the 208 program. the board conducted hearings and, with the concurrence of the EPA,
selected the Bay Area as one of seven California regions
to receive priority attention. The choice was based on
several considerations: the Bay Area's concentrations of
population and industry and conditions adversely
affecting water quality as shown, for example, in polluted
shellfish beds in the relatively shallow South Bay.
Further, there was evidence of major problems in solid
waste management. Moreover the region had previously
been designated an air quality maintenance area (one
with critical pollution levels).
The state water board also named the Association of
Bay Area Governments, a 9-county Council of Governments, as the "208 planning agency," i.e., the body
responsible for carrying out the provisions of Sec. 208.
The EPA then granted $4.3 million directly to ABAG,
which established an Environmental Management Task
Force (EMTF) currently composed of 45 members
including elected local officials and representatives of the
public and special interest groups (discussed below).
The program's timetable calls for seven plans, for:
surface runoff; industrial discharges; municipal facilities; miscellaneous sources; water conservation, reuse
and supply; air quality; and solid waste management, all
to be ready by August 1977. This version will be a discussion document, a preliminary Environmental
Management Plan (EMP). In the Bay Area, air quality is
tied to 208 water quality planning, and EMTFs goal is
also to reach and maintain federal and state air quality
standards "as expeditiously as practicable."
Accordingly, a management structure must be designed
that will be capable of on-going planning and
implementation.
As they push the plans along, officials are reminded
that all 208 funds are to be used "not to make a study or
report but rather to develop" an environmental management system "integrated with all Bay Area regional and
local planning programs."• Clearly, such a directive
implies a high level of cooperation among local. regional.
state and federal agencies, and willingness to negotiate.
The following discussion briefly treats some earlier
planning efforts related to Bay Area concerns, and
summarizes the roles of local governments, ABAG, and
the state and federal governments in the Bay Area's
environmental protection. The focus. then turns to
ABAG's Environmental Management Task Force,
reviewing regional planning efforts in the interest of air
and water quality and solid waste management. Finally,
the discussion attempts to provide both an interim
assessment and possible guideposts for future evaluations.
Lessons from the Past and
Evolution of New Efforts
In the past half century the San Francisco Bay Area
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Area's 208 program because the EPA regional administration's interpretation held that such inclusion would
help promote integrated planning in the region.

has seen the establishment of many agencies in response
to environmental problems, but these single-purpose
efforts suffered from uneven performance, as well as
jurisdictional and functional limitations. Creation of
single-purpose agencies has continued, but policymakers
have also considered proposals for more comprehensive
regional environmental governance, as noted earlier.
Some would have had substantial powers, including
regional land use controls, but none became law.
The 208 effort, seen as an alternative to the regional
bills that failed, evokes serious questions such as these:

Federal Initiative and Local Responsibility

While much of the Bay Area program's impetus comes
from federal policy and funds, "208" is regarded
primarily as a state and regional program requiring coordination among levels of government, the "critical
element being local government and the people and
interests it represents." 8 Implementation at all governmental levels is stressed, but major responsibility is
assigned to local and regional bodies. To involve local
citizens and governments, ABAG is allocating nearly $1
million in "pass through" 208 funds for local preparation of surface runoff plans, review of policies on land
development, and efforts to stimulate citizen participation.
With respect to the regional approach, George Hagevik
ofthe ABAG staff, noi:ed that the authors of the Federal
Water ?ollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 sought
to foster comprehensive regional agencies that could
implement 208 mandates; but their intent was not
realized. As for the possibility of creating a comprehensive regional agency in the Bay Area empowered to
implement the EMP, Hayward Mayor Ilene Weinreb,
chairperson of an ABAG policy committee. commented
that the "Bay Area might be ready for such a move" after
the 208 process is complete. She thought cities, counties
and special districts probably would not "give up powers
unless forced to do so," and suggested that agency
leadership and ABAG staff meet to "look into ways to
combine separate permit procedures" and adminis-

If we are going to come out of this 208 process with
a different set of rules for land-use decisions .. .
won't someone or something have to change? ... If
we just rearrange the same old pieces of the governmental puzzle, will it make a new and better
picture? 5

Despite some misgivings about implementation, there
is substantial agreement that the three major Bay Area
problems in the EMP assignment - air and water
quality and solid waste management - must be
addressed together and that those problems have been
intensified by the absence of common policy. Time constraints will force the EMP to focus first on technical,
short-run preventive measures, designed to arrest and
reverse harmful practices. Further in the future lie such
considerations as major new regional policies for land
use and transportation. Meanwhile, the EMP goal is to
win conditional approval for an on-going planning and
implementing mechanism.
As EPA regional administrator Paul De Falco, Jr.
commented:

tration.~

... the existing water quality institutions... are
taking pollution control as far as technology will
carry it. But the problems that remain require
programs that involve major public policy choices
regarding life style. land use. resource use and
conservation, growth and tax base. and equity in
the distribution of benefits and costs . ...
[emphasis supplied]8

Dianne Feinstein. a San Francisco County Supervisor
who chairs the EMTF, acknowledged that environmental
decisions are political choices - tradeoffs - made by
locally elected officials working together. She stressed the
politics of plan implementation, and described local
regional responsibility as the willingness to take appropriate actions to solve environmental problems.' 0

De Falco further noted that:

Focns on Three Critical Problems

... the Clean Air Act requires land use and transportation controls to reduce growth in auto
emissions to ... maintain ... air quality standards.

Under the federal water pollution laws, · EMTF
planning will attack significant problems of air and
water quality and solid waste management. Examples of
water quality problems as outlined in a 1976 ABAG
report include: (1) polluted Bay Delta outflows including
contaminated agricultural drainage; (2) polluted runoff
and overflows from sewage treatment plants that
endanger water supplies; (3) significant annual fish kills;
and (4) contamination in parts of the Bay, requiring bans
on harvesting of shellfish.' 1
The ABAG report also outlined critical air quality
problems, including such interrelated matters as
(1) failure to meet air quality standards, especially in the
Livermore and Santa Clara valleys (where federal and
state standards were exceeded at least 90 days in 1975);

It has become clear~ . . that in some of our major
metropolitan areas. such as Los Angeles or the Bay
Area, the long term solutions to the air quality
problem must be solutions to the area's land use
and mass transit problems . ... [emphasis suppliedJ7

Consequently, implementation of the EMP may focus
on both immediate and future improvement of water and
air quality and solid waste management through back-up
measures. These relate to controls by other agencies, and
take into account the implications of land use and transportation. Note that air quality is included in the Bay
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(2) pollution from stationary sources such as service
stations; and (3) other motor-vehicle related pollution.
In addition, the report described the Bay Area's solid
waste management problems including: (1) more than 10
million tons of unsightly, environmentally disrupting
wastes produced annually in the region. with most
current sites likely to be filled within less than 10 years;
(2) pollution caused by disposal sites located near ground
and surface waters; and (3) Jack of regional management
programs for disposing of hazardous and toxic wastes. ' 2

sources of water pollution. The institutional
analyses conducted for these studies were often
rather mediocre. whereas financial analyses were
sometimes more innovative.... [these] agencies
which began work in advance of ABAG are not
really ahead in concept. and ... may need to look at
ABAG's work instead. 11•
He suggested that several other combinations of characteristics were "not found in any other 208 program."
including the degree of local governments' involvement.
the complexity of the 9-county governmental network.
the considerable industrial development ringing the Bay.
the area's interest in comprehensive approaches. and the
primary emphasis on implementation. ' 6
According to Seraydarian. the older 208 programs
(funded in 1974) and the Lake Tahoe 208 program
(funded in 1975) lacked adequate money and had only
interim guiding regulations. Further. tight schedules
forced the use of consultants instead of regular staff.
limited program and planning efforts. and worked
against continuity.
The Bay Area 208 program. funded in 1975. benefited
from a subsequent court-ordered release of 208 funds
nationwide. Along with other financing. 208 monies had
been impounded by the Nixon administration. The 1972
act also intended that plans for location of local waste
treatment facilities under Sec. 201 proceed simultaneously with Sec. 208 and consider its land use
planning implications. But all except two of the area's
current 201 projects are already located and exempt from
EMTF's initial 208 planning. All future 201 projects.
however. must be included in the EMP. and approval of
future federal grants for construction of treatment
facilities is contingent on their conformity with the 208
plan. 17
Court action also mandated a final completion date of
November 1978 for the Bay Area's and all other 208
plans in the country. Fmally. the court required EPA to
issue improved regulations and policy statements: these
were made available to 208 projects by November 1975. 18

ABAG's Selection for the 208 Assignment
ABAG was formed in 1961 to bring together cities and
counties on a voluntary basis to deal with mutual
problems. Since 1964 it has engaged in regional planning
studies supported principally by federal funds under a
variety of programs. This effort resulted in ABAG's
existing Regional Plan, a policy guide for 17 different
functions related to the region's environmental. social
and economic well-being. 13
A combination of desirable structure and effective
performance gave ABAG visibility as a likely candidate
for the 208 planning job. First. most 208 agencies nationwide are Councils of Governments (COGs). Further. like
other COGs, ABAG had federal authority for the A-95
grant review. covering local governments' applications
for nearly 200 federal aid programs. ABAG had made
vigorous use of its discretionary review powers. particularly with respect to wastewater developments (sewage
connections). Finally. ABAG had worked effectively
against an ill-advised Las Positas "new town" proposal
in smog-prone Livermore Valley.
When the rime came to establish the scope of 208
planning and designate the 208 agency. the State Water
Resources Control Board at first appeared reluctant to
select ABAG. In anv event it soueht to limit 208 olannine
to two relatively
sub-areas: Richardson Bay in
County, and the Livermore Valley in Alameda County.
When the EPA pressed for~ larger scale. 208 planning
was expanded to include virtually the entire drainage
basin of San Francisco Bay. and the state water board
agreed to ABAG's designation. Thereupon most of the 9
Bay Area counties passed resolutions of intent and all
signed contracts to participate with ABAG in the 208
effort.

tiny
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Organizing ABAG's Environmental Management
TaskForce
In September 1975. the Air Resources Board
established a 9-countv Air Quality Maintenance
Planning Task Force to' provide assistance in meeting
court-ordered federal clean air requirements. The
following January. ABAG modeled the 208 Environmental Management Task Force on the air quality group
and included most of its membership. Headed by Super·
visors Dianne Feinstein of San Francisco and John
Tuteur of Napa. EMTF's membership of 45 includes
city and county elected officials' 9 and representatives of
business. labor (especially the building trades). ethnic
minorities. agriculture and civic and environmental
groups.
Seven regional agencies are also represented: the Bay

EPA's Special Interest in the
Bay Area's Program
EPA had designated one hundred and seventy-six Sec.
208 programs nationwide by February 1977.'" but in
some ways the Bay Area program is unique. For
example. Harry Seraydarian. 208 project officer for EPA
Region IX including the Bay Area. noted that:
Many agencies began before ABAG. and the
earliest 208 plans concentrated ·largely on point

4

(2) improvement of air quality, through (a) back-up
measures promoting cleaner emissions, and (b) indirect
means such as improvement of transportation facilities
with consideration of motor-vehicle-related pollutants
linked to developments, e.g., shopping centers with large
parking lots; and
(3) improvement of solid waste management, through
better practices such as (a) improved methods of
disposal, especially of hazardous wastes, and (b) coordinated site location.
When the initial Environmental Management Plan is
ready, ABAG will recommend to the Governor and to
EPA (a) the methods of regulation, (b) the agencies to
carry out the plan, and (c) the manner of funding. The
plan will also specify the agencies that will be eligible for
future water quality grants. Moreover, the total plan will
be incorporated into ABAG's Regional Plan for future
Bay Area urban and regional growth.

Area Air Pollution Control District, the Central and the
North Coast Regional Coastal Zone Conservation
Commissions, the Metropolitan Transportation Commission, the San Francisco Bay Regional Water Quality
Control Board, the San Francisco Bay Conservation and
Development Commission and the East Bay Municipal
Utility District. In addition, one person represents the
Sub-Regional and Local Advisory Committee for the San
Francisco Bay Area Wastewater Solids Study Group- a
joint powers agency preparing a residuals (sludge)
management plan for sewage dischargers.
In pursuing its work, the task force has established
several technical advisory committees as well as four
principal subcommittees for (1) work program and
budget, (2) plan implementation, (3) assessment procedures (to look into social, economic and environmental
effects of carrying out the EMP) and (4) public participation. As noted earli!!!'· it was suggested that ABAG
look into ways to combine the administration of regional
agencies. In a small first step, an interagency management committee was established - with management
personnel from ABAG, MTC and the Bay Area Air
Pollution Control District - to meet every two weeks to
review progress on the air plannjng element.

Processing the Plan

ABAG and the EMTF have designed a complex
approval process for the Environmental Management
Plan, including informational notice and review by
affected parties, followed by action and approval. Notice
and inj(1rmation consist of (1) sending an integrated
draft plan to affected parties; (2) allowing up to 30 days
for EPA review and comment by local governments
including special districts, and informal review and
comment by all other interested parties (federal, state,
regional and local agencies and the public); and (3) in
early 1978, presentation to the ABAG General Assembly
and to regional agencies.
Action and approval include (1) hearings and approval
by EMTF and ABAG's Regional Planning Committee;
(2) public discussion and approval by ABAG's Executive
Board; (3) approval by ABAG's General Assembly,
tentatively scheduled for April 1978; (4) certification
consideration by the State Water Resources Control
Board by June 23, 1978; and (5) review and possible final
approval by EPA by November 1978.

The 208 Environmental Management Plan

An EMTF staff report outlined the status of the
Environmental Management Plan as of January 1977:
Surface Runoff: Contracts have been signed
with ... [Bay Area] counties to prepare surface
runoff plans .... Pass-through grants from ABAG
will fund the planning effort and public participajion.
Air Quality Maintenance Plan: A base year of 1975
has been selected for air quality data input and
LIRAQ [Livermore Regional Air Quality Model,
designed by the University of California's Lawrence
Livermore Laboratory] will be used as the prime
computer model for developing this plan.
Solid Waste Planning: County solid waste plans
have been reviewed. . . as the basis for the solid
waste portion of the EMP. An attempt will be made
to integrate the State Solid Waste Board's study
[Bay Area Solid Waste Management Project]
and the county plans. 20

Federal Funds and State-Directed
Water Quality Programs

The Bay Area's 208 water quality planning is not
starting de novo, but builds on prior efforts by such
agencies as the State Water Resources Control Board,
the San Francisco Bay Regional Water Quality Control
Board, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, EPA and the
Bay-Delta Water Quality Control Program (completed in
1969), and by local agencies concerned with discharged
wastes. Further, in addition to 208 planning, federal
funds support several related state-directed water
quality programs in the Bay Area. They include (1) basin
planning for water quality (Phase 1 was adopted in 1975
as the S.F. Basin Water Quality Control Plan and may be
amended by the 208 plan); (2) Sec. 201 planning for

As noted earlier, provisions for implementing the EMP
may focus on both immediate and future changes:
(1) improvement of water quality, by (a) back-up
measures promoting cleaner waste discharges and
construction of treatment plants, (b) related measures
like street sweeping and containment of dairy wastes to
reduce runoff pollution, and (c) controlled location of
new sewage facilities that indirectly allow addition of
pollutants from industrial and housing developments;
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waste treatment. as a basis for locating future sewage
facilities and allocating future federal construction
grants; and (3) continuing waste discharge permit
pro~-:rams under the National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System. 21

implementation plan for California- which includes the
Bay Area basin plan- a power it exercised in 1974. That
disapproval was based on the plan's failure to designate a
structure for implementation, and because emission
controls were not considered effective for maintaining air
quality. EPA's disapproval made the federal agency
responsible for both the Bay Area and the statewide air
quality programs with respect to federal standards. As
indicated earlier, EPA has subsequently delegated some
responsibilities to ABAG, some to ARB and some to the
Bay Area Air Pollution Control District. Significantly
however, ultimate authority in these matters remains
with EPA. 22
In compliance with the federal Clean Air Amendments
of 1970 requiring air basin plans, the ARB has divided
the state into 14 air quality regions (air basins). for the
purpose of maintaining California and national air
quality standards. EPA in turn, with ARB recommendations, named the Bay Area air basin an air quality
maintenance area, based on findings that there are major
air pollution problems in the five southern Bay Area
counties (Alameda, Contra Costa, San Francisco, San
Mateo and Santa Clara), with the remaining four
counties (Napa. Marin, Solano and Sonoma) contributing substantial wind-driven pollutants.*

State and Regional Authority
Over the Area's Water Quality
The State Water Resources Control Board and the 9
regional boards have authority over California's waterpollution control programs. Before the 1972 federal
program came along the state board had already taken
responsibility for regional basin planning. In its first
phase under the 1972 law, the Bay Area's basin plan
dealt with water quality. and the nature and volume of
discharged wastes acceptable under federal standards. It
set priorities for constructing and modifying treatment
plants to meet regional needs. Recognizing urban and
nonurban runoff as heavy contributors to pollution. it
did not yet identit)· this condition as a problem. Instead,
the main thrust wa~ to specify treatment levels that
would protect "beneficial uses" of the Bay. its tributaries. and the region's ocean waters from pollution by
discharges at specific locations (point sources), e.g.,
industrial or municipal sewage outlets.
As the second phase of basin planning begins, pollution problems are being addressed from additional
quarters: ABAG's EMTF is focussing on surface runoff
in urban and nonurban areas, and the implications for
land use. 208 planning will also deal with miscellaneous
sources of pollution. such as wastes discharged from
water-borne vessels. oil spills, septic tanks and salt water
intrusion. Finally. ABAG will recommend basin plan
amendments to the regional and state water control
boards. When the EMTF's Environmental Management
Plan is completed and it has won EPA approval, under
the 1972 law it will then have a life of its own.
The object is to provide adequate water quality for
recreational use and aquatic-life protection by 1983.
California anticipates reaching this goal through the
combined contributions of the state's 208 programs, the
construction of wastewater treatment facilities, and the
operation of its permit program to control pollution
sources.

The Bay Area Air Pollution Control
District's Related Activities
The Bay Area Air Pollution Control District is the
region's principal regulatory agency for air quality. In
recent years its measures have been tightened in response
to increasing environmental concern. Thus under
pressure from EPA and ARB. the district is implementing regulations to ban new stationary sources of
pollution that would violate national ambient air quality
standards. With ABAG it is studying trade-off measures
that would permit development.
An example of the district's stronger stance is its rejection of Dow Chemical Company's proposal to build a
large petrochemical complex in predominantly rural
Solano County. Bolstered by ARB's pressure to consider
environmental factors, in August J 976 Air Pollution
Control Officer Jud Callaghan announced the district's
preliminary denial of Dow's permit request:
. .. emissions from the plant would interfere with
the attainment of federal and state mandated air
quality standards in the vicinity. The action was
taken pursuant to the District's permit regulation
[No. 2] which was adopted in accordance with state
and federal requirements. 23

An Intergovernmental Program for the
Region's Air Quality
Air quality planning- one of the EMTF's three functional assignments- will continue and complement the
work of the California Air Resources Board (ARB), the
Bay Area Air Pollution Control District, ABAG and
EPA. Several regional bodies, including the MTC and
the air pollution control district, will help EMTF with air
quality planning. If, however, the resulting plan fails to
win ARB approval. under the 1970 clean air amendments either the state ARB or the federal EPA may
prepare a plan for the region.
Further, EPA has the power to disapprove ARB's state

In another example of outside pressure, in August
1976 the ARB responded to an EPA initiative by
changing its Bay Area regulations to require that. before
• A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY: Dc~ignation of a .. ,tate air hasin"
or "air quality region" doe~ not necessarily imply the exi\tcncc of
pollution problems. On the other hand. dc~ignation of an "air qualitv
muintenunce area" means that observed pollution levels ha,c hccomc
criticaL
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issuing permits. the district's control officer ;:onsider
pollutants that might move to other air basins. That year,
ARB also authorized $220,000 for a study of potential
effects other major proposed developments would have
on air quality in the Bay Delta area and the Central
Valley.
In addition to the district's air regulations. and in the
interest of better air quality, transponation measures are
also being considered. Prime examples are MTC's Transportation Control Plan 24 and local parking plans like
those of San Francisco, San Jose and Oakland.
Finally. in addition to these efforts to consider transportation's influence on air quality. the effects of the
energy .crisis and President Carter's proposed energy
program must be acknowledged. In time these are sure to
have major impacts on transportation and air quality in
the Bay Area and elsewhere.

Program Review and Plan Approval

The Program Review Board is an important
mechanism set up by the State Water Resources Control
Board to assist EMTF and to monitor the 208 program.
Meeting every two months. it brings together some of the
principal policy people, including representatives of the
state water resources, air resources and solid waste
management boards, the state Office of Planning and
Research, the regional water board, and the federal
regional EPA office. with ad hoc participation by ABAG
and EMTF. The group's principal contribution is
probably its potential for resolving interagency conflicts.
In the past, it has dealt with questions respecting 208
plan preparation, progress and scheduling, as well as
representation, and coordination of multi-agency efforts.
ABAG and the EMTF have expressed concern about
the power of the state water board and EPA to alter the
plan after its submission for certification and approval.
But the state agencies and EPA have assured ABAG that
the initial plan will not be changed unilaterally. Instead
the agencies will respond by indicating aspects they find
inadequate or unacceptable. How the local governments
and regional bodies will respond, or how they will agree
on the necessary plan revisions, remains unclear.

Solid Waste Management: The Third Program

The 1972 federal water quality act amendments and
the EPA guidelines provide the framework for the
EMTF's solid waste planning. which also coordinates
work launched by California's Nejedly-Z'berg-Dills Solid
Waste Management and Resource Recovery Act of
1972. 25 Although less generously funded than air and
water planning, EMTF's solid waste effort will collect
data on waste quantities as well as disposal sites,
processes and needs. It will look at problems of
hazardous and toxic wastes, and evaluate measures for
recycling and recovery of resources. Finally it will take
ABAG's growth policies into account in seeking to integrate solid waste policies with air and water quality
programs.
Other Bay Area programs contributing to the 208 solid
waste management element include: (1) individual
county plans developed in compliance with the 1972 state
solid waste act noted above; (2) a state-directed Bay Area
Solid Waste Management Project; (3) the Sec. 201 wastewater solids (sludge) study by a group of major dischargers (the East Bay Municipal Utility District being
the lead agency); (4) a study of sites for hazardous and
toxic wastes, directed by the State Water Resources
Control Board; and (5) the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers' management programs for dredging and for
removing floating debris.
Further contributions mav come from the national
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 noted
earlier, although this must wait for congressional
approval of funding. When implemented. the new
federal act will require three types of waste disposal
planning: institutional. to determine who does what;
regulatory, to establish compliance controls for
hazardous-waste disposal, especially on land; and
planning for facilities and services. Presumablv, this act's
implementation will be coordinated with that· of the Bay
Area 208 program's solid waste element.

Implementation

Noting the crucial roles of state and federal agencies in
review and approval, ABAG President Lenard Grote also
raised questions about the plan's implementation. He
pointed out that the state air and water boards and the
federal EPA actually function as "real regional governments," and that all three are "implementing law, and
ABAG is not." Grote also foresaw the "distinct possibility" of state legislation giving these agencies further
functions and powers:
[Since] one of the major objectives of the 208
plan ... [is] to redo the institutional arrangement in
the Bay Area ... some of the cities and counties
might have some. . . functions curtailed and ...
other governments might have. . . powers
added ....
Reacting to such wholesale shifts of power to higher
level bodies, Grote urged local-regional alternatives.
Thus instead of a paramount state-federal role in plan
implementation, he seemed to contemplate legislation
like the Knox bills. noted earlier, which proposed to
strengthen ABAG. He suggested that
a better way of rearranging the institutional
relationship ... would be to increase the powers of
cities and counties and ABAG, and enable ABAG
to play a role of coordinating an effective program
in this environmental field. 26
Further, while distribution of power and authority
represent a major issue in structuring a management
agency, the allocation of costs and benefits is equally
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crucial if not more so. An experienced planner warned
that "if... cost/benefits impacts ... are uncertain" then
a "push to retain power" can be expected.
A workable implementation system, he thought. would
include at least one and preferably ·all three of the
following "pieces of authority" at the regional level:

NOTES
Summary of major acronyms and abbreviated references used in this
paper:
ABAG:
ARB:
BCDC:

the authority to. . . guarantee an integrated
areawide system,
(2) the authority to finance the system, or
(3) the authority to establish cost allocation rules.
(1)

COG:
EMP:
EMTF:
EPA:
MTC:
NEPA:
A-95:

This authority may exist by state legislation, by
joint powers action, or by contractual agreement
among the local governments.
The most important ingredient [however] is a
commitment to do something - either from the
top down as a federal/state commitment or from
the bottom up as a citizen/local elected official
commitment. Lacking both of these, nothing is
going to be accomplished. 27

Sec. 201:

Sec. 208:

To sum up, the Bay region still faces several implementation dilemmas. How much will the necessary
measures cost, and how will the costs be distributed?
Should the plan be implemented by existing governments
through ad hoc arrangements? Should a stronger ABAG
or regional agency be set up? Or should state and federal
bodies play a greater role in charting the region's future?
In any event, the plan's ultimate effectiveness rests
largely on the realism of the 208 decision makers in facing
the problem of implementation. If major institutional
reforms are needed, can agency anxieties and self-protective responses allow significant special-district
"sovereignties" to be ceded to a stronger regional
mechanism? If not, can 208 planners devise a means of
multi-agency collaboration for sustained implementation, capable of surviving the controversies that
inevitably surround important decisions on a region's
future?

Association of Bay Area Governments
Air Resources Board- state
San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development
Commission
A voluntary regional Council of Governments. like
ABAG
Environmental Management Plan
Environmental Management Task Force - established
byABAG
Environmental Protection Agency - federal
Metropolitan Transportation Commission
National Environmental Policy Act
directive from the federal Office of Management and
Budget. implementing advisory review and comment on
federal grant applications
Sec. 201 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972. Concerns location, design and
construction of sewage treatment facilities
Sec. 208 of the same federal act. Requires areawide and
statewide planning to achieve federal clean water
standards

' Their performance, vigor and effectiveness in protecting the Bay
Area environment vary considerably. For example, observers have
criticized the Bay Area Air Pollution Control District for moving into
strong pollution control only after urging by the Environmental Protec·
tion Agency and others; and the MTC for failing to fulfill its direct
legislative mandate to relate air quality concerns to transportation
planning.
2 Examples of environmental measures include the Oean Air
Amendments of 1970 (Public Law 91-604), the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972 - Sec. 208 (Public Law 92-.500), the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-580),
and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA, Public Law
91-100).
• Association of Bay Area Governments (hereafter ABAG), Environ·
mental Management Program, Water Quality Ana(vsis and Pollution
Control Strategies, Issue Paper No. 1, Water Quality Management
Plans(December IS, 1976), pp. 2-3.
• Paul De Falco, "What is 208? What Will It Do?" Bay Area
Monitor (Berkeley: League of Women Voters of the Bay Area (hereafter
LWVBA), Transportation Alternatives Project, with the assistance of
the Metropolitan Transportation Commission, October 1975), p. 3.
• Holly O'Konski's remarks at the Seminar 76: 208 Planning
Conference. "Benefit or Boondoggle," Davis, California. March 24 and
25, 1976, pp. 2. 3, and 4 (variously paged) (State Water Resources
Control Board in cooperation with U.C. Davis).
• De Falco's remarks. ibid., p. 6.
7
Ibid., p. 7.
8 "What is 208???" LWVBA, newsletter, Bay Area Voter (January
1977), p. 1.
• ABAG. Legislation and Governmental Organization Committee,
Minutes (October 28, 1976), p. 2. ABAG. a Council of Governments,
includes only cities and counties, not special districts.
0
' U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Water Planning Division
WH-554, WQM: Highlights o.f"September 1·2 /1976/ Meeting (undated)
p. I.
"ABAG. Prospects: Environmental Management Program for the
San Francisco Bay Region. public information report (1976), p. 1.
Shellfish harvesting has been prohibited in San Francisco Bay since
1930.
•• Loc. cit.
13 Prior to 208 planning. functions covered in ABAG's Regional Plan
included: air quality. airport systems, community development,
comprehensive health services. criminal justice, employment. growth
management, housing. human services. ocean coastline use, open
space, seaports. seismic safety, solid waste management. transportation. water quality and water resources. Updating wiiJ include housing,
environmental quality, economic development, health. safety and
recreation.

Future Planning and Broader Goals
It should be acknowledged that planning comprises a
process, not an end product; thus plans are never really
finished, but need regular revision, periodic rethinking
and continued implementation. How can this essential
process be handled when the current 208 work is ended?
In short, 208 planners face twin institutional questions:
(1) how can their plans be carried out, and (2) who will
continue the planning process?
In seeking to free the region from pollution and waste,
208 planning is an early phase of the quest for long-term
goals. The latter should be built on residents' social and
economic aspirations, and quality-of-life concerns. These
go far beyond achieving a clean environment, precious
though this is.
Future plans will have to treat these broader issues.
Meanwhile, if 208's environmental planning works
reasonably well, it will be a big step ahead for the San
Francisco Bay Area.
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22
In 1974, EPA tried to implement its air quality maintenance plan
in the Bay Area and elsewhere through control of indirect sources of air
pollution. using parking regulations. Proposed regulations included on·
and off-street facilities and extended to developments that involve
parking, e.g., subdivisions. commercial buildings and shopping
centers. .Congressional and public pressure exerted locally and in five
other affected areas nationwide - as well as fund limitations for fiscal
1975-caused the EPA to suspend the program in July 1975.
23
Bay Area Air Pollution Control District (BAAPCDl, newsletter.
Air Currents. 19 (8) (August 1976). p. 3. In one month's rime the district
studied the matter and denied the permit. Dow Chemical Company
first appealed the denial, then withdrew the appeal and cancelled the
project, with the intention of allocating the petrochemical activity
among its existing plants. Subsequent reports, however, alleged tbat
the disrrict had stalled. and erroneouslv stated that Dow would therefore build a replacement facility in "another country. A company
spokesman later noted (in a telephone interview with IGS May 3. 19n)
that some published accounts of the episode had been garbled, and that
the plants Dow is building in Brazil and Canada had been under
construction before the permit was rejected.
Although the air pollution district acted promptly, the full governmental review process for Dow"s project was admittedly protracted and
involved many agencies. Partly in response to such complaints of delay
and at the request of the Governor's Office of Planning and Research
(OPR), ABAG and OPR have joined to conduct an indusrriallocation
study of the Bay Area; ABAG has established a siting task force as a
subcommittee of its Regional Planning Committee. The principal
assignment is to survey available industrial sites and environmental
standards for industrial development is well as existing environmental
policies and permit procedures.
24
Although no program has been proposed. the EMTFs
ABAGIBAAPCDIMTC joint technical advisory committee on air
quality planning could suggest a variety of progrants to reduce air
pollution: limit growth in environmentally vulnerable areas; encourage
development patterns that reduce the number and length of auto trips;
set criteria for the location, size and timing of major new growth areas;
reduce automobile-related air polluting emissions; control types offuei
and methods of using it; and encourage the use of public transportation.
25
SB S. Cal. Stars. 1972. Ch. 342.
28
ABAG. Executive Board Meeting #172 (July IS. 1976). Summary
Minutes. pp. 17-18.
27
Robert C. Einsweiller. "'What is Needed to Implement the
Management Plan?" distributed at a 208 workshop, Burlingame.
Calif.. May S-7. 1976, sponsored by the National Association of
Regional Councils (Washington. D.C.). Ensweiller is a planning
consultant in Minneapolis and an observer of the Twin Cities region.

Re: ABAG. see also Victor Jones. "Bay Area Regionalism: Institutions. Processes. and Programs." in Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. Substate Regionalism and the Federal System.
vol. II: Regional Governance: Promise and Performance (May 1973),
pp. 75-110; Jones. "Bay Area Regionalism: The Politics oflntergovernmentai Relations.'' in Kent Mathewson. ed., The Regionalist Papers
(Detroit: Metropolitan Fund, lnc., 19741. pp. l2lS·l'RS; ana Jones.
Regional Home Rule for the San Francisco Bay Area: Concepts for
Constructing a Workable Plan. Regionalist Paper No. 2 (prepared for
Associated Regional Citizens. September 1968), pp. 1-4.
14
Interview with Harry Seraydarian, February 24, 19n.
15
ABAG. Environmental Management Task Force Plan Implementation Committee. Summary Minutes (February 16, 1977), p. 1.
14
See note 14 above.
17
With EPA's concurrence. the State Water Resources Control
Board has directed that EMTF not consider any ongoing Sec. 201
planning, because resulting interference might delay funds needed for
Bay Area project construction. Thus. while the EMP is being drafted, it
will not affect current 201 planning; but as noted. after completion all
subsequent 201 planning must conform with the EMP. The manage·
ment plan must also show how and by what agencies 201 planning will
be carried out after the initial plan is completed.
1
• Coun order issued in 1974 in Natural Resources Defense Council.
et aL v. Train. et aL. District Coun. D.C.. Civ. Act. No. 74-!485. See
Fed. Reg. 40 (230), Friday, November 28. 1975, p. 55321. Grants were
ordered for designated areawide 208 water quality management
planning, and states made responsible for assuring that 208 provisions
are implemented in areawide and state planning areas. Plans are to be
submitted to EPA bv Nov. 1.1978.
•a Elected officiais representing city and county governing bodies
include: one city and one county official from 7 of the counties; in
addition. at the recommendation of the task force. the two non-ABAG
Bay Area counties of Solano and Sonoma were each allotted two city
memberships because each of the other 7 counties had both a city and a
county representative. (Subsequently, Solano County decided to join
ABAG as of July 1.I9n.)
20 L WVBA.
newsletter, Bay Area Monitor (January 1977),
"Update... Environmental Management Program." p. J. EPA and the
Air Resources Board have approved the EMTF contract with the Bay
Area Air Pollution Control District for use of the 2-part URAQ Mode!.
URAQ Part 1 is a "dispersion model" for measuring the generation
and transportation of major air pollutants. URAQ Pan 2 is for measuring photochemical pollutants. such as stnog.
21
The National Pollutant Discharge Eiminarion System (NPDESl.
authorized under Sec. 402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972. includes EPA-approved stare permit programs.
State and regional boards issue permits specifying levels of waste
treatment.
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AIR TRADE-OFFS: A 'IT.EMPTING TO
RECONCILE INDUSTRIAL. GROWTH
AND CLEAN AIR IN CALIFORNIA

regulations governing new facilities are intended to prevent air quality from deteriorating further in alreadypolluted areas, while sufficient additional controls are
developed for existing sources to achieve and maintain
air quality standards.
~n December 1976, the EPA issued an interpretative
ruling that for the first time stated a policy on air tradeoffs (discussed below). Individual air trade-offs have
:Uso been negotiated in some parts of the country, e.g.,
m Oklahoma, where a new General Motors facility is
~der constructio~ after making plans to reduce pollution from nearby oil refineries.
California is the first state that has attempted to set
up consistent statewide procedures for air trade-offs.
Because this state has long been in the forefront of air
pollution policy, the direction it takes in implementing
air trade-offs is likely to have nationwide impact on the
development of air trade-off policy. Accordingly this
paper will examine provisions of an air trade-off bill
currently under legislative consideration in California:
Assembly Bill 471, authored by VictOr Calvo, who
chairs the Assembly Committee on Resources, Land
Use and Energy.
The trade-off concept in turn raises questions about
implementation. For example, what constitutes a net
improvement in air quality, and within how large a
~eographic area will trade-offs be allowed? Will pollution become a valuable commodity, with industries in
effect buying and selling the right to pollute?
Before dealing with these questions, and with the
California bill, the following discussion examines the
way air trade-offs fit into California's overall effort to
meet federal clean air standards.

Aileen Alfandary
Research Associate,
Institute of Governmental Studies

Introduction
California is currently wrestling with the question of
how to accommodate industrial growth in parts of the
state that still have not met federal clean air standards
designed to protect public health. The dilemma confronts many areas throughout the nation where air quality standards are being violated, but at the same time industrial expansion is expected to provide new jobs. The
growing intensity of the conflict, as seen in the San
Francisco Bay Area, exemplifies the need for comprehensive ongoing planning and implementation related
to "environmental protection and •.. consequent social
and economic impacts."'
Meanwhile, however, the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has devised a short-to-middlera_nge approach to air pollution controls that it hopes
will help reconcile the otherwise conflicting objectives
of industrial growth vs. progress toward achieving clean
air. Under this policy emission offsets apply to modifications of existing facilities, and air quality trade-offs to
construction of new facilities. For the sake of simplicity,
this paper will refer to both emission offsets and air
quality trade-offs as "air trade-offs."
The general concepts behind air trade-offs are as follows: A new industrial facility, or an addition to an
existing facility, may be built in an area where pollution
levels violate air standards only if the new source ( 1)
has the "lowest available emission rate" (roughly the
lowest emission rate actually achieved anywhere by a
similar plant), and (2) reduces air pollution from existing sources in the same region (i.e., by paying for the
clean-up of existing sources) sufficiently that air quality
is actually improved. In other words, there must be a
net reduction in air pollution. Air trade-offs and other

The Federal Clean Air Act
Air pollution control is a three-tiered system of regulation, with federal, state, and regional or local levels.
The federal government sets certain clean air goals-national ambient air quality standards-and retains
ultimate authority to implement them. States are allowed to set stricter standards than the federal requirements, but not weaker. A state must have a state implementation plan detailing how it will attain clean air
standards.

1 See Ora Huth, "Managing the Bay Area's Environment: An Experiment .in Collaborative Planning." Public· Affairs Report, 18 (2)
April 1977 (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, University
of California) , p. 1.
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In California, each of the 47 air pollution control districts submits to the California Air Resources Board
plans for meeting state and federal air standards. The
collection of air district programs forms the basis for
the state plan, which also includes a statewide plan for
controlling mobile pollution sources, e.g., cars and

sources that would interfere with the attainment or
maintenance of air quality standards.
Industrial Growth. in Dirty Air Basins
The implications of new source review led to the
concept of air trade-offs. The EPA said that allowing
additional industry to locate in an area whose air was
already dirtier than federal standards would be a violation of the Clean Air Act. But many labor and business
groups opposed the policy of refusing to allow further
development in regions violating air standards, calling it
a "no growth" measure.
The Clean Air Act did not specify how this conflict
might be resolved. At the end of 1976, the EPA interpreted the act to allow the establishment of an air tradeoff policy. As noted above, the EPA issued an interpretative ruling on air trade-offs in December 1976, and
then held hearings around the country. The EPA said it
hoped its ruling would focus congressional attention on
the issue ;md lead to amendments to the Clean Air Act
that would give guidance on how to allow trade-offs.
Meanwhile in California, the state Air Resources
Board adopted new source review regulations for the
South Coast Air Quality Management District.' Part of
that rule was interpreted to mean that air trade-offs between different companies would be permitted. But the
Bay Area Air Pollution Control District had its own regulations dating back to 1973, and those rules did notallow trade-offs between different companies. In short,
California had a series of inconsistent air trade-off rules.

trUcks.

The state can devise regulations for an air district, or
revise the district's plan if it is considered inadequate.
Similarly, the federal EPA has final review and approval
authority over the state plan. California's implementation plan is currently under revision because the EPA
judged that part of the procedures for meeting air standards was inadequate. Parenthetically, it should be
noted that there are practical limitations to the EPA's
authority. The EPA cannot force a state to implement a
specific program if the latter chases not to do so. The
EPA may itself implement such a program, but would
probably find the administrative requirements prohibitive in terms of costs and personnel needed.
The federal Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970
specified certain air standards that were supposed to be
met by 1975, but the 1975 deadline has now been delayed twice. First the EPA granted California and other
states an extension until June 30, 1977. California, like
many other states, did not meet clean air standards in
1977, so in the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act
Congress granted another extension, this one until1982;
for areas with severe oxidant or carbon monoxide problems, the extension may last until 1987. The recent
federal amendments also require states to submit new
implementation plans by 1979 detailing how air standards will be met.
California is certain to have a problem meeting those
standards, especially with respect to photochemical oxidants in both Southern California and the Bay Area,
. and particulates in Southern California. In addition,
California must meet standards for sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and nonmethane hvdrocarbons.
Some air pollution obse~ are concerned that if
the 1979 version of California's state implementation
plan provides controls that would be inadequate to meet
air standards by the 1982 and 1987 deadlines, then further industrial growth would have to be prohibited after
1979. However, considering the political forces favoring
continued industrial growth, it seems highly unlikely
that Congress would proscribe all industrial growth after
1979 simply because air standards were not going to be
met. After all, two deadlines for achieving clean air have
already come and gone and industrial growth is still
with us, although admittedly under certain restrictions.
In any event, each state implementation plan is already required to contain rules regulating the construction of "stationary sources" of air pollution such as industrial facilities, power plants, or the proposed oil terminal Standard Oil of Ohio wants to build at Long
Beach in Southern California.
These rules constitute what is called new source review. More precisely, all state implementation plans
must contain regulations requiring preconstruction review, and disapproval of new or modified air pollution

Pressure For A. Califomia Policy

Pressures soon developed for an integrated statewide
policy on trade-offs in California. Concerns became
more urgent when Dow Chemical Company withdrew
its plans to build a huge petrochemical complex in Solano County, citing environmental roadblocks. There
were several environmental problems with the Dow proposal, including worker health and safety questions. But
much attention focussed on the Bay Area Air Pollution
Control District's denial of an air quality permit. Largely
in respon·se to the uproar created by Dow's withdrawal,
the state Legislature decided to move toward streamlining industrial siting regulations. One consequence of
that effort was the development of air trade-off regulations that, under certain circumstances, would allow
major industry to locate in an area where air quality
standards are already violated. Of course, air trade-off
rules enacted by the state will also require review by
the EPA before they can be applied.
The most recent version (August 5, 1977) of the
California trade-off bill leaves much of the decisionmaking on specific issues to individual air pollution control districts, thus continuing to give local rather than
state government primary control over stationary
sources of pollution. This policy is to the liking of the
California Council for Environmental and Economic
'The Long Beach area, where (as mentioned earlier) Standard
Oil of Ohio is negotiating for permission to build a huge terminal to
receive Alaskan oil, is included in the South Coast Air Quality Management District.
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A similar issue arose over how to set the baseline for
air pollution trade-offs. Key questions were, how much
pollution clean-up was required by law, and how much
clean-up could be used for trade-offs? Setting the baseline was complicated by the fact that California's state
implementation plan had been disapproved by the EPA
as inadequate to meet federal air standards. A new state
plan had not yet been approved, so it was unclear how
much pollution clean-up would be required by law, and
how much would be available for use in trade-offs.
This issue was resolved with the 1977 amendments to
the Oean Air Act, which said that a state's current implementation plan would be the baseline, until 1979
when a new and presumably adequate state implementation plan must be prepared.

Balance ( CCEEB), a business-labor organization and
one of the major groups lobbying on the bill. CCEEB
prefers leaving development of regulations to local
boards rather than to the state Air Resources Board,
which has the reputation of devising stricter air pollution
controls. Another provision tightens control of existing
facilities by requiring that regulations will periodically
be made more stringent to reflect advances in pollution
control technology. This provision was backed by the
Sierra Club, the other major group lobbying on the bill.
It may be helpful next to consider specific issues involved in implementing air trade-offs, along with provisions of the current version of AB 471. The suggestions
of the Sierra Oub and CCEEB wll also be noted.
Calculating Air Trade-Offs

Only "Major" Sources Must Comply With Trade-Offs

How is the amount of pollution available for tradeoffs to be calculated? Is it to be based on an existing
facility's actual emissions, or its allowable emissions?
The issue arises because some facilities are not currently
polluting to the maximum extent allowed by law. For
example, if a source were allowed to emit up to 500 tons
per year of sulfur dioxide, but was emitting an average
of only 460 tons per year, should the extra 40 tons be
available to use as a trade-off? If so, a region could experience a net increase in actual air pollution as a result
of a trade-off arrangement. The present version of AB
471 specifies that trade-offs will be based on actual or
allowable pollution, which ever is less. In any event,
defining a source's actual emissions remains a problem.
One air pollution control official said that the determination would be technologically difficult, because refineries, for example, emit different quantities of air pollution
from month to month and year to year, depending on
the grade of crude oil being processed and the refined
product being made.
As noted, EPA regulations state that each trade-off
must have the effect of improving air quality. That is,
the reduction in pollution mnst exceed the added pollution emitted by the new source-but how much greater
must it be, i.e., how much must air quality be improved?
CCEEB originally suggested a 1.5 to 1.0 trade-off ratio.
Under this formula, if a new source emitted 100 tons of
sulfur dioxide per year, it would have to reduce pollution from the old source by 150 tons per year. CCEEB
later changed its position to advocate that each air pollution control district devise its own formula, taking into
account the severity and frequency of violations of the
particular air quality standard. The California bill contains such a requirement.
The Sierra Oub suggested requiring a trade-off equal
to what the new facility would emit, plus an increment
equal to the proportion by which ambient air standards
were currently exceeded. For example, if sulfur dioxide
standards were being violated by I 5 percent, a plant
that would emit 100 tons of sulfur dioxide per year
would be required to reduce another source's sulfur
dioxide emissions by 100 tons plus 15 percent of 100
tons, or a total reduction of 115 tons per year. (The
question of geographic boundaries within which a tradeoff occurs is discussed below.)

Air pollution control districts are responsible for
monitoring pollution emissions from individual sources,
as well as general air pollution levels. This is done two
ways: in-stack and ground level monitors measure the
emissions of individual facilities, while ambient air quality monitors measure the general level of air pollution.
However, air pollution control districts do not have
enough staff to monitor emissions for all small businesses. Moreover Congress and regulatory agencies have
generally agreed that not all small businesses should be
expected to spend the time, paperwork and money
needed to meet trade-off regulations. Thus a determination must be made as to which new sources will be required to comply with trade-offs.
The State Air Resources Board adopted a 25 tonsper-year (250 tons for carbon monoxide) definition of a
major source in the polluted South Coast air basin; EPA
regulations require trade-offs for any source that emits
100 tons per year for any air pollutant for which there
is an air quality standard (except for carbon monoxide,
which can be emitted at the rate of 1000 tons per year).
The EPA has stron!rlv encourae:ed states to use a lower
cut-off number "wh~r"ever resources permit," and is also
considering reducing its cut-off figure to 50 tons per
year ( 500 tons for carbon monoxide). The Bay Area
Air Pollution Control District says it has enough staff
to e~force the 50 tons-per-year figure."
The Geographic Boundaries

How far away can the new facility reach to obtain
trade-offs? The Sierra Oub argues that a new facility
should be required to obtain a trade-off from another
facility at the same site or a contiguous location. Thus
it says that a trade-off with a more distant location
should be allowed only if the new source can prove that
the emission reduction will have an actual effect at the
site of the new plant.
In contrast, CCEEB proposes that a facility be
allowed to obtain a reduction from anywhere within the
• Even the 100 tons per year figure would cover vi"ually all oil
refineries and chemical facilities. For example, Bay Area Air Pollution Control District figures for 1975 show that Standard Oil of
California's refinery in Richmond emitted more than 12 tons per
day of sulfur dioxide. See Bay Area Air Pollution Control District,
Air Pollution and the San Francisco Bay Area (June 1977).
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same air quality control region, if it cannot find a tradeoff in the immediate vicinity. If that is not possible,
CCEEB says the source should be allowed to obtain a
trade-off from a nearby air quality contrOl region, if the
reduction would have an impact on the air basin where
the new source was being constructed. This suggestion
would allow air at the site of the new facility to become
dirtier, as long as air at another site in the same air basin
became somewhat cleaner.
The Bay Area Air Pollution ContrOl District has discussed still another plan. For primary contaminantsparticulate matter, carbon monoxide and sulfur dioxide-trade-otis would be possible within a five-mile
radius of the proposed new source. For hydrocarbons
and nitrOgen oxides, trade-offs could be possible anywhere within the air quality control region.
The state bill originally specified a five-mile radius,
but later adopted the CCEEB proposal, allowing tradeoffs outside of the immediate vicinity of the new source.
However, the local districts must make a finding that a
trade-off will not result ..in any substantially adverse
impact on the ambient air quality" in the immediate
vicinity of the new source. This provision may still conflict with the EPA's current interpretative ruling, that
the tnide-off for pollutants such as sulfur dioxide, carbon
monoxide or particulates must be made at the same site
or in the immediate vicinity.
Exemptions and Pollution Credits

A concept called banking would allow a pollution reduction-in excess of that required by federal, state or
local law-to be employed as an air pollution "credit"
for future use by the same owner or operator.
The EPA's preliminary ruling does not allow banking
because it does not represent progress toward clean air.
The Sierra Club opposes banking for the same reason.
On the other hand, CCEEB contends that banking is
fair. and eliminates any possibility of deterring operators
of existing sources from making improvements in their
operations. The Bay Area Air Pollution Control District
also favors banking. In its current version, AB 471
would allow the owner or operator of an existing source
to hold onto pollution credits for banking purposes for
five years.
There is agreement that facilities ordered to switch
from gas to fuel oil should be exempted from the tradeoff requirement. The Sierra Club holds that if air quality
declines because of a fuel switch, the state implementation plan should require additional cut-backs from other
sources.
CCEEB suggests that industries be exempted from
the trade-off requirement whether the fuel-switching is
voluntary or involuntary. CCEEB also originally argued
that new power plants should be exempted if they could
not find offsets. contending that supplying electricity is
a necessary public service. But CCEEB later dropped
that proposal.

off policy. For example, the Clean Air Act allows states
to pass regulations that are stricter-but not weaker:than the federal regulations devised by the EPA. Thus,
as noted, the EPA defines a major source as one that will
annually emit 100 tons of a pollutant, but it also says
that ..States are strongly encouraged wherever resources
permit to utilize a lower cut-off number." States considering bills considerably stricter than the federal rules
may, however, face local political opposition. A strong
nationwide constituency opposes a stricter air pollution
law for a number of reasons, including the fear that jobs
will be lost. The Clean Air Act amendments recently
passed by Congress also reflect moves toward leniency
in clean air regulation.
The air trade-off bill was proposed in part because
California's regulatory climate had been labelled "antibusiness," and it was hoped the bill would provide consistency in state regulation. But if California passes
controls (as in AB 4 71 ) that are much stricter than the
federal interpretative ruling, California may be accused
of still being hostile toward business. Conversely, the
state's affinnation of strict reguhitions may provide political support encouraging the EPA to do likewise.
Confrontation with the EPA

According to federal law, California's air trade-off
regulation must be at least as strict as the EPA's rules,
and if the EPA finds portions of the state rules weaker,
they can be suspended. The EPA is itself in the process
of reviewing its own air trade-off rules. If California, the
state known to be the nation's toughest on air pollution,
passed weaker rules than those of the EPA, the latter
might find little political support for its policy and weaken its regulations.
For example, the EPA ruled out pollution creditsbanking voluntary air pollution clean-up so that it can
be used against future trade-offs. The EPA wants to see
steady progress toward achieving clean air standards,
and regards pollution credits as backsliding. But the
California bill allows pollution credits. Thus either California or the EPA will have to back down on this issue.
Reaching the Limits of Technology?

Air trade-offs may provide an incentive for industry
to devise technological innovations that reduce air pollution. Certainly little incentive exists today. But as technology reduces emissions, the cost of eliminating the remaining increment tends to rise. Moreover, there is likely to be a limit to major technological breakthroughs
in reducing air pollution emissions. Thus the ultimate
result of an air trade-off policy could theoretically be a
no-growth policy. Realistically, however, there is no
evidence to suggest that Congress is ready to sacrifice
industrial growth for the sake of achieving strict air
standards designed to protect public health. On the contrary, proposals for restrictive measures, other than improvements in technology, have been shortlived. For example, in 1973, under prompting from the EPA, the
Bay Area Air Pollution Control District issued "indirect
source review" regulations for projects such as shopping
centers that attract large volumes of traffic. But the EPA
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came under political pressure and backed away from indirect source review, and the Bay Area regulations were
rescinded by the local district one week after thei~ adoption. In the 1977 amendments to the Oean Atr Act,
Congress admonished the EPA not to require indirect
source review, but told the local districts that they may
do so.
Air Pollution As A Commodity
Another problem will arise if all extsung sources
should refuse to allow trade-offs by new enterprises
seeking to locate in a region. In some cases, the new
source might be a potential competitor of the existing
source, or the latter might wish to retain its "extra" air
pollution for future development. Such eventualities
could put the existing business community in the awkward position of being labelled "anti-business."
Even more interesting is the question of whether a
polluting industry could sell its right to pollute. If_ for
example, two enterprises were trying to locate in the
same region, could an existing facility sell its pollution
to the highest bidder? Conversely, if nearby residents
wanted to reduce pollution levels once and for all, could
they pay for the installation of pollution control equipment, and then retain the pollution credit? As the air
trade-off policy is applied in succeeding cases, less pollution will be available that can be readily traded off, and
the value of the pollution still available will surely rise.
Perhaps it is not absurd to foresee a day when pollution
could become simply another commodity that is bought
and sold.
Some Further Questions
Some observers of the air pollution scene have already expressed concern that an air trade-off policy may
result in worsening air quality rather than reducing air
pollution. For example, in Pennsylvania a Volkswagen
assembly plant is under construction after receiving a
rather questionable trade-off involving reduction of the
solvent content of asphalt used in street paving. Many
other states already use low-solvent asphalt and some air
pollution officials believe this pollution control measure
probably should not have been available for negotiating
a trade-off. The net result is a pollution reduction that
probably ought to have been required anyway, plus the
addition of a new polluting facility.
Another potential problem concerns the geographic
area in which pollution trade-offs can be negotiated. The
current version of the California bill seems to allow a
trade-off between a new source located at one spot and
an existing source at another-if the local air district
staff verifies that the region where the new source is
locating will not suffer "any substantially adverse impact. ... " The determination of what constitutes a sub- ·
stantially adverse impact is obviously open to argument.
It will probablv be left to the judgment of the local air
district staff, who often come under heavy pressure from
industrial facilities seeking to locate at a particular site.
Still another ouestion remains to be resolved: How
broadlv should the emissions associated with a "new
source" be defined? An important precedent may be set
14

in the case of the SOHIO oil terminal proposed for the
port of Long Beach. Both the South Coast Air Quality
Management District Board and the California Air Resources Board are demanding that SOHIO offset the additional emissions caused by generating the electrical·
power requirements of the facility.
A Final Appraisal
The ultimate success of air trade-offs in reducing air
pollution will depend on the specific regulations devised
to implement the concept, and on the enforcement of the
regulations. The roundabout nature of the trade-off approach points up the political difficulties in cleaning up
the air. Logically, a more direct approach would require
old facilities to install the best pollution control technology currently available, bring air up to standards, and
then selectively allow new sources to build; but there
·
are two problems with this.
First, existing sources argue that installation of such
pqllution control technology may be economically im. pOssible unless financial inducements are offered
through subsidies, tax write-offs and other means. Existing sources are supported by the convention that they
have vested interests entitling them to due proce$S before their rights (including the right to pollute) are revoked.
Second, government has depended on industries to
develop pollution control technology. Regulations therefore need to be "technology-forcing" in nature, inducing
technological improvements not otherwise likely to be
developed and installed. Some hope that air trade-offs will
provide such inducements. Once the effectiveness of the
new technologies is proven, air pollution control officials
can then require other existing sources to adopt them.
In short, a combination of trade-off policy and improved technology may make it possible to further mitigate some pollution while allowing limited additional
industrial growth. However, a single-purpose regulation
snch as air trade-offs should not be expected to solve
the nnderlying conilict between unlimited development
of energy-intensive, polluting, industrial growth, and
protection of public health and environmental values.
For example, a recent staff task force report from
the Association of Bay Area Governments anticipated
some decrease in Bay Area smog under current regulations until 1985. After that, however, the report noted
that growth will cause smog to rise rapidlv until it
reaches almost twice the national federal oxidant standards. (This estimate is based on the pollutants emitted
by autos and other mobile sources as well as stationary
sources.)
·
Accordingly questions need to be asked about achieving future land-use patterns and population distribution
that can facilitate shorter journevs to work and greater
use of mass transit. Questions should also be addressed
to the kinds of economic growth that regions or localities want to encoura~e.
Energy planners in industrv, government and environmental circles are now debating how best to deal
with the nation's future ener~;V needs. Should energy
needs be met bv hi!!h-technology, capital-intensive nuclear reactors and coal power plants, or by using "soft"

energy technologies such as solar and wind, as well as
by conservation?
The same kind of debate can focus on future economic growth. Should emphasis be placed on high-technology, energy-intensive, polluting development, or lowtechnology, labor-intensive, low-polluting forms of economic growth? What forces tend to encourage each
type of growth?
These are the kinds of questions that need to be addressed in considering the future of air quality. The
controversy over air trade-otis may help shed light on
the basic unresolved issues now emerging, issues we are
likely to confront "head on" in the next five to ten years.
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THE CALIFORNIA DESERT:
MULTIPLE USES AND CONFLICTING DEMANDS*

since the late 1960's, until now there has been little information on uses of the desert in teaching and research.
This article attempts to provide some of the additional
information needed to evaluate the California Desert and
its future.
Emphasis is placed on use of the desert for teaching
and research, and on its related values for scientific pursuits. These in tum, can also have highly practical appli·
cations. For example, as we shall see, botanical research
in the desert promises to provide valuable alternatives to
resources that are endangered or in short supply. Moreover desert research may help in the development of plants
and practices that can make arid lands more productive.
While these possibilities deserve further exploration, they
are only mentioned here and acknowledged.
In addition to teaching and research uses, the article
also touches on such other multiple-use demands and claims
upon the desert as recreation, including both traditional
uses (e.g., hiking) and new-style mecllanized uses (e.g.,
off-road vehicles-ORVs). Not discussed are industrial
and residential uses, as well as the significant impact of the
grazing of livestock, which in many desert areas can have
a very destructive effect.
The article assesses compatible and conflicting activities,
and examines some of the consequences of conflicts.
Finally, it summarizes some of the measures that can
improve desert management, and suggests several fu'rther
steps urgently needed if the desert environment is to be
safeguarded from man-caused deterioration.

Robert C. Stebbins
Professor of Zoology and Curator in Herpetology

Theodore J. Papenfuss
Graduate Student in Zoology
Florence D. Amamoto
Research Assistant
University of California, Berkeley
Museum of Vertebrate Zoology

Introduction
Traditional views of deserts have often dismissed them as
desolate wastes having little or no value, and consequently
expendable for whatever purposes humans might wish to
put them to. Thus the California Desert 1 has been the site
of such activities as large-scale military maneuvers and races
between off-road vehicles, which are severely damaging to
desert environments unless carefully managed to limit destruction and minimize long-term harm.
We are learning now that far from being only barren,
useless wilderness, desert lands are in fact valuable resources
that are also highly vulnerable to injury and slow to recover. Thus recognition is growing concerning the California Desert's great intrinsic worth, which may be irreplaceably lost through inadequately regulated impacts of man
and machines on the fragile, arid environment.
For some years, the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) has been surveying the desert's physical and biological characteristics; the kinds, places, and duration of human
activities there; numbers of persons involved; use conflicts;
and the nature of impacts on the natural environment.
Although the BLM planning process has been underway

Ufe Forrns Olaracteristic
of the California Desert
The California Desert is a region of unusually diverse
natural terrain. It contains over I ,200 species of higher
plants, and over 350 species of wild native vertebrates.
More than 100 of the plant species are unique to the
region; those of lower plants (fungi, lichens, and the like)
and the invertebrates number in the thousands, but have
been little studied. The variety of life forms is due to

*This report is adapted from "Teaching and Research in the California Desert," Research Report 78-1, forthcoming, Institute of
Governmental Studies.
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climatic and historical factors, as well as the varied topography and soils of the desert. The region contains
remnants of an ancient hydrologic (water drainage) system
that existed during the last pluvial period (a time of substantial runoff from precipitation or glaciers), when rivers
and lakes occupied the area.
Many desert organisms are highly specialized to withstand extremes of aridity, temperature and light. The
seeds of some annual plants may lie dormant for many
years until conditions of moisture and temperature are
suitable for germination. Then spectacular wildflower
displays occur.
Of great interest to the evolutionary biologist are the
many isolated remnant populations of plants and animalsfish, amphibians, reptiles, mammals and invertebrates.
These populations often occur at remote springs, on humid
mountain tops, or in the sand dunes or playas (desert
lakes-usually dry). Some are classed as rare or endangered.
Sand dunes, now a favorite playground for dunebuggy
enthusiasts, are among the most interesting desert habitats.
They contain specialized sand-burrowing insects, lizards,
snakes and unusual plants adapted to life in shifting sands.
On the dry lakes, eggs of fairy shrimp (primitive crustaceans) can withstand a decade of desiccation, then hatch
into beautiful translucent aquatic creatures when the
playas fill after rare storms.
The desert records much history, from prehistoric
to recent, in its rocks and land forms. Many fossil deposits
have yielded remains of plants, shells and vertebratescamels, sabre-tooth cats, three-toed horses, mastodonsand lesser forms. Signs of human occupancy stretch back
some 12.000 years and hint that man may have been pre·
sent 50,000 to 80,000 years ago. These earlier occupants
left a rich archeological heritage. The California Desert
appears to contain the world's largest collection of pre·
historic art.
Thus, the desert provides extraordinary opportunities
for both basic and applied research. Some examples
drawn from zoology, botany and paleontology are des·
cribed briefly below.
Research in Zoology
Studies conducted by students and staff of the University of California Museum of Vertebrate Zoology at
Berkeley provide much of the available base-line information on the distribution and habits of land animals
(terrestrial vertebrates) in California.
The Museum's
collections of California vertebrates are the world's largest
and constitute a major resource for studies in vertebrate
evolution and for monitoring effects of environmental
changes on wildlife. For example, the Museum's wild
bird egg collection helped document the eggshell-thinning
effect of the pesticide DDT, and contributed to the studies
that Jed to its ban.
Despite many years of exploration, new species and
varieties and isolated populations of known forms continue

to be found in California, as, for example when a new
species of salamander was discovered in 1973 in the arid
Inyo Mountains. The Gila Monster was discovered recently
in the little-studied eastern Mojave, the flrst convincing
evidence for naturally occurring populations of this animal
in the state.
The Museum's research program includes studies aimed
at the protection and conservation of the state's vertebrate
animal life, with special concern for isolated small populations. Some are officially classed as threatened, rare or
endangered. Others remain to be discovered.
In addition to distributional and natural history studies,
many zoological investigations have focused on the physiological adjustments made by desert animals in coping
with environmental extremes, e.g., thermoregulation and
water metabolism. Professors and students at the University of California at Los Angeles and Riverside and Fullerton State University have been particularly active in such
research. In addition, the work of UCLA's Raymond
Cowles and his student Charles Bogert, who studied the
role of temperature in the lives of California Desert reptiles,
stimulated a major investigation of temperature in the
physiology, behavior and evolution of vertebrate animals.
Thermal studies in the California Desert provided advances
in understanding mechanisms of temperature control,
and contributed to the understanding of such diverse
phenomena as the evolution of fur and feathers and the
extinction of the dinosaurs.
The invertebrate life of the desert is abundant, varied
and different from that of most other arid lands of the
southwest. Much speciation (development of different
species) is still occurring. There are often major differences in species populations from canyon to canyon in
many desert mountain ranges, and from dune to dune.
Of particular interest are the ants. There are many
species and they occur virtually everywhere in the desert.
They are extremely important in food chain relationships.
Studies of ants are being conducted at the Deep Canyon
Desert Research Center of the University of California,
Riverside, and by researchers at U.C. ·Berkeley and elsewhere.
Important interactions occur between ants and plants.
In the Vizcaino Desert of Baja California, we found that
cactus (Opuntia) roots appeared to selectively penetrate
the nests of the harvester ant (Pogonomynnex) where
moisture and nutrients were concentrated. A similar
relationship perhaps exists between ants and plants in the
California Desert.
Invertebrate studies are also important in the development of biological pest controls. In the desert, experiments have shown the desirability of large natural buffer
zones, about 10 miles wide, around agricultural areas.
Wild, free-living predatory and parasitic insects move into
the agricultural lands and attack the crop pests. A great
reservoir of natural control species is thus available to
cope with pest flare-ups.
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Research in Botany
The dearth of information on desert plants is so great
and the probable benefits of their study so promising,
that the National Science Foundation has given extensive
support to the New York Botanical Garden for a major
study of vegetation of the southwestern United States.
Studies of the creosote bush, a dominant desert shrub,
conducted by Frank Vasek, Hyrum Johnson, and Leone!
Sternberg, University of California, Riverside, are of special
interest. Aerial photographs reveal that some creosote
bushes are arranged in rings. The rings appear to have
originated from a central point by vegetative segmentation,
and the individuals that compose them are members of a
clone (asexually reproduced offspring of a single individual). Cloning seems to be facilitated when the root crown
is covered by wind or water-borne soil. The center of the
bush dies, presumably due to drought, and new growth
develops at the periphery. Ring expansion is very slow
and is estimated to be less than 1 millimeter (mm.) a
year, even under optimal conditions. Undecayed wood
at the center of a ring 30 centimeters (ern.) in diameter
was found to be approximately 580 years old;2 another
contained wood approximately 700 years old (radiocarbon dating). A ring 20.7 meters (m.) in diameter,
or about 68 feet, has been observed, estimated to be
over 5,400 years old. 3 It is speculated that some of the
rings go back to the time when the creosote bush was
first establishing itself following the last ice advance, some
10,000 years ago. The slow growth rate and plant fragments in fossil middens of woodrats,4 which indicate vegetation changes in the desert, have contributed to this
theory. Painstaking biochemical studies have been performed to determine whether or not the members of a
ring are all parts of an original fragmenting and expanding
plant. These tests have required repeated trips to the desert
to study the same rings.
Desert botanical research has important practical- aspects. Deserts are the largest remaining uncultivated
land areas with potential for agricultural expansion. Much
of the world's arid lands research is going on in Australia
and the southwestern United States, especially in the
Mojave and Colorado Deserts. Many desert plants may
prove to be important crop species. An example is jojoba
(Simmondsia chinensis) under cultivation in Israel and the
U.S. as a livestock forage plant and as a source of liquid
wax from its seeds.5 The wax can replace sperm whale
oil (obtained from an endangered species), an oil used in
machinery that operates at high speeds and temperatures.
At this stage all desert varieties of jojoba are considered
important because it is not known which may prove most
suitable for crop development.
Also of interest is the photosynthetic process in "fourcarbon" plants.6 Many desert species are of this type,
including the salt-bushes (Atriplex). Four-carbon plants
utilize a four-carbon cycle of photosynthesis, and have
certain anatomical differences from three-carbon plants.
The four-carbon plants appear to represent an evolutionary

adaptation that provides high-efficiency photosynthesis,
and enables many of these plants to function in climates
that are hot and dry. Experts suggest that four-carbon
plants now found in desert environments could play a
central role in developing agricultural practices and crop
varieties especially adapted for use in areas having limited
water supplies.
Halophytes are also under study. They are salt-tolerant
plants that take up salts from soils and exude the excess,
or remove it by dropping parts of their structure as they
dry. The desert box thorn (Lycium) and Mesembryanthemum are examples. Salt tolerance is valuable to aridland agriculture in the development of crop species, weed
control and soil desalinization. The U.S. Salinity Laboratory at Riverside is investigating such tolerance in crop
plants. Halophytes can be grown to remove salts from
soil, thereby preparing the soil for more productive species
with less salt tolerance. The alkali flats are important
desert research areas for the study of halophytes, but the
sites are also attractive to ORV recreationists.
The University of California at Riverside and the Australian National University have undertaken a joint study of
the ecology, physiology and biochemistry of cacti in
native and favorable exotic environments. One aspect of
the study pertains to the action of cactus stomates, the
"breathing pores." The stomates open at night when cacti
take in most of their carbon dioxide, storing it in an acid
medium, for use the next day in photosynthesis. In the
daytime, water loss is minimized by closing the stomates.
Cacti are used as forage plants. In some areas (Africa,
Australia, portions of the southwestern United States)
cacti constitute pests, and knowledge of their physiology
is important for control purposes.

Research in Paleontology
Some of California's richest vertebrate fossil faunas are
found in the Barstow and Ricardo formations. These are
famous, internationally known sites, about 12 miles north
of Barstow, and near Red Rock Canyon, respectively,
containing priceless scientific and educational resources
that cannot be duplicated anywhere else on earth. Paleontological exploration of these areas goes back to 1911,
and study of the rocks at Ricardo to 1871. (The Barstow
Formation is the namebearer for one of the 17 major subdivisions of mammalian evolution over the last 60 million
years in North America.) Each yielded approximately 100
kinds of extinct plants and animals, and additional new
material is coming to light. The Barstow beds contain over
200 localities; those of the Ricardo over 450.
Studies on fossil animals in the desert have been conducted by the University of California, California Institute
of Technology, the American Museum of Natural History,
the Los Angeles County Museum, and the U.S. Geological
Survey. The desert has also contributed greatly to the
paleobotanical investigations of Daniel Axelrod, Professor Emeritus, at the University of California, Davis. More-
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over paleontological research in the desert is growing in
importance as new sites are discovered and old ones are
more intensively worked.
Teaching in the Desert
In the desert as elsewhere research and teaching are
closely allied and major educational centers located in the
desert itself attract many students and teachers: notable
are (1) the Philip L. Boyd Deep Canyon Desert Research
Center, (2) the Living Desert Reserve at Palm Desert,
Riverside County, (3) the Barstow Unified School District
Research Station near Hinkley and (4) the California Desert
Studies Consortium station at Soda Springs, San Bernardino
County. Participants in the programs of these centers work
not only at the centers themselves, but often range widely
into other parts of the desert.
To ascertain one recent year's use of the desert for
teaching and research, the writers conducted a survey (in·
eluding elementary, junior high school, high school,
college and university use as well as special groups) from
October 1975 to June 1977 _7
With respect to colleges and universities, approximately
500 questionnaires were sent to nearly all California state
colleges and universities, all campuses of the University of
California, most community (or junior) colleges, and most
private universities and colleges, with a focus on life science
departments.
(1) One hundred and ninety respondents estimated a
total of 47,617 person days (p/d) of use in teaching and
12,522 in research. (Information is inadequate to estimate
statewide use.)
(2) A total of 201 sites were visited.
(3) Common topics taught were biology, natural
history, ecology, plant taxonomy, herpetology, ornithology, entomology, environmental studies and mammalogy.
In addition, of the 41 State Chapters of the National
Audubon Society contacted, 14 reported desert use and
estimated a total of 8,838 p/d. We also surveyed desert
use by 9 museums, natural history organizations, and other
nature-oriented groups; they reported 3,997 p/d for a
combined total of 12,835 person days.
Perhaps more unexpected is the extent to which California's public and private schools make use of the desert
for teaching purposes. At this level, the survey and its
results were as follows:
(I) Most of the public and private schools in 8 Southern
California counties in or near the desert (part of Los
Angeles County excepted) were queried as to teaching
use. Approximately 3,000 questionnaires were mailed.
Three hundred and thirty-five respondents estimated a
total of 132,374 person days of use. We project actual
use to have been at least 182,000 p/d. Adding spot-check
returns from elsewhe.re in the state to projected use, brings
the total to over 183,000 p/d. (There are insufficient
data to estimate statewide use.)

(2) Many additional schools would go to the desert
if funds, transportation and other needs were met. Out
of 1,082 negative returns, 683 (63 percent) expressed
such a desire.
(3) A total of 187 specific sites of use, widely distributed over the desert, were reported.
(4) Topics most commonly studied were general science
and biology by elementary schools and biology and geology
by junior high schools and high schools.
Total Estimate for
Desert Educational Use
Combining information reported by precollege, higher
education and the organized groups, we obtained a figure of
207,328 p/d; adding to this our projected public and
private school use, we estimate a minimum of 256,892 p/d
of educational use of the desert by this group of respondents (548 persons) during a recent average year (since
1975). We calculate our margin of error in interpreting
results as less than 4 percent. The public and private
schools and colleges and universities together, visited a
total of 272 sites in the desert.

Human Impacts and Demands
Upon the Desert
Until quite recently the desert remained relatively undisturbed by man's activities. But now the pressure of
rapid growth and ·economic and recreational demands
threatens natural environments. The desert faces the same
fate that has befallen many other natural places in the
United States and elsewhere. Situated near high density
population areas in Southern California, the desert serves
as a safety-valve, relieving some of the effects of crowding
and the pressures of city life. Its own rigors and the fact
that its values were little known, once protected it from
substantial intrusion by civilized man. However, with the
popularization of campmobiles and off-road vehicles which
provide comfort and mobility, the desert has become
readily accessible even in remote areas, and is attractive
for outings to large numbers of people.
Moreover, increasing demands for energy have intensified the search for sites for solar, geothermal and atomic
plants. Powerlines, housing and agriculture are on the
increase, and overgrazing has seriously disturbed natural
environments in some parts of the desert. Many of these
developments conflict with each other, as well as with
traditional, usually benign, uses of the desert, such as
"on foot" recreation, sight-seeing, picnicking, tent-camping,
nature study, and teaching and research.
Desert lands are particularly vulnerable to mechanical
disturbances, overgrazing, and other kinds of human-related
impact. Activities that damage or destroy soil structure
and vegetation increase water erosion and wind erosion.
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Dust can be expected to increase,8 accompanied by property damage, soil loss, and perhaps increased health
hazards. 9 Following the Barstow-Vegas motorcycle race,
November 30, 1974, dust fall in one area was recorded
as approximately 30 percent above normal during a period
of one month. 10 Plant cover-damaging activities may
increase the ground surface albedo (reflectivity), so that
light reflection from the desert surface may increase, with
possible significant effects on local climate.
In the open unobstructed terrain of the desert, environmental features lie exposed, readily visible, accessible and
vulnerable. The desert's antiquities are especially in danger.
These include ancient creosote bushes; rock pavements
that have remained undisturbed and exposed to the sun for
2,000 years; rare plant and animal species, remnant populations found nowhere else; fossil deposits; and prehistoric and historic human artifacts.

mented the decline in abundance and diversity of native
plants and animals in ORV areas in our wild lands.
Fossil sites are also highly vulnerable. Deposits of bones,
shells, petrified wood and leaf impressions have been ripped
apart, scattered and pulverized. Tell-tale "signs," small
fragments of bone and other fossil materials on the surface,
that may lead a scientist to a new fossil discovery, are
obliterated. ORVs have entered the famous Ricardo
deposits, the Coso beds, and other important fossilyielding areas.
There are more subtle damaging effects. The behavior
of resident animals that are still present in ORV use areas
may be altered. There may be damage to their hearing,
interference with their communication signals, and physiological stress induced by the noise, sight, ground vibrations
and fumes of vehicles. Desert iguanas experimentally subjected to motorcycle sounds at sound pressure levels
found in the vicinity of ORV "pits" (areas of concentrated
ORV "play") have suffered losses in hearing. 12 The
sounds are transmitted with damaging force even into
their burrows.
Many desert animals have daily routines of activity and
rest that provide little margin of safety if disrupted. In
warmer weather some desert lizards are active only about
six hours a day. Prolonged inactivity is necessary for survival when temperatures are high and humidity low. ORVs
disrupt patterns of foraging, breeding, thermoregulation
and rest. They cause burrows to collapse, destroying refuges that are crucial to desert animals in escaping environmental extremes. By breaking desert crusts they make
burrow construction for some animals difficult or impossible in some areas, because an intact crust is required to
prevent collapse of burrows near the surface.
Any natural area is a complex mosaic of unique biotic
features. No two square meters are quite the same. On a
quarter-mile walk in the desert, for example, one might
intersect a communal egg-laying site for lizards; a hibernation site for snakes; an amphibian breeding area; special soil conditions supporting growth of a community of
rare plants; a wash bank containing burrows of tortoises;
an isolated population of lizards found nowhere else in
the area; a fossil site; and many features unseen and unknown. All are fragile and readily damaged by crosscountry ORVs. Many are uncommon and several attract
prime, breeding adults to a limited area. Such a range in
biotic variety along short stretches in natural environments is not uncommon. Every time a vehicle is driven
off-road in such lands there is the risk of damaging or
destroying unique biological resources.
Moreover unregulated motorized intrusions do more
than damage the scientific and educational resources of the
desert. They also destroy important visual and esthetic
values. Thus a desert defaced by the long-lasting tracks of
off-road vehicles is no longer primal desert, but has lost
some of its worth as an undisturbed wilderness resource.
While environmental disfigurement is usually abundantly
clear to the layman's eye virtually anywhere mechanized

Effects of Conflicting Uses

Survey respondents were asked to ·note any disturbances
that interfered with their educational pursuits in the desert.
Off-road vehicles were ranked as most disturbing by all
educational groups, followed by vandalism (noted by
schools and college and university groups) and urban and
housing expansion (noted by organizations). Vandalism,
which includes damage to study sites and equipment,
and destruction of the natural objects of study, is aided
by the mobility of ORVs.
Of the 17 respondents who ranked disturbances, 14
scored ORVs as highest. Reasons for the high scoring of
uncontrolled ORVs are apparent. ORVs damage, and
sometimes completely destroy, the subjects of studygeologic features, soil, plants, animals, fossils, and archeological sites. 11 They make it difficult to fmd protected
sites for field observations and research. People who are
interested in nature study avoid areas where cross-country
ORVs occur because of the noise, dust and threat of injury to persons on foot.
Many desert studies require months or even years of
close attention, and a researcher's investment in his project
grows with time. This emphasizes the vulnerability of
desert research to the impact of vehicles.
Vehicles off-road can quickly degrade natural environments. A single motorcycle travelling 20 miles impacts
one full acre of soil; an average four-wheel drive vehicle
affects one full acre in only 6 miles of travel. Even a
single pass by an ORV, under some conditions, can start
deleterious changes in a natural community by spreading
weeds. Tumbleweeds (Sa/sola) have been found growing
in single motorcycle tracks. In some areas these plants
have significantly altered the entire biotic community.
F. R. Fosberg, an authority on alien plant species, has
warned that unless it is desired to change the character of
the vegetation and thus much of the landscape of the
desert, vehicular traffic in the desert must be limited to
established roads. A number of studies have now docu20

equipment is used in the desert, it is perhaps most visually
obvious during the periodic blooming of desert wildflowers.

Management Responses:
Plans for the Desert
Since the late 1960's, the BLM has been studying the
environment and use patterns in the desert. Environmental damage in many areas was obvious, and problems
of sanitation, littering, vandalism, traffic and personal
safety of desert users were pressing. The planning effort
was, in considerable measure, prompted by the very rapid
increase in off-road vehicle recreation that began in the
late 1960's. In 1973, President Nixon issued an Executive
Order, no. 11644, pertaining to ORV regulation and control (it was recently amended but without much change).
The Order called upon federal agencies to prepare regulations controlling ORVs on lands under their custody.
The planning process for the desert is now far advanced:
Areas have been set aside for ORV recreation; a BLM public education center has been established at Barstow,
California; and many critical habitats and species populations have been identified and protection areas designated.
Maps have been published showing places for recreational
vehicle use. The BLM now has police power and a staff
of desert rangers. Planning for the entire desert is to be
completed by 1980. However, at this date, rapid deterioration of the desert continues, chiefly because many
people using it lack understanding of its fragile ecology
and some are indifferent to its natural values. Consequently adequate regulatory policies and policing measures
are essential. This is principally the job of the BLM.
In addition to the desert, other BLM concerns include
the regulation of grazing, mining and other land uses as
increasing numbers of people strain the capacity of the
desert to withstand human impact.

Special Areas Needing Protection
There are now far more data available on the desert's
natural values and on the effects of various kinds of human
impact than when the BLM first began publishing its
management plans. The present report adds further to
this expanding data base.
The natural lands of the California Desert constitute
a unique teaching and research facility. There appears to
be no other place on earth where such a biologically and
historically rich desert environment has been subjected to
such breadth of study over such a long period by a variety
of academic disciplines. The desert is logistically well
situated for such investigations.
The arid lands of the southwestern United States, Mexico, and in particular, the California Desert, and the desert
lands of Australia and Israel are emerging as important
foci for arid lands research. These are the areas where
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manpower, funding and proximity provide unmatched
opportunities and where research and teaching programs
are exerting important guiding influences on the use and
management of desert lands throughout the world.
Our survey has helped identify a number of areas that
we believe should be set aside primarily for their wild
land values and long-term use for non-mechanized recreation, nature-study, teaching and research. These areas,
which already have a long tradition of such use, include:
(1) The Kelso Basin, including Kelso Dunes, Soda Dry
Lake, and flanking mountains-the Providence Mountains
and the Granites. This is an outstanding natural area, as
yet little disturbed by man. It. may well qualify for National Park or Monument status. The area presently vies
with Death Valley, Joshua Tree National Monument and
Anza-Borrego State Park in frequency of use by school
groups. Eighty-one respondents reported use of the areamore than listed for either Death Valley or Anza·Borrego
State Park.
(2) The Pisgah and Amboy lava flows. These lava areas
conUlin alternating patches of. pale wind-blown sand and
black lava, resulting in a remarkable mixture of sand and
rock-dwelling organisms.
(3) Jawbone Canyon area. This and nearby Red Rock
Canyon contain major fossil deposits.
(4) The Algodones Dunes and adjacent mesas. The
area has one of the richest dune biotas in the worldcontaining many endemic plants and animals. Major
sections of it should be designated for teaching and research and non-mechanized recreation.

Conclusion: Second Thoughts
on Multiple Use
Finally, it seems essential to re-examine the multiple use
concept as applied to open natural terrain, such as is found
in arid lands. It is not possible, in our judgment, to protect wild land values while at the same time allowing a
geographically fme-grain interplay of many uses. The broad
desert expanses notable for their silence, the delicate and
precariously situated biota, the lack of screening :vegeta·
tion, which in forests impedes sights and sounds of human
and vehicle activity, all call for special planning. It is
evident from our studies that off-road vehicle recreation
is incompatible with teaching and research in the desert.
The two activities must be well separated physically.
We have found that teaching and research in the environmental sciences have been major activities in desert
use for many years .. Like traditional forms of recreationhiking, camping and sight-seeing-educational use usually
leaves the land unmarred. The academic interests grade
into the traditional recreational ones; both are oriented
toward the land and its natural features. The knowledge
and appreciation of the desert gained through teaching
and research fosters respect for the land and develops
the wisdom to provide for its proper management.

The extensive use of the desert by nature-oriented
visitors and by school classes and researchers, which
is documented here, argues strongly for conservation of
the desert's natural features.
The future of our wild lands depends upon the development of a land ethic in which all citizens see themselves
as part of the earth's community of living beings, and assume a moral responsibility for that community's welfare.
There is also need for vigilance in seeing that governmental
agencies and other institutions adopt and implement
the protective policies necessary.
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COASTAL CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT:
BALANCING LOCAL AND STATEWIDE
INTERESTS

Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972. In fact, there
may be "national constituency" pressures, in addition to
those from local and statewide constituencies.
The zone's. ecology is declared by the state act to be
especially fragile and in need of extraordinary protection.
On the other hand, within this protective framework,
development is also to take place. Furthermore, development is intended to benefit the new, larger statewide constituency by contributing to its economic well-being,
as well as meeting some of its recreational needs.
Proposition 20-the California coastal initiative of
1972-set up a temporary state coastal commission. That
commission was empowered to regulate coastal development (1973 through 1976) while it prepared a plan for
California's coastal zone and adjacent territory. The plan
was submitted to the Legislature in December 1975, setting
forth a land use map and calling for the creation of a
permanent successor agency. In 1976, after debate and
compromise in which the Governor played a significant
role, the Legislature did establish a permanent state coastal
com111ission, and inserted it into the existing web of government, effective January I, 1977. However, the Legislature
did not adopt the plan or _the accompanying land use map.
Generalized though they were, the plan and map were
more specific than the environmental elements in most city
and county plans. Thus, if the California coastal plan and
map had been adopted, they would have had a strong,
official role in the future planning of the coastal zone. This
would have placed the coastal commission in a position
comparable to that of the San Francisco Bay Conservation
and Development Commission (BCDC) with respect to the
Bay and local governments around the Bay.

Lenard Grote
Instructor, Social Sciences
Diablo Valley College

Introduction
Under the California Coastal Act of 1976 the 68 cities
and counties of the state's Pacific shore are required to
draft plans for the conservation and development of the
coast. In preparing, adopting and implementing plans,
the local governments must relate not only to their usual
local constituencies, but also to a new statewide constituency. While admittedly some members of the new constituency reside in or own property within the jurisdiction
of coastal local governments, this larger group is not confined to coastal cities and counties. By definition the
statewide constituency includes all the people of California.
The coastal zone has been declared a resource to be
managed for the benefit of this larger constituency .1
The California Coastal Commission has been established
to see that statewide interests in the conservation and
development of the coast are protected. The commission
relates to the coastal cities and counties through a planning
and permit process-a process in which primary responsi·
bility for balancing statewide and local interests has been
placed upon the local coastal governments.
The conservation and development of the coastal zone
is further complicated by federal requirements that must
be met to assure continued funding under the Federal

Editor's note: Since 1961 Lenard Grote has served as councilman, and three times as mayor of Pleasant Hill, a city of 25,000 population
in Contra Costa County. Since 1974 he has been a member of the Executive Committee of the Association of Bay Area Governments. and in
1976-78 he served a two-year term as President of ABAG.
From the formation in 1973 of the North Central Coast Regional Commission-including coastal portions of San Francisco. Marin and
Sonoma counties-he has been a member of that commission, serving as the appointee of ABAG.
In 1976-77, while on sabbatical leave from Diablo Valley College. he spent some time in the Institute of Governmental Studies, reading
and retlecting on the implications of coastal governance as observed and interpreted from his vantage points as a local elected official. presi·
dent of a council of governments, and member of a regional coastal commission. This article outlines some of his principal conclusions.
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The new law requires coastal cities and counties to
develop their own local plans for their coastal areas, under
guidelines laid out by the state commission. The local
coastal plans (LCPs) must be reviewed and certified by the
state commission. 2 During the transitional period prior
to certification the state commission has permit review
authority over developmental proposals in the coastal
zone. It will also provide permanent back-up controls
over future modifications of local plans, over near-shore
and sensitive areas, and as a guard against failures in local
plan enforcement that would threaten statewide interests.
While it may appear that the powers of the state coastal
commission make it the governing body for the coastal
zone, this is not really true. Legislative and administrative
power for implementing the LCPs will be returned to the
local governments.

a great many people-have either a direct or indirect economic interest in local plans and zoning. At the same time,
local governments have a continuing interest in maintaining
and expanding their property tax bases. In this process
there are windfalls and wipe-outs for individuals, as well
as great debates over what is in the public interest for
the local constituency.
These conflicts are likely to continue to accentuate
the competition between different possible uses of land.
Usable land is fmite, and will grow scarce, especially in
the coastal zone, as additional ecological constraints are
imposed. This emphasizes the urgent need to fmd a new
balance between and among the uses ofland.
It is frequently asserted that the private sector
uses land as a commodity, while the public sector
preserves it as a resource. To these assertions are
often added the judgment that land as a commodity
is "used up" in pursuit of self-interest, whereas land
held publicly is retained as a resource for generations
to come. At least these are the arguments of political confrontation, but they do not help illuminate
man's relation to the land.
Virgin land is a source from which parcels are
drawn for many kinds of uses. For example, some
of it may be converted to agriculture and diligently
worked as farms. Other portions may be enjoyed
in a leisurely way as beaches for recreation. In both
cases, the land used becomes a commodity-serviceable in the processes of production and/or consumption.
There is no necessity for land to be laid waste.
Thus, if land is used so that its essential propenies
are preserved, it may be used again and again for
either production or consumption, and remain a
resource. The use of land makes it a commodity; its
C11Teful use makes it a resource.
If land is not mistreated, the resource may be
serviceable for generations. Through time it may be
owned in a variety of ways-by individuals or groups,
including the public. But the essential requirement
is that it be protected against destructive misuse,
and not treated as an expendable commodity.
Land planning-including policymaking by elected
and appointed officials-is an evolving art that attempts to systematize the careful use of both privately and publicly owned land. If the art matures and is
universally practiced, all land, including the coastal
areas of California, may be retained as a resource.

Traditional Land Use Planning and Zoning
Land use planning and zoning has grown in complexity
as new demands have been made on it. Traditionally, the
principal function was to sort out private and public uses
of land and integrate them so that the developing diversity
of land uses could proceed with a degree of what the
planners and decisionmakers consider to be rationality.
The state delegated the power to carry out the planning
and zoning to cities and counties, as an expansion of the
local governments' police powers to guard and promote
the community's health, safety and general welfare.
In the case of planning and zoning, each local government has its own body politic within the boundaries of
its jurisdiction. Accordingly each local government has
historically planned and zoned for its own constituency,
ROt for the health, safety and welfare of the population
of the state. This is the very essence of local home rule.
Until the coastal law came into effect, state government
had never established regulatory agencies or other machine·
ry to monitor the contents of local general plans.

Relation of Planning/Zoning to
Local Government Revenue
As local planning and zoning proceeded in California,
its effects on the land market soon became apparent and
impinged upon local governments' property tax resources.
Every local government is expected by its constituency
to provide services and finance them. The property tax
rate is applied against the jurisdiction's tax base-the sum
of the assessed valuation of all parcels of property within
the jurisdiction. Those values ultimately depend upon the
development that takes place on each parcel, which in turn
depends upon the planning and zoning policies applied to
each parcel.
Those who deal in the land market-and this inchides

Local governments are clearly in competition with each
other in trying to attract the kinds of land development
that fit into their zoning patterns and enhance their property tax bases. Such competition was augmented when the
state adopted its formula for subventing a portion of the
state sales tax to cities and counties. The formula gives
each local government a share of the total sales tax gener-
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ated by the stores, markets, warehouses, and other commercial activities within its jurisdiction. The local governments compete with each other for private facilitiesespecially regional shopping centers-to locate within
their boundaries. Since retail stores, for example, can
only locate on land zoned for such activity, each city and
county must work such zoning into its land use plan and
zoning ordinances.
For each city and county there is a relationship between
revenue from the property tax and the sales tax. Given a
level of expenditure for facilities and services, property
tax rates can be lowered only if sales tax revenue increases,
other things being equal. Again, every local government
is in competition with neighboring governments for available development, while a continuing set of arguments with
private developers goes on. Local governments hope to
gain public revenue from each development, but also to
put such constraints and conditions on developments as
are necessary to achieve the public goals laid out in the
general plan. All of this has been referred to as the "planning game."

Disenchantment with City/County Planning
Within the Coastal Zone
The responsibility' of cities and counties for regulating
land usage has gradually increased, and the goals to be
achieved by planning and zoning have expanded. City and
county responses to this responsibility have also varied
increasingly. Perhaps this tangle of responses-plus the
competition already noted-contributed to some Californians' disenchantment with local governments' ability to
plan and zone for the environment's protection. Or, perhaps it was the growing realization that ecological relationships are not confined to the boundaries of cities and
counties, but instead spread out in a seamless web across
geographic regions. At any rate, fueled by dissatisfaction
with city and county performance, environmentalist
groups united and campaigned successfully for Proposition 20. The measure took ultimate planning and development decisions affecting the coastal zone (i.e., in the
permit area) away from the cities and counties and gave
it to a temporary coastal commission.
Thus for four years, 1973 through 197 6, cities and counties lost power to control development in the zone's permit
area and the traditional planning game was interrupted.
While private owners and public agencies could still initiate
development proposals, ultimate governmental control was
exercised by the state commission. That commission had
no motivation to advance the goals contained in the 68
general plans and zoning ordinances of the coastal cities
and counties, nor any responsibility or power to provide
services and facilities within the zone. It was not accountable to voters in the 68 jurisdictions, nor for that matter
to the voters of the state; members of the state commission and its six regional commissions were appointed in a
variety of ways and were responsible for applying the
criteria contained in Proposition 20.
Motivation for each perrnit application came from a
developer. Environmentalists or others could oppose the
application at public _hearings conducted by the regional
and state commissions. In short, environmentalists had
a new political arena that was comparatively free from local
governmental, fmancial and other trade-off considerations.
Proposition 20 contained planning goals which for four
years were used in lieu of a general plan for the zone.
The fundamental approach of Proposition 20 was to leave
to the Legislature the fmal determination of how the
coastal zone was to be controlled. The temporary commission had the power to allow environmentally sound
development, and to prepare a plan for the zone for the
Legislature's consideration. The plan was to recommend
a permanent governmental and financial structure for the
zone. On schedule, in December 1975, the plan was laid
before the Legislature.

Mandated Responsibility to Protect
the Environment
To the complex set of planning and zoning practices,
the state has added another function: protecting ecological
relationships. Through the technique of Environmental
Impact Reports (EIRs), required by the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), each proposed development
must be analyzed from the standpoint of its impact on the
environment. All significant impacts must be mitigated
to a degree in one way or another. Such requirements
increase the incidence of wipe-outs for some private developers and add to the costs of development. On the other
hand, the requirements charge each local jurisdiction to
plan for the protection of the environment within its
area.
Some local governments-depending upon who had
been elected to local office-had been moving in this
direction prior to CEQA. With the mandating of this
function, all local governments must be concerned, but
there is still wide variation among the many cities and
counties. This aspect of planning and development also
enters into the local political arena as a basis for much
debate over the degree of environmental concern that is
in the constituency's interest. Once again, however, it
should be noted that the state has not established a statewide agency to set specific environmental standards, or to
monitor the content and quality of city and county environmental planning; nor has it declared the environment
within city and county boundaries to be a resource for
all the people of the state.
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Coastal Act of 197 6 Restores the Planning
Powers of Coastal Cities and Counties

already appear to be behind schedule. While the Legislature
can amend the .. due dates," even scheduling probably will
become a political question. As in all such matters, some
cities and counties may have fallen behind schedule deliber'\ately as a matter of strategy. In the interim, the commission does not perceive its role to be the actual drafting of
a plan to reflect statewide interests. Rather, it will be attempting to see that each of 68 LCPs reflects such interests-encouraging each local government to interpret the
act's policies for the benefit of a statewide constituency,
as well as for the benefit of each local constituency. This
is a monumental task.
The pressures of the old planning game still operate on
each coastal city and county government. Each must still
view every parcel of land in its jurisdiction, and existing or
potential development on it, in light of the government's
fmancial position. Each is still in competition with its
neighbor for potential beneficial development. Each act of
a local official is still accountable to the local voters. Few,
if any, could gain political strength locally by championing
the rights of a statewide constituency in the development
of an LCP, if it runs counter to irnponant local-constituency interests. Consequently as the 1981 certification time
draws near, the commission will probably be confronted by
countless debates with many if not most coastal cities and
counties. How decisively can the commission act as these
debates unfold?

From the opening of the 1976 legislative session it
was obvious that there was well organized opposition
to the commission's proposal as introduced. Included
was a coalition of developers and labor unions, as well
as the statewide organizations of counties and cities. Later
the League .of California Cities supponed the coastal
legislation, after changes were amended into the bill.
The first bill containing the nlan. though amended many
times, was killed in a Senate committee. A second bill
was also amended many times.
The legislation fmally enacted-The Coastal Act of
1976-does not include a state-adopted general plan for the
zone. Thus, in effect it lacks the fundamental planning
tool submitted by the temporary commission. However,
many of the policies upon which the temporary commission based its coastal map are found in the coastal act,
and coastal cities and counties are directed to incorporate
these into their local coastal plans.
Whatever its reasons, the Legislature in effect restored
to the 68 local jurisdictions coastal planning and zoning
responsibility. The coastal act's irmova tive steps are to
outline the planning goals and policies the coastal cities and
counties should include in their LCPs, and to establish a
permanent commission to monitor their initial drafting
and future amendment. Also the concept of a permit
procedure, with a public hearing for each coastal zone development, is retained but will be conducted in the ftrst
instance by local cities and counties. A limited appeal
procedure to the state commission is retained. But the
new process cannot avoid the trade-off considerations
in which all local governments are involved.
Among the many policies coastal cities and counties
must consider in developing their LCPs are these concepts:
(1) the coastal zone has a particularly fragile ecology that
needs protection; (2) it constitutes a resource that must
be conserved, restored, and where appropriate, developed
for all of the people of the state; (3) agricultural ust of
land is to be encouraged and aided; and ( 4) visitor-serving
facilities are· also to be encouraged. The act provides no
additional funding for cities and counties to accomplish
any of this. 3 In fact, the Legislature offers little money to
the cities or counties, or to the new commission, to pay for
costs of developing the LCPs, but instead looks to the
federal government for planning funds-assuming that
such grants will be available in the years ahead.

Weakness in the Coastal Commission's Position
In effect the Coastal Act of 1976 injects the state commission into the planning games of 68 coastal jurisdictions.
(Proposition 20 did not do so.) Furthermore, the 1976
act gives the commission only limited ability to prevail
in the impending debates. It is import~t to remember that
the Legislature in 1976 almost failed to act-the planning
and permit procedures established by Proposition 20
almost came to an end. Since then, the Legislature is
widely believed to have become more anti control. This
is frequently referred to as the emergence of the "Dow
Syndrome"; an impatience with environmental controls
that might discourage private development. Many people
involved in the act's administration seem to fear that the
Legislature will weaken the act if the commission even
appears to be discouraging development. Also to the point,
there is still apparent opposition to the commission as a
threat to "home rule" of cities and counties.
The act itself contains another threat to the commission's effectiveness. By law, the six regional commissions
will soon terminate. In addition, another round of appoint·
ments to the state commission is soon to begin. Six members of the state commission will continue to be chosen
directly by the Legislature and the Governor. The remaining six, however, will be appointed through a complicated
process involving nominations of city councilmen and
county supervisors by coastal city and county representa-

Probable Consequences of the Restoration
During a transition period the state commission and the
six regional commissions will continue to exercise permit
control over development in the zone. In this period, 68
coastal cities and counties will work on LCPs, trying to
meet a strict time schedule, but many cities and counties
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tives, with final selections to be made by the Governor
and Legislature from among the local officials nominated.
When the new appointment formula is fully operative
after the regional commissions have gone out of existence,
a significant shift in the composition of the state coastal
commission will occur. Presently it numbers only one
locally elected official in its membership. The new appointment formula, however, will mean that at least six of
the 12 voting members are locally elected officials. This
will be a major change that is likely to have a substantial
4
effect on the state commission's voting pattern.
Presently, some of the state commissioners already
favor weak control over the LCP process. After the next
round of appointments, this position will probably prevail. If the appointment process and the commission's
composition thus influence the certification of LCPs, the
commission will undoubtedly continue to have a major
influence thereafter. Once an LCP is certified, the permit
approval process passes from the commission to the local
At that point local governments' intergovernments.
pretation of the LCP and its application to each permit
proposal becomes paramount and, once again, development along the coast will be returned to the control of 68
competing local governments. Mter certification, certain
kinds of appeals can still be taken to the state commission,
but the numbers of permit decisions appealed to the state
level will depend on the actions of applicants and so-called
"watch dog" environmental groups. In any event, a gloomy
prediction is that not many appeals carried by environmentalist groups will be successful before a commission
dominated by those sympathetic to local control.

new taxing power was proposed. The Coastal Act of 1976
does not address these fmancing needs.
Furthermore the state has not provided sufficient
funds to finance, or even to match the enormous sums of
federal assistance that might be available to finance the
public transportation systems, low cost housing, subsidies to farmers, additional sewer and water systems, and all
of the other facilities that are required to convert the coast
into a usable resource for all of the people of the state.
In fact, the permanent coastal commission really does not
even have state funds adequate to support the preparation
of state-mandated LCPs. Two possible sources that might
provide significant fmancial help-whose dimensions and
future are unknown at this writing-are Governor Brown's
Urban Strategy, and President Carter's forthcoming urban
programs.
In 1976, the Legislature also created, by separate act,
the state Coastal Conservancy, with power to acquire land
and to grant and lend money. It may purchase agricultural
lands that are in danger of falling to other uses, as well as
land within Resource Protection Zones. The conservancy
may- make grants to local governments, or to the state
Department of Parks and Recreation, to do some kinds of
restoration work and to develop public access to regionally
significant portions of the coastline. The conservancy can
also lend money to the Department of Parks and Recreation to preserve some kinds of sites.
Significant sums of money spent annually over a sustained period of time could address many problems. To
date, however, the funding of the new agency has consisted
only of a small portion of a state bond issue passed in 1976.
Whilt: the conservancy is not now funded adequately,
the situation might change in the future. In fact, if some of
the fmancing mentioned above materializes, it may come
through the conservancy. If such funding attains significant proportions, however, one must also note that the use
of this separate agency would further divert power away
from the coastal commission. Moreover, a new set of
actors-the five-member board of the conservancy and
its staff-will in any case be added to the already complex
governmental equation. In any event, so long as the conservancy has little money at its disposal, the agency will
not have much effect.
Most assuredly, coastal cities and counties have acquired
no new source of funds for achieving statewide goals. Of
course, the act charges the cities and counties with planning for such statewide goals in their LCPs, but is silent on
new sources of revenue. Even if the coastal city and county
governments could persuade their local constituencies that
the zone ought to be used for statewide purposes, it is
doubtful that they could ever persuade local voters that
funds from the local property tax and sales tax should be
used to pay for such facilities. In fact, few if any coastal
city council members or county supervisors would approve
such procedures.

The Consequences of Inadequate Funding
The temporary commission established by Proposition
20 had no powers of acquisition, development or taxation.
It had no ability to undo coastal development that had
damaged the environment. It was not intended to have
such ability; it was a holding device, a means of arresting
trends for four years until a permanent mechanism was
created by the state.
The· absence of implementing powers was understandable for a temporary agency, but even the plan submitted
in December 1975 was deficient in recommendations as
to how an effective restoration program for the zone could
be paid for. The proposed plan analyzed the damage
already done and outline~ policies which, if instituted,
would prevent further damage. There were, however, no
estimates of the money needed to undo the development
already in place, nor recommendations of sources for such
money. Furthermore, the plan, through its recommended
policies, asserted that new acquisitions and public facilities
were needed to achieve goals for the statewide constituency, but once again, no reliable source of revenue such as
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authorities, without requirements that any members be
locally elected officials.

Instead, it is predictable that local leaders will try to
construct LCPs that reflect local goals more than they do
state goals, and later will also probably interpret certified
LCPs to local advantage. They will resist any attempt to
use local monies to fmance facilities for statewide use, and
will contest the coastal commission if it tries to force them
to do otherwise. They will battle the commission by lobbying in Sacramento to change the act, and by seeking the
appointment to the commission of sympathetic commissioners; in brief, by co-opting the commission.

The Basic Change:
The Shift Back Toward Home Rule
Both Proposition 20 and the coastal act made a basic
change in local home rule in the coastal zone. That change
requires a governmental structure that recognizes a new,
larger constituency with coastal rights and interests that
should be actively advanced.
First, the state spelled out, as never before, how the
environment was to be protected from certain kinds of
development. Second, local coastal governments were
directed to carry out the LCP process. But the state law
did not relieve those governments of their local involvements and responsibilities. As a result, some important
questions remain: How can local government be faithful
to its role in community representation, while also being
responsible to a second, statewide constituency'? How can
any government be responsible to two constituencies,
especially when the two have conflicting interests?
If the Legislature had been willing to take coastal zone
control from cities and counties, it might have established
a structure similar to the Bay Conservation and Development Commission in its relationship to the cities and
counties around San Francisco Bay. By adopting a plan
submitted by BCDC and making the latter-a regulatory
agency-the administrator of the plan, the Legislature
permanently transferred power over the Bay and a narrow
band of Bay frontage from the cities and counties to
BCDC.
.
Admittedly, there are significant differences in the two
situations. In the case of the Bay, the principal target for
control is the Bay waters. The 100 foot strip of bayshore
was transferred to BCDC's regulatory jurisdiction as a
means to that end. In the case of the coastal zone, the
target for control is not the ocean as such, but the land in
the zone itself-a little under 1,000 yards wide on the
average, although narrower in some places and much wider
in many areas of recreational or environmental significance.
BCDC was given powers adequate to achieve the objectives for which it was established, i.e., to conserve the Bay
and its immediate shoreline, while allowing appropriate
non-damaging development. On the other hand, the
coastal commission has not been given adequate power
to conserve the California coastal zone and guide its restoration and development "in a manner that protects the
irreplaceable resources of coastal land and waters." 5
A state commission so constituted could be expected to
represent effectively the statewide constituency which the
coastal act brought into the governance of the coastal zone.
Cooperation between governments more or less equal in
power is the only alternative to the domination of one over
the other. By returning planning, zoning and permit issuance to cities and counties through the LCP process,

Needed: A Balance of Powers

As things stand, effective provision has not been made to
undo the considerable damage already done to the coastal
environment by years of unwise development. True, the
trend toward further damage was changed at least temporarily by Proposition 20's coastal commission, and this
policy is being continued by the present interim commission. But as basic control of the zone passes back to cities
and counties, the policy of conservation, restoration and
development, with a balance of local and state interests,
is likely to be blunted because of the conditions under
which cities and counties must operate.
If the Legislature had a strong majority that was determined to secure environmental and developmental balance
in the coastal lands, it might have created-and could still
establish-mechanisms sufficient to accomplish the complex
task. If the coastal zone is to be a statewide resource, then
sufficient and reliable statewide funds should be provided
to fmance the facilities and services entailed by that statewide designation. Such funds could be channeled to cities
and counties, if it is desired to retain power for their
governments within the zone. This would seem appropriate
in order to have a means of balancing the rights and interests of the local constituents against the rights and interests of the state constituency.
To insure that the local city and countY· officials use
such funds for state purposes, however, the state funds
should come through the coastal commission. Coastal cities
and counties would then receive funds from the commission on demonstrating that their LCPs contained policies
that would advance state goals, as well as local goals. This
would give the commission an effective means of maintaining its end of the balance.
Finally, the membership of the commission should be
as fully responsible to the state constituency as local
officials are responsible to their local constituencies. The
threat of co-optation should not hang over it. Perhaps
the membership of the state commission should be reduced to the six clearly state-level positions now filled by
the state appointing authorities. Or perhaps the number of
state-level positions should be increased, maybe to nine or
11, in order to insure a broader base. But the additional
positions should be filled in the same manner as the basic
six state seats are now, i.e., chosen by state appointing
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the state is glVlng those governments and their constituents a strong voice in coastal policy. We need assurance
that the commission also has a strong voice in coastal
policy, adequate to protect the interests of the statewide
constituency.

3 The enactment of the Jarvis.Cann Initiative, or any other
restrictive measure limiting the traditional funding sources of
cities and counties, will impinge sharply on their already heavily
taxed ability to respond to any new demand.
4

One group of researchers examining the record of the South
Coast and San Diego regional coastal commissions found evidence
suggesting that "whether a commissioner is a public member or an
elected official appears to be a significant factor in explaining voting
behavior." (p. 47) They found that "Public commissioners vote
pro-environment twice as often as elected commissioners.... " (p. 51)
and also noted that commissioners who were city councilmembers
were particularly likely to vote pro-development, as compared with
other commissioners. They concluded: "there is now some empirical evidence to suggest that city council members, because of
the 'pull' of local control, may not be the best suited to serve on
commissions where they have to make land use decisions which
are in conflict with the decisions of local authorities." Judy B.
Rosener, with Sallie C. Russell and Dennis Brehm, Environmental
vs Local Control: A Study of the Voting Behavior of Some Cali·
fornia Coastal Commissioners (Claremont Graduate School, Claremont, Calif., Apri11977).

NOTES
California Public Resources Code. sees. 30000 et seq. As defmed in the 1976 statute, the coastal zone inciudes land and water
areas of California extending seaward to the state's outer limit of
jurisdiction, and including all offshore islands. The zone extends
inland generally 1,000 yards from mean high tide line, but with
important exceptions. Thus in "significant estuarine, habitat, and
recreational areas" it goes inland to the fttst major ridgeline, or
five miles from mean high tide, whichever is less. In developed
urban areas, the zone generally extends inland less than 1,000
yards. The specific boundary lines of the zone are detailed on maps
identif'led by the enacting legislation.
2 If a local government's coastal plans have not been certified
and zoning and implementing devices made effective by January l,
1981, the coastal commission may prohibit or restrict the local
government from granting permits to develop, or may require state
comiiUSSlon permits in the case of developments that would be
contrary to the coastal act. Public Resources Code, sec. 30518.

5

Quoted material from M. B. Lane letter of December 1, 1975
to Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., transmitting the California
Coastal Plan.
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enough evidence, some of it impressionistic, to assess
problems and accomplishments so far. This "coast-watch"
may help Californians judge whether and how well the legal
mandate is being carried out, and what the next steps in
coastal planning should be.
Mter a brief look at the federal coastal program, California's experience under Proposition 20 and the 1976
coastal law will be explored.

COASTAL PLANNING IN CALIFORNIA:
A PROGRESS REPORT*

Stanley Scott
Assistant Director

Introduction
California's state coastal planning program was enacted
in response to certain shortcomings seen in the performance
of local government. Critics believed that local governments were often not effective with respect to the environ·
mental aspects of land-use regulation on the coast, were
incapable of dealing with big projects, usually proved unwilling to consider the needs of their neighboring communities, and tended to give developers too free a rein. Mter
several years of trying to gain satisfaction from the state
Legislature, conservationists went directly to the people
with a coastal initiative (Proposition 20). It was approved
by a 55 percent vote at the November 1972 general election.
Proposition 20 gave California a temporary four-year
mechanism for coastal planning and regulation; the system
was then made permanent, although with significant modifications, by a 1976 law. The 1976 legislation sought to
resolve some serious controversies by formulating a sort of
uneasy compromise between local government supporters
and conservationists.
While real disputes and a certain lack of trust underlie
the coastal act, it represents major opportunities for resolving conflicts and arriving at workable compromises
on coastal issues. The conflicts help emphasize the dif.
ficulty of preparing plans concrete enough to meet the
requirements of the coastal act, while allowing enough
flexibility to take into account future uncertainties and
leaving ample room for future creative action in matters
that cannot now be foreseen.
California is thus a year and a half into the exceedingly
difficult process of implementing the 1976law. Obviously
the-end result cannot now be foretold, but there is already

The Federal Program
California's coastal planning has received a big push
under the federal Coastal Zone Management Act, passed
in 1972. This act in turn was stimulated largely by the
example of the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission and its successful experiment
in Bay fill control and shoreline regulation.1 Passage of
the federal law was part of a larger environmental movement that-beginning with the National Environmental
Policy Act in 1969-brought about wide-ranging federal
legislation. Examples include the Environmental Protection Agency, requirements for environmental impact
reporting, and encouragement of comprehensive planning, particularly the "208" environmental planning
efforts now in progress in most metropolitan areas.
The federal program under the Coastal Zone Management Act offered funding for state coastal planning and
held out the promise of additional money to help carry
out approved state plans. Further incentive was offered
the states in the law's "consistency" provisions requiring
that federally related activities on the coast be consistent
with (federally approved) state coastal plans, in the absence of a cabinet-level decision otherwise. The state
work is monitored by the federal Office of Coastal Zone
Management under general criteria outlined in the act:
, . . fa state J must have a management program ...sufficient to implement its coastal plan. Although states
are given maximum flexibility ... each state management program is expected to provide clarity, unity, and
definite assignments of responsibility . . . . [with] a
single state agency or entity ... in charge of the overall
program, at least for administrative and policy purposes.2

*The research on which this article is based· was supported by the
Sea Grant Program of the University of California. Other publications analyzi.ng and reporting on California's coastal experience will
be forthcoming.
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commiSSions go out of existence, however, former regional commissioners will be replaced on the state commission by persons selected by the state appointing author·
ities, who will choose from lists of county supervisors
and city council members sent up by the coastal cities and
counties. This change would therefore cause "a significant shift in the composition of the state coastal commission . . . ." 6 At least six of the 12 voting members will
be locally elected officials, and perhaps more.

In qualifying for the federal program, states may exercise direct controls over land and water uses; they may
collaborate with their local governments by setting statewide standards for local implementation; or they may provide for administrative review of coastal plans and regulations proposed by state and local agencies and the private
sector. The coastal states are trying to comply with the
federal programs; California is one of the front-runners,
largely because its own coastal program was initiated in
1973 under Proposition 20.

An "Impossible" Job?
California's Program
To sum up, California's coastal law initiated a new set
of collaborative planning processes, while continuirlg most
of the old ones-especially coastal regulation-at least
temporarily. The basic planning job was assigned to coastal
cities and counties, under guidelines and policies outlined
by the state commission, subject to review and certification
by the state commission, and with a tight set of deadlines.
Some have called the assignment an impossible job, given
the limitations on human and information resources and
the time constraints.

Proposition 20 established a four-year coastal planning
process backed by a state comrn:lssion and six regional
commissions to oversee planning and regulate coastal
development in the interim. 3 Meanwhile the state coastal
plan, including recommendations on how to carry out the
plan, was delivered to the Legislature at the end of 1975.4
The Legislature had a year to pass a new coastal statute, or
the entire system would have ceased to exist January 1,
1977. At the end of the 197 6 session and after a hectic
struggle, a coastal bill was approved continuing the system
established by Proposition 20, but with 'important modifi·
cations.
The 1976 law continued the state commission; the
regional commissions are to be continued only until mid1979 unless the Legislature passes a bill in the current
session to extend them, as seems likely. Local governments
were given a key role in coastal planning, under policies
in the 1976 act and guidelines set by the state commission.
They are to prepare local plans and implement ordinances
for their portions of the coastal zone, subject to review
by the regional commissions and certification by the state
commission.
The local planning effort is being funded largely with
federal money available through the Office of Coastal
Zone Management, with an additional 20 percent matching
share provided by state funds. A major part of the planning
process is supposed to be fmished by 1981. After the state
commission certifies that a local plan complies with the
1976 coastal act, the local government will make the
principal decisions on land use and development in the
coastal zone, subject to appeals in carefully limited situations.5
In addition, of course, the state commission
must approve any amendments to a state-certified local
plan.
A forthcoming shift in the membership formula of the
state commission should also be noted here because of the
increase in local representation. This is how it works.
Presently the Governor, the Senate Rules Committee,
and the Speaker of the Assembly each select two state
comm1ss10ners. The other six state commissioners are
appointed by and from the regional commissions, one
from each region. The regional commissions in tum are
composed equally of public members chosen by the
Governor, Senate Rules Committee and Assembly Speaker,
and by local councilmen and supervisors chosen by their
city and county governing bodies or by regional councils
. of governments.
As of summer 1978, only two state coastal commissioners were locally elected officials. When the regional

Guidelines and Other Documents
Local coastal programs (LCPs) will comprise each local
jurisdiction's plans for its portion of the coastal zone,
with implementing ordinances. First, local governments
were asked to identify coastal issues in their areas, and
then to develop work programs-including proposed
budgets-for completing the LCPs.
The state commission prepared guidelines and other
documents giving local governments advice and instructions. The written materials drew a mixed response. Their
volume seemed to overwhelm many local planners. although some documents were called "invaluable," and
"very helpful." But the LCP regulations were characterized as "too vague" and "hard to interpret." Use of
excessive legalese was a major source of criticism:
Whoever wrote the LCP Regulations was a prisoner
of his own jargon. For example, the first sentence
in paragraph (b) on page 10 contains 75 words, and if
you read it carefully is almost meaningless, or at least
open to wide and varying in_terpretation ... [and there
are many similar examples] . 1

Early Phases of Local Planning:
Some Initial Difficulties
While a few local governments had conducted pilot
projects in 197 6 and 1977, almost all the coastal cities
began issue identification in 1977 and started developirlg
their work programs. Most are being submitted to the state
commission around mid-year 1978. (In 1977 a very few
front-runners also began work on their land use plans
as such.)
In most cases, new local staff had to be hired, or consultants employed for the plarming work. Some local staff
appeared to develop good working relations with regional
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or state coastal staff, while others voiced a variety of com·
plaints. These complaints included difficulties in inter·
level staff relationships, inadequacy of communication and
understanding between levels and agencies, and an appearance of conflicting goals and interpretations between
state and regional commissions. 8 Some local people and
other observers believe that with better guidance from the
state commission and more authority to make decisions,
the regional commissions and staffs could play stronger
roles in coastal planning, working more closely with local
governments.
There was also some local unhappiness with funds made
available for coastal planning. By urging local governments
to include a wide range of topics in their early identification of issues, the state commission may inadvertently
have encouraged local overshooting of the mark by sketch·
ing ambitious planning efforts, including studies of numerous topics. In any event, as localities proposed work programs and budgets for approval by the coastal commissions,
the latter found many too elaborate and expensive for
available time and funds, and called for cut-backs. Subsequent budget reductions led to uneasiness on the part
of some local governments who feared that the preparation of acceptable plans would force them to spend much
larger sums than would be available through the state
commission.
At this point in mid-1978, it is unclear to what extent
local governments will have to go back to the drawing
board to produce local plans to comply with the coastal law
as interpreted by the state commission. It seems certain,
however, that virtually all local governments will have to
do appreciable additional work to bring their plans into
conformance.

staff prevailed upon them the wisdom of handling the
"cumulative impact" issue through one giant permit,
the LCP. . . . I think the fact that ... the coastal bill
. . . retained the specific coastal policies ... indicates
the Coastal Act was meant to concentrate on implementation of the policies and not further planning..•.
In any event, lawyers and plarmers obviously sometimes
do not see eye-to-eye, and in many situations misunderstandings can arise between them, especially when they
must work together in controversial, high-pressure enterprises like coastal governance.
To some degree this is
probably inevitable:
.•. lawyers tend to see plarmers as fuzzy-minded, im·
precise people with grand schemes but no ability to put
down the fme print that really determines whether the
plans will work or not. Plarmers, on the other hand,
tend to see lawyers as narrow minded, prissy people who
have no vision and can't understand people who do, and
who are always trying to shoot down things by insisting
.on more detail than can reasonably be provided .... In
an operation such as ours, you obviously need both
kinds of people, but you also need to arrive at a balanced planning approach. 9
Plarmers increasingly emphasize the need for new skills,
capabilities and sensitivities, as planning shifts from a
"product to process orientation" and as negotiation and
mediation are recognized as crucial planning tools:
Open, complex, collaborative planning processes such
as [are] required to carry out the Coastal Act need
people that can facilitate a "diplomatic" rather than
an "authoritative" resolution to the problem. 1 0

Implications of Professional Styles:
Some Conflicts
A New Mission

Some recurring problems relate to the professional
styles of staff members and questions about the most productive enforcement methods. Many observers have suggested that controversy over approaches to the LCPs has
resulted partly from differences that stem from staff back.
ground, training, and experience, as well as the professional "tools" they are accustomed to use. For example
some coastal policies and procedures may have been too
heavily influenced by a legalistic cast of thought and a
permit-review style of decisionmaking.
One observer
of the reception of early local plans suggested that LCP
submissions were being treated as "giant permit appeals."
Joseph E. Petrillo, Executive Officer, State Coastal
Conservancy, and a former state coastal staff member who
was one of the principal drafters of the coastal bill, responded as follows to the "giant permit appeal" comment
(letter of August 3, 1978):

Many saw the principal success of the fzrst commission
(under Proposition 20) as based on enforcement, used to
reduce damaging impacts by guiding coastal development,
and also employing the permit system as a learning process
to facilitate completing a comprehensive coastal plan on
time. The second commission, created by the 1976law,
continues vital enforcement by permit hearings until local
coastal plans are completed and certified. Meanwhile,
however, its principal new mission in 1977-1981 is to see
that local governments develop good local plans and implementing ordinances that comply with state goals and
policies for the coast, and that they are accepted and
supported at the local level.
In this effort, success may depend on persuasion, ex·
planation, and negotiation as much as it does on state en·
forcement of detailed regulations, or "strong arm"
methods .

. . . in drafting the fmal Government, Powers and Funding section of the Coastal Plan, I intended the Local
Coastal Programs to be very much ... [a giant permit
process]. The permit staff ... realized that a project-byproject review of proposals did not get at the "cumulative impact" problem . . . . Although the regions, environmental groups and others . . . wanted a simple
adjustment of the current permit process, the permit

The Specificity Controversy
Some other big questions are: What major policy
changes in local plans will be required, if any, and how detailed will the coastal plans have to be? \Vhi.ch state coastal
policies will apply, how stringently, and in what areas?
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Which policies must give way in certain circumstances?
Local governments sought clarification and guidance on
these questions as they prepared their work programs. In
the spring of 1978, a basic controversy emerged over the
degree of specificity and amount of detail to be required
of local plans before certification.
In drafting coastal plans, many decisions must be made
regarding which options are to be kept open, and which
.. closed down." Making plans more specific means giving
up more future options. It is often difficult for a local
government to decide fmally what ought to be done with
individual parcels on a "crash" basis, unless it already has
reached a consensus on policies or until it receives and
responds to specific developmental proposals. In a continuing process of planning, things are presumably never
really fmished. Although some fmal decisions can be made,
others must be held over for further consideration and to
await future developments. On the other hand, an approved plan presumably means approved development, and
the approving body needs to have a reasonably good idea
of what they are authorizing.
Much of the coastal commission's present power to
enforce and implement coastal policy is to be delegated
to local government when local plans and zoning ordinances
are certified. Local plans as interpreted by local governments will then govern the coastal zone except in carefully
limited situations, noted earlier. Thus it can be argued
that detailed plans written in specific terms will increase
the assurance that current commission policies for the
coast will determine its long-term future. This view,
drawing on past experience, led to concern that failure to
require detail might limit the commission's (and the state's)
future ability to be sure that local plans conform to state
policy. Accordingly early this year, a state staff member
proposed highly specific criteria for local plans. He emphasized "decisions at the first major fork in the road-the
land use plan ... "arguing that" ... the [local] plan must
be 'sufficiently detailed' ... to leave no major questions
unresolved .... " 11 The memo continued:

echoed these sentiments, ranking .. degree of specificity"
highest among pressi.Rg coastal issues causing great concern:
The coastal commissions may intend to require greater
specificity than is prevailing practice in land-use planning. This may make the planning process more diffi.
cult and rigid, force decisions prematurely, and close
off future options too soon. 13
The Agua Hedionda Case
The first land use plan submitted for state commission
approval related to Agua Hedionda Lagoon and adjoining
areas in the City of Carlsbad (San Diego County). At the
outset the plan seemed likely to be judged by the detailemphasizing criteria. Coming before the commission in
February 1978, the initial staff comments on the Agua
Hedionda proposal were lengthy, calling for many changes
and ·much detail. Statewide attention focused on the issue,
with many local governments expressing concern because
it was widely believed that decisions on Agua Hedionda
were likely to be precedent setting.
Meanwhile there was a top-level change in state staffmg,
and the new Executive Direcror Michael Fischer took office
in mid-March, replacing the retiring Executive Director
Joseph E. Bodovitz, who had served with distinction for
five years since the inception of California's coastal planning under Proposition 20. Prior to his appointment
Fischer had spent two years carrying primary responsibility
for preparing Governor Brown's urban strategy for California, working closely with business, labor, environmental
interests, plarmers, and local governments. In armouncing
Fischer's selection, state coastal commission Chairman
Bradford Lundborg emphasized his view that the commission's most important task was developing "a strong, cooperative relationship with local governments up and down
the coast," and noted that Fischer's earlier experience in
local government and as a plarmer should help.
Recognizing the significance of the specificity issue and
the precedent-setting nature of imminent decisions, Fischer
gave priority to Agua Hedionda and relations with local
governments as demanding his close and continuing attention. He worked with coastal staff to prepare a new
set of recommendations and conditions for the Agua
Hedionda proposal, focussing on principal objectives
rather than on design detail. The state commission also
asked the City of Carlsbad for its view.
Seeking to permit flexibility in local plans along with
reasonable assurance that state policies will be complied
with, Fischer asked the League of California Cities to prepare a second memorandum, issued in late May. They
suggested several alternatives for conditional or partial
certification of local plans that would retain the state
commission's basic jurisdiction over unresolved issues
while permitting coastal planning and zoning to proceed
in an orderly marmer with respect to areas and issues
where agreement can be reached. 14 Partial certification
could apply either to a geographic portion of a local government or to certain portions or policies of its land use
plan. This proposal would allow local governments to
begin implementing ordinances for approved areas and
policies while the state commission and the local government continue to address policies or areas not certified.

precise, well-defined land use designations and
precisely drafted policies are essential. . . . Thus the
[local] Land Use Plan must designate the principal
permitted use(s), the specific conditional uses, the
specific policy (i.e. performance) standards applicable
to the types of permitted and conditional uses, and
the precise policy standards that will be applied in reviewing uses for specific geographical uses. [emphasis
in original]
In early April 1978 the League of California Cities
responded by arguing that the state commission should
concentrate on. major policy issues rather than on details
oflocal plans:
The specificity needed in the land use plan should be
obtained through the inclusion of policies rather than
site specific plans or designs. The land use plan should
not contain specific easements and setbacks on a lot
by lot basis. . . .There needs to be flexibility in the
plans to assure that projects can be made economically
viable. 12
Shortly afterwards a workshop of local coastal planners
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New Criteria: Priority Issues

preferences felt in the local halls of government. As Lenard
Grote observes:

Focussing on high priority issues and giVIng further
guidance to local governments in LCP preparation, coastal
staff prepared new criteria (adopted by the state commission on June 20, 1978). 15 The new criteria are summarized as follows: Undeveloped land that would be
affected by coastal act policies should be given highest
priority, especially if it is under developmental pressures,
and natural resource protection (e.g. lagoons and agriculture) should be given high priority. In areas already
highly urbanized, LCPs should focus on beach access, parking and traffic congestion, visitor-serving uses, and low-tomoderate cost housing, usually in that order. Development
design, bulk, height and setback requirements should be
dealt with only in very general terms, except on scenic
routes, shore areas or other specially significant areas.
Where the potential impact of new development would be
comparatively small, the LCP should not try to resolve
the issues.
In all cases, original research or new data ~ollection
should be minimized. Moreover, ''low cost" sqlutions
to problems should be used where possible. For example,
review procedures could be established for future determination of geologic stability of proposed developments,
rather than actually conducting costly geologic studies in
preparing an LCP. To give local governments further
guidance, the new criteria were accompanied by oneparagraph summaries for each local coastal jurisdiction,
highlighting the principal issues to be resolved in LCP
preparation.

This is the very essence of local home rule. Until the
coastal law came into effect, state government had
never established regulatory agencies or other machinery
to monitor the contents oflocal general plans. 20

In short, some basic ground rules of the planning process
were changed rather abruptly. Local governments and the
coastal commissions are both feeling their way in new relationships that are inevitably somewhat strained, and will
surely be characterized by much maneuvering and bargaining. It will not be easy to reduce tensions because they are
built into the process, which was established in large part
to deal with "real world" conflicts between those who want
special protection for the coast, and developers and their
presumed allies in local government. Further, as Sorensen
notes:
. . . in states that are beleaguered by rapid growth and
threatened with an avalanche of development activity,
such as California, Florida and Oregon, the first round of
program approvals may be the only good shot the
administrative agency will have to assert state interests;
the state might not get a "second chance."
(Presumably] . . . the California Coastal Commission
will attempt to tie down local government plans with
as much specificity as possible to protect against avalanche losses. 21

State, Local and Regional Tensions

A Stronger Role for Regional Commissions?

Presumably local governments will welcome the new
criteria, which should provide some degree of the desired
flexibility. Nevertheless some of the tensions between the
state and local levels are likely to remain. After studying
coastal planning in nine states, Jens Sorensen likened the
shifting relationship to a tennis match, "with the burden
of responsibiliry and work bouncing back and forth between state and local government." 16
_
The state must be realistic in its expectations. If its
demands exceed local planning capabilities, the locals may
see this as demonstrating state staffs failure to recognize
local limitations or understand local goals. But Sorensen
also emphasizes that state guidelines need to be "demanding enough, (otherwise} local programs may not even
come close to achieving the objectives" of the coastal
legislation. 17 For their part, the principal question of most
local governments will be: "What is the minimum amount

As noted earlier, some local staff believed that the
regional commissions could play better-defmed and more
important roles in the negotiating process, but to do this
would need more guidance from the state commission.
Moves in this direction seem imminent. Thus Executive
Director Fischer has said that he intends to schedule
workshops in each of the coastal regions, where he and
each respective regional executive director would meet
jointly with city and county planning directors to review
policy differences and try to negotiate their resolution.
Subsequently regional workshops could also be held with
mayors and supervisors, at their request.
As the review of draft LCPs by the regional and state
staff proceeds, another device could help insure stateregional coordination and give local governments the policy
guidance many have been asking for. State and regional
executive directors would send a joint letter indicating
their views of the LCP to each local government before the
council or board of supervisors reviewed it.
A stronger role for the regions would also clearly be
furthered if Assembly Bill 34 78 should pass. The measure
would extend the life of each regional commission until
it has certified all local plans, or until mid-1981, whichever
is earlier, instead of dissolving it by rnid-1979.
In 1976 the Legislature virtually ignored the regional
commissions partly because there was strong opposition
to their continuation on the part of labor and builders.
This opposition was apparently based on "gut reactions"
and may have been stimulated by what appeared to be

of ef[on needed to modify the way we are now doing
business in order to receive state approval?" [emphasis
in original] 1 8
In other words, with some significant exceptions, most
local governments will try to get by with only marginal
adjustments in their existing local plans, whereas the state
coastal authority will push for more searching review, and
.
19
overhaul where needed to comp1y w1.th state ob.JeCtives.
Previously, local governing bodies -had been accustomed
to dealing with their own local constituencies. Each local
unit planned and zoned to meet the interests and concerns
of those who could effectively make their influence and
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arrogant behavior by a single regional commissioner.
Moreover the conservationists, who might have been expected to support the regional commissions, did not do so
actively, but concentrated instead on the hard-fought
struggle to continue the state commission. As an astute
observer then on the staff of the League of California
Cities observed:

There is general agreement that allowing the regional
commissions to go out of business just as local plans
are coming together would, at a minimum, cause intolerable delays ... and might lead to enough confusion to
make it impossible to fmish some of the plans. 24
Despite severe work pressures the regional bodies and
staffs have handled a heavy permit-hearing load and made
other significant contributions to the coastal planning
process by reviewing and commenting on draft plans.
When asked if the regional commissions would be missed,
a strong proponent answered

The decision to abolish the regional commissions was
not made after a thorough analysis . . . of the need
to continue them, rather they were in a sense sacrificed
so that the State Commission could continue. 22
In addition, state coastal staff may well have harbored
some ambivalence toward the regional commissions. The
former chairman of the state commission, Mel Lane, had
these perceptive comments:

... indeed they will be. The state commission cannot
give the necessary perspective . . . . [with the regional
commission] there are few parts of my region where
if a person felt he was asking for something consistent
with a plan, he could not get to the commission meeting
to discuss it . . . . it is possible for [regional] commissioners to look at the problems on the lands themselves.
The regional commissions will be sorely
missed. 25

The planning process could have been organized better.
The way it was set up ... begged for civil war between
the regional commissions and the state commission.
A tremendous amount of energy and time was spent
trying to prevent that civil war ....

In fact, the shift to local coastal planning under the
1976 law ..may have opened a stronger potential role
[for the regional commissions] in monitoring and reviewing
local performance. as well as in helping negotiate future
issue conflicts." 26 Such negotiations, involving local officials as well as state and regional staff and commissions,
may be one of the most effective ways of seeking local
cooperation and accommodation to state objectives.

. . . the state commission and staff just kept pushing.
Furthermore the regional commissions and staffs had a
sense of responsibility. They had to go along with "our"
schedules for the overall good. This meant they went
along even when they strongly disagreed.2 3
Lane attributed the tension to distance, the size of the
1,000-mile coastal zone, time pressures, and the difficulty
of getting state and regional commissioners together regularly, since state and regional commissioners rarely met,
except for the six regional members who also sat on the
state body. On the other hand, the relationship improved
markedly over time. Lane believed that all the regional
commissions were cordial . to him personally, noting no
animosity but a feeling that he "was on a different wave
length than the regional commissioners due to a lack of
communication."
Of course, the tensions also were partly due to genuine
regional differences of opinion with respect to coastal planning goals. For example, the North Central Coast regional
commission (San Francisco, Marin and Sonoma counties)
was seen as strongly in favor of coastal conservation, while
the North Coast regional commission (Mendocino, Humboldt and Del Norte counties) was considered lukewarm if
not down-right negative to coastal conservation. The
commissions tended to reflect attitudes believed to be
widely held in their respective regions.

Ultimately the entire . . . effort . . . boils down to
whether local government will eventually take the attitude that implemeQ.tation of the certified program is
in their best interest."" 7
Additional Responsibilities of the State Col'DJilission

In addition to collaborative state-local planning and permit appeals, the state commission also has other responsibilities. Substantial work has already been done on most
of the following: serving as lead agency for the coastal
energy impact program (fmanced under the federal act);
ranking possible coastal sites for liquified natural gas (LNG)
terminals; designating portions of the coast where power
plant development would be inconsistent with the coastal
act; identifying coastal zone forest land where special
logging procedures are needed (advisory to the state Board
of Forestry); considering relationships between coastal
management and controls of San Francisco Bay Gointly
with BCDC); and certifying port master plans for California's four major commercial ports.
Earlier, other Sacramento-based state agency staff may
have resented the coastal commission, sitting in San Francisco, with its good publicity and strong permit review
powers. "Turf' problems with several state agencies came
to a head during the 1976 legislative session when the
coastal bill's early version would have given the coast commission some control over the actions of other agencies
affecting the coastal zone. Opposition from the agencies
caused an entire chapter of the bill to be painstakingly

Negotiation and Consensus Building
In addition to reflecting regional opmwn, however,
regional commissions can provide certain important services, especially playing intermediary, consensus-building
roles in coastal planning. AB 3478 now has virtually
universal support, including that of labor, realtors, developers and contractors, suggesting that opinions have
changed drastically on the usefulness of the regional commissions:
35

This optlmiSttc view of improved local performance
relates principally to the work of professional staff planners and consultants. It remains to be seen how local
governing bodies and community political leaders will
respond to the coastal planning program. So far, city
councils and boards of supervisors have scarcely been involved. Before long, of course, they will have to enter
the action and necessarily play a crucial role in determining
the outcome.

drafted, reducing duplication of authority and interagency
conflict, while giving the coastal commission a clearly
acknowledged though largely advisory role with respect
to such agency policies and actions. This removed the
active opposition, although some coolness persisted in
certain quarters.
In any event, the state coastal commission has recently
been mending fences with the state agencies, especially
since January 1977 when Peter Douglas joined the state
commission as deputy director, with agency relationships
as one of his principal assignments. Interagency agreements are being concluded to facilitate state agency involvement in the coastal planning process in a meaningful way.
This is important, because without increases in manpower
the state agencies nevertheless have a good deal of coastal
planning to do. The agencies need to participate in LCP
preparation in order to be sure that appropriate provisions
for future state projects are included in local coastal plans,
otherwise later on there will be problems in obtaining
permits.

Retrospect: Permit Review and
Other Accomplishments
From th~ California program's start-up in 1973, coastal
planning has been back-stopped by permit power, with
the regional and state commissions hearing appeals from
city and county decisions with respect to development or
land-use change within the area of permit control.30
Many thousands of permit appeals have gone through
the coastal mill since early 1973. In 1977 alone, for
example, more than 7,700 applications were processed by
the six regional commissions, and over 95 percent of them
were approved. Such widely quoted figures on the high
approval rates may have led some observers to the mistaken
conclusion that the coastal process has made little dif.
ference, except in a handful of cases.
Admittedly, in the words of Paul Sabatier, "the vast
majority of permits involved essentially routine decisions
by the regional commissions." 31 On the other hand,
substantial numbers of the permits counted as "approved"
by regional commissions were actually approved with
conditions or modifications. 32 Robert Healy comments:

A Stimulus to Local Planning
The infusion of federal and state funding and the demands for coastal planning staff work at the local level
have brought in some capable new planners and given preexisting planning staff exciting new challenges. Of course,
the local revenue cuts under Proposition 13 could have a
severe negative impact on this pr9mising start. Only time
will tell, plus the extent of continued state and federal
fmancial support. Meanwhile, in a variety of ways coastal
planning is helping shake up and alter the environment
many planners have worked in. This paraphrase of com·
ments at a recent conference suggests one view of the
status quo that the coastal program is helping to change:

Our own observation from attending many permit
sessions of the South Coast Commission is that the
conditions imposed . . . were frequently quite significant, often involving major changes in design or reductions in density .3 3

Most . . . planners have been in their positions for per·
haps 15 years. The job many of them have been doing
is itself "negative," consisting of saying "no" to developments that do not conform to zoning and other require·
ments. Added to this, they have been working with
out-dated ordinances. Finally, the staff in time comes
to mirror the outlook of the board of supervisors or
city council, which can sometimes be downright antiplanning.28

Moreover the state commission generally took a stricter
approach· to permissible development thin the regional
commissions. Thus many applications approved by the
regional bodies were later denied by the state commission,
or had other conditions attached to the approval. In fact,
when the state commission on reviewing an appeal found a
substantial issue and therefore heard the case, "it was
virtually certain to either impose conditions or deny the
application altogether. " 3 4
Conditions often related to bulk, height and design of
structures, landscaping, provision of. public access, transportation and parking, reduction of the density of multiunit developments, erosion, or water quality controls.
The commissions were "very tough on residential projects
of five or more units considered significant . . . enough
to be appealed to the State Commission.'' 35 A major
nuclear reactor addition-San Onofre-was allowed to
proceed after some redesign and other conditions were
met. Urban redevelopment projects were required to be
scaled down, and other decisions attempted to prevent
urban encroachment onto agricultural or forest land.
In addition, another elusive but important factor was at
work. When builders and developers saw how the coastal
law was being enforced, many voluntarily began anticipa·

Some local jurisdictions that were already doing a com·
paratively sophisticated job of planning have had their
attention directed more forcefully toward the coast, and
are being required to consider state coastal goals. Other
local jurisdictions that were lagging are having to gear up.
The following comment (by a coastal workshop partici·
pant and experienced local planner) may overstate the case
a little, but probably not much:
We should acknowledge that the coastal law got local
government out of the dark ages in planning. Most or
all of us were doing sloppy plannirig, but have stopped
fooling around. Despite complaints about some of the
details I am very pro-coastal act over the longer
sweep.29
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preliminary negotiating sessions;
(10) staff were too young and inexperienced for the
difficult tasks;
(11) staff were seen socializing with "Sierra Club
types," contributing to appellants' fear of possible unfairness; and
(12) insuffient allowances were made for owners of
single family lots who got caught by the coastal act unexpectedly.
While the merits of such complaints are unevaluated,
those relating to procedure and due process ought to stimulate improvement of the regulatory machinery's functioning
so as to insure equitable treatment for all. 40

tory planning, "upgrading" their proposals before submitting them.
Developers, local government, and state agencies are all
showing a lot more environmental awareness than they
used to. And ... they are acting on this awareness. Not
as much or as fast as most environmentalists might want,
but not badly either. 36
·
Healy sums up his view of California's recent coastal
development under commission regulation:
In general, we fmd modest growth, mainly in the form
of infilling of semi-developed areas or slow increases in
intensity of land use in older, built-up areas. No new
large-scale subdivisions were allowed in the near-coast
area. Owners of lots in existing residential or recreational subdivisions were generally allowed to build,
provided the~ built structures no larger than those on
nearby lots. 3
Drawing on his study of controversial permit decisions,
Paul Sabatier concludes that "the coastal commissions substantially altered the developmental outcomes that would
have existed in their absence." 3 8 In short, California's
coastal program clearly has effectuated higher standards
in coastal development and environmental protection.

Complaints About Permit Processes
Despite Proposition 20's "vested right" protection.
California's coastal regulation and the permit process
caught some projects in mid-stream, creating awkward
policy questions such as : Which projects should be permitted to "build out" and which should not, and why? 39
Some owners of small lots have been unhappy when building plans were slowed, modified or denied. Larger development proposals have also gone through the regulatory mill,
and the coastal commissions took a rather strict line with
some of them.
Coastal property owners have lodged a number of
complaints about the permit decision process, and recent
legislative hearings catalog many such grievances. Appellants have alleged that
(1) actions were sometimes arbitrary, discriminatory
or capricious;
(2) the process was much too rigid, and tight time
limits during hearings precluded adequate presentations;
(3) staff documents were sometimes received by
appellants only a short time before hearings, preventing
adequate study and response;
(4) last-minute conditions were imposed without adequate study or time for appellant to respond;
(5) staff recommendations were based on inadequate
or inaccurate information, and appellant had little or no
opportunity for rebuttal;
( 6) some owners have been forced into costly longterm holding actions until completion of local coastal
plans;
(7) limits on building size and height were unrealistic
or architecturally infeasible;
(8) required conditions made projects too costly or
economically infeasible;
(9) staff or commissioners were not available for

Private Sector Cooperation and Acceptance
Despite complaints from the private sector, however,
there are many bases for constructive cooperation between
private-sector interests and coastal management. Admittedly there is widespread sentiment that private persons
owning individual small parcels or lots (on which they
perhaps hoped to build retirement homes but got "caught"
by the coastal law) are probably the most deserving group
for some form of relief or compensation. 41
On the other hand there is persuasive evidence that
larger developers are learning to live with coastal planning,
and in fact look forward to completion of its current
phase, which should remove many ambiguities and much
uncertainty.42 In short, a good deal of understanding
and even acceptance of the coastal planning process seems
to be emerging.
After reviewing grounds for agreement between environmentalists and developers, and noting the learning process
the environmental movement has spurred, Robert Healy
commented:
. . . beyond heightened interest and concern, some
builders have developed a remarkable sophistication
about how their constructions interact with natural
systems. They have had to do so in order to stay in
business in an era of impact assessment;environmental
planning, and stringent land-use controls. [In this
regulatory environment] . . . the developer himself
receives and digests the reports of his soils engineers,
and revises his projects to meet the public's demands.
Having gone through this process again and again, the
developer is increasingly likely to understand the technical basis of environmental control. 4 3
Of course a host of other interests and cont1icts also
confront communities as they move into coastal planning. Recent interviews with local recreation and park
administrators disclosed a wide range of concerns with
future coastal policies and the ways these will affect coastal
communities. For example, the concept of "coastal access"
generated many relevant definitions and interpretations as
well as numerous examples of the consequences of access,
and conflicts over access policies. 44
Public Participation
The 1976 coastal law and state commission guidelines
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governments and the coast] on the part of the commission.'>48 Because fee-simple acquisition of coastal property
can quickly become prohibitive in cost, it is essential
to explore measures short of full acquisition. Coastal
researcher Jens Sorensen concludes:

strongly support "public participation" in coastal planning,
prompting the publicizing of agendas and announcements
of meetings, and the availability of planning drafts and
documents. To alert citizens about coastal issues, local
governments are mailing notices in larger numbers, encouraging media coverage, and contacting a variety of
special interest groups. But local government observers
point out that "all of these methods cost money, and
. . . [we] will need substantial fmancial help." Furthermore they complain that, despite such efforts and expenditure of additional funds, "for the most part, regular public meetings and hearings do not get good results" in the
form of public participation.45
If these methods of encouraging wide public participation have not appeared sufficient, what further measures
may be more realistic? One approach is to make opportunities for participation available through as many channels as feasible but to expect only a relatively few wellinformed and highly motived citizens actually to come
forward. Some of the most effective "public participation" is provided by individual citizens who have the time
and inclination to become familiar with coastal issues in
their communities. Most of these participants will probably
be affiliated with organizations like the Planning and
Conservation League, the Sierra Club, the League of
Women Voters, or local community groups, who have
banded together out of mutual interest in public policies,
and who rely on their organizations to provide informational services reaching their fellow members and other
citizens.
Sierra Club observers, for example, emphasize the imponance of working with a relatively few active citizens
and knowledgeable people, focusing on concrete, pragmatic
coastal planning issues, rather than on general policies or
concepts. 46 Experience with other public interest organizations also underlines the imponant roles a comparatively
small number of citizens can play when allied with appropriate community groups, if they are able to become well
informed on issues, attend meetings, and communicate
their fmdings and recommendations to others.
Capitalizing on this potential, governmental mailing
lists should include-but of course not be limited to-a
wide variety of organizations known to be interested in
planning concerns.
Foreign observers have frequently
remarked on the American "genius" for organizing around
shared goals and interests through networks of citizen
groups. Information provided to such networks-from the
coastal commissions and other appropriate sources-will
be most likely to reach citizens who have already indicated
their willingness and ability to participate in planning
discussions. Finally, since such groups play an essential
role in public participation, outright subsidies from public
funds have been suggested as a way of helping give them
continuity and staying power. 4 7

Many state and local plarmers do not see a bright future
for collaborative planning until it can move beyond mere
permit regulation toward such positive activities as the
acquisition of development rights, low interest loans
for promoting socially desirable projects, and tax incentives for retention oflands in open space uses .... 49
State bond issues and other actions in 1976 provided
substantial funds for urban and coastal parks and other
properties. About $150 million could be applied to coastal
acquisition and related activities, with $110 million of this
slated for coastal parks and beaches to be acquired by the
Department of Parks and Recreation. These sums are clearly
modest when compared with the magnitude of the coastal
resources needing protection in some way. Further, a
coastal observer disputes the frequent assumption that
coastal property will necessarily be properly managed and
afforded better protection if publicly acquired:
State Parks with its 10 to 12 years lag time from acquisition to development and staffmg will pose some
serious problerm in the area of resource protection ....
hence it is mandatory that this limitation be recognized
early in the planning process.5 0
Another alternative device is offered by the State
Coastal Conservancy, set up as part of the 1976 package of
coastal legislation. The agency has imponant powers to
acquire coastal lands, or assist in their acquisition by other
state or local agencies for purposes of preservation, restoration or redevetopment. Lacking major funds, however,
and necessarily feeling its way, the new agency has so far
kept a rather low profile.
Even before Proposition 13 passed, Lenard Grote,
city council member, regional coastal commissioner and
President of the Association of Bay Area Governments,
argued for substantial state funding to help local governments implement the state's coastal goals. He complained
that cities and counties have not received new funding
sources for achieving such objectives, and thought it unlikely that local governments or voters would willingly use
local propeny or sales tax revenues for such purposes.
Grote emphasized the pressures on local governments
that would demand more positive state measures:
The pressures of the old planning game still operate
on each coastal city and county. . . . Each must still
view every parcel of land in its jurisdiction, and existing
or potential development on it, in light of the government's fmancial position. Each is still in competition
with its neighbor for potential beneficial development.
Each act of a local official is still accountable to the
local voters. Few, if any, could gain political strength
locally by championing the rights of a statewide constituency in the development of an LCP, if it runs
counter to important local-constituency interests ....51

Acquisition and Implementation
Even proponents of strong regulation acknowledge that
it cannot protect all of the coast that needs preservation,
hence "there is a need for a substantial acquisition program,
as well as for an expanded watchdog role (over local
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coastal processes are hard put to deal with them effectively.
On the other hand, a wide range of important issues
involving management of the coastal waters is already
present and promises to become more pressing. There are
extraordinary difficulties in dealing with seaward-side
issues, partly b,ecause states have only limited experience
with matters significantly beyond the shoreline, and partly
because of the intricate intermingling of state and federal
authority, jurisdictions and interests in the seaward side.54
These seaward-side issues may soon become an important testing ground for new organizations and intergovernmental relationships needed to reconcile and achieve federal
and state objectives. We have begun experimenting with
federal-state regional councils authorized to formulate
fishery management plans under the federal Fishery Conservation Act of 1976. That law established the 200-rnile
zone within which foreign vessels can ftsh only with a
federal permit, and otherwise strengthened offshore flshery
management.
It is also important for the coastal states to establish
comprehensive coastal water management programs. In
their new book, coastal researchers Armstrong and Ryner
urge that the need is far greater than many states realize.
Moreover they acknowledge the states' comparative inexperience with coastal water management, and recognize
the difficulties that must be overcome. But they also point
out that the federal Coastal Zone Management Act provides
the states with several useful tools, including national
recognition of the states as appropriate vehicles, and of the
right of the states to review federal activities that may
affect coastal waters.
They conclude by urging the states to build on existing
estuary, river and coastal land management programs
in developing comprehensive coastal water management
capabilities:

Federal Funding
A critical future issue is the need for continued and substantial federal funding of coastal planning. The federal
government often encourages state and local governments
to start up new programs with "seed money," and then
eliminates or reduces federal support when the programs
are in progress. Such reductions are usually urged by the
money-conscious Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
seeking to economize. Failure to provide sustained federal
support for the coastal program is likely to have serious
adverse effects on the now-promising effort:
The state and local governments won't pick . . . up
[coastal costs] because they can't. They are not going
to shut down schools and libraries and discharge ftremen
so they can hire coastal planners; therefore without the
incentive of federal money and federal support, these
programs aren't going anywhere.
[Moreover] federal leadership creates the impression
that this is an important matter ... so for the feds to
pull away is by contrast to say it is no longer very
important.5 2

... without renewed Congressional efforts the program
might peter out after current funding expires in September 1980.53
These remarks were made before passage of California's
Proposition 13 on June 6, 1978. Approval of the taXcutting constitutional amendment, withdrawing massive
funds from local governments, further emphasizes the
importance of continued federal funding to the success
of coastal planning in California.

. . . a creative use of the Coastal Zone Management
Act, along with the other local, state and federal programs, should allow the establishment of a basic integrated management program that can protect, enhance
and allocate the submerged lands, water column and
surface waters of the coastal zone, as part. of an overall
·
state resource management effort.55

A '"Stretched-Out" Process

The period of greater public fiscal austerity that seems
to lie ahead makes even more attractive a suggestion by
Jens Sorensen who calls for phased funding and a
"stretched-out" process. Under his proposal, selected
localities would be chosen by the state commission, presumably with local governments on the coast having some
say in the matter. Resources would be focused on these
chosen communities, enabling them to push ahead with
their programs, while those of other localities would be
deferred or pursued at a slower pace. When the selected
initial programs were reasonably complete and further
funding becomes available, the other programs could be
pursued. Meanwhile the permit system would continue
to apply in the "deferred areas," affording them protection in the interim.

A Look to the Future: Clarifying Coastal Issues
Coastal planning in California has so far been a success
story of some magnitude: initiative petitions for Proposition 20 were circulated in the summer of 1972 and a
coastal regulatory and planning process has been in place
since early 1973. Virtually all of many tight deadlines have
been met, and a hard-fought legislative struggle in 1976
established state-local coastal planning on a permanent
basis.
State and local bodies are in the early phases of the
collaborative effort to make the process work. Proposed
local programs are being reviewed by the state coastal
commission, which will later examine and certify acceptable local plans and implementing ordinances.
The state and regional commissions need to focus
attention on the major issues that local plans must deal
with in order to protect the coast and achieve state goals.
In providing needed guidance, the state commission ought

Coastal Waters and Seaward-Side Issues

Coastal planning
with land-use issues,
edge inland to the
immediate pressures

has so far dealt almost exclusively
involving that area from the water's
coastal zone boundary. The great
are on the land, and the fledgling
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to decide which policies are more important and in what
circumstances, and identify those that may require further
interpretation.
With such state. leadership, the regional commissions
and staff can, in turn, play a stronger role in coastal planning, working with local governments more closely in the
bargaining and negotiation that lie ahead. Such state-local
collaboration will be a central need during the next three
years, when a host of issues must be resolved both within
coastal communities and between the state and regional
commissions and local governments.
Coastal decisionmakers must strike a balance between
proposals that may be too lenient to provide coastal protection and others that may be so strict or detailed as
to be unworkable, unenforceable or otherwise unacceptable. Clarifying state coastal priorities will give the
state and regional commissions additional yardsticks
to guide future judgments on local plans.
While refming its policy priorities for the coast, the
state commission needs to work closely with other state
agencies having major coastal zone responsibilities. Those
agencies, in turn, need to develop coastal priorities and
plans in cooperation with the coastal commissions and local
governments. The concept of collaborative state-local
plarming includes accommodating the goals and objectives
of both local communities and state agencies in the local
governments' LCPs, which, when certified, will govern
future state activity on the coast.
Other Important Considerations
As suggested earlier, a number of additional considerations must be addressed as coastal planning develops.
First, the 1981 deadline for completing the current
phase of coastal planning may be unrealistic. A "stretchedout" planning process permitted under the 1976law might
be useful. Resources could thus be funnelled into selected
local governments, and the deadlines for the others postponed. The lessons learned in approving the first round of
local plans woUld probably facilitate the second round.
Second; regardless of the deadline, substantial state
and federal funding will continue to be essential to effective coastal planning, probably for a long time to come.
The tasks looked formidable even before passage of
Proposition 13 in June 1978. The massive diversion of
property tax revenue away from local government seems
almost certain to affect coastal planning adversely. On
the other hand, if major federal funding continues to be
available for California and the other coastal states, the
initial momentum may be continued.
Third, implementing coastal plans is a big job that
must be addressed soon. It is not clear how effective regulation alone can be in preserving the coast. On the other
hand, large-scale acquisition of coastal property could be
prohibitively expensive, especially if not accompanied
by measures to restrain speculative market forces and land
price inflation.
Fourth, while difficult problems remain in resolving
conflicts between the public's interest in coastal resource
preservation and the interests of property owners, regulation will nevertheless continue to be the heart of the
coastal protection program. Critics have complained that
coastal regulation has sometimes been arbitrary or other-

wise faulty. Environmentalists have expressed concern that
new regulatory agencies may fall into the same traps as
the old-line state and federal agencies, i.e., cumbersome,
legalistic and costly court-like procedures that discourage
public participation and help pave the way for "client
capture" of the agencies. Accordingly the rich experience
of California's coastal permit appeals ought to be mined
for evidence of what has worked well, and what changes
might improve regulatory processes.
Finally, interested private citizens should also monitor
coastal planning in their communities, especially since
public participation is encouraged and solicited under the
law. While widespread participation is hard to achieve in
practice, coastal planning nevertheless offers excellent opportunities to citizens having the time and energy to study
and understand coastal issues. Even a relatively few active,
well-informed persons can have significant influence, especially if allied with one or more organized community
groups.
In a National Perspective

It is appropriate to conclude by viewing coastal planning
-in national perspective, emphasizing its accomplishments
and promise. In California and elsewhere the new processes
signal an attempt to break with the history of uneven and
often poor results of using unassisted local land use powers
to protect the environment. Local governments have been
required to yield some of their control over land use
decisions. Technical planning processes in local governments are being improved, or being installed where to ali
intents they may have been virtually lacking.
Federal policy is also providing guidance for future
state coastal land use decisions. The states will review local
efforts to implement the coastal law for compliance with
state and federal objectives. The forums created by coastal
planning have helped involve new community-minded
clientele groups, in addition to those with special interests
in the profits that could be made under lenient regulation.
The emerging processes of coastal decisionrnaking will
force ali governments with coastal interests-federal,
state and local-to plan more carefully. Long-term commitments will have to be made as coastal plans emerge.
These changes will be of major significance to the private
sector. While some investors and developers may object
to the more stringent regulations, others may fmd welldefmed coastal plans to their liking, and much preferable
to uncertainty and delay.
Finally, the federal-state coastal programs may be setting
precedents for new experiments in federalism. Federal
policy seems aimed at a federal-state partnership, with
most of the planning and policy decisions delegated to the
state level. The states in turn are free to shift important
responsibilities downward, and in most states, local governments will play a major role. So far California's experiment
has been one of the nation's foremost successes in coastal
planning. With much luck and hard work, it may be possible to keep the momentum.
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wished to encourage greater development of water resource~ and to bring apparently useless western land under
cultivation and produce more food and fiber. On the other
hand, Congress wanted to promote broad social and economic development, with widespread land ownership and
a family farm system of production. 1 To insure achievement of these broad social goals, Congress further stipulated that in order for a family to be eligible for project
water, it must not own more than 160 acres within federal
water projects, and must reside on or near its land. Congress also provided a small additional benefit to stimulate
such economic development by permitting water users to
repay the full cost of irrigation construction over a tenyear period, interest-free.
In the intervening 76 years, Congress has not amended
the acreage or the residency requirements. It has, how·
ever, extended the original ten-year, interest-free repayment period to 40 years, and has changed the repayment
criteria so that water users are no longer,liable for full re·
payment of all project costs. Since 1939, water users re·
pay only the portion of irrigation costs they can "afford"
to repay (measured by an ability-to-pay formula) and the
remainL11g costs are paid from other project revenues,
mainly from sales of hydroelectric power. The effect of
these amendments has been to increase the water subsidy
dramatically, although tlus was presumably not the intention of Congress. Instead, Congress amended the law to
provide relief to hard-pressed farmers who could not pay
the high costs of federal water during a period of extreme
agricultural depression, and to stimulate the Reclamation
program during the New Deal in order to provide massive
public employment. In sum, with these amendments
Congress did not intend to create a system of subsidies
that would, in more prosperous times, give huge windfalls
to those fortunate owners of land in Reclamation projects.
The current crisis in Reclamation policy arises from a
growing discrepancy between the stated goals of the Re·
clamation Act and the actual implementation of the pro·
gram by the USBR. Through a variety of questionable
administrative interpretations of the law, USBR has all

RECLAMATION POLICY AT A CROSSROADS
E. Phillip LeVeen
Department of Agricuitural and Resource Economics
University of California, Betkeley

Introduction
This report analyzes a major issue in the current congressional debate over the future of Reclamation policy-the
water subsidy. It will be argued that there is little justification for its continuation under either (1) the present
policies of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) or (2)
those contemplated by most of the proposed Reclamation
Act amendments currently before Congress.
The subsidy no longer meets the original objectives of
the Reclamation Act. Its elimination would restore fiscal
stability to the Reclamation program, provide a measure
of equity in the distribution of project benefits, and
change the incentives that now encourage wasteful development and use of water, an increasingly scarce natural
resource. The only justifiable way to continue the subsidy would involve a major revision of Reclamation policy
to bring it into line with its original objectives. Few if any
of the legislative proposals before Congress would effectively do this. (See Table, pp. 6-7.)
These arguments will be illustrated with examples drawn
from the recent experience of the Westlands Water District, which contains the newest and most expensive of
all Reclamation irrigation projects, and which demonstrates, in the extreme, many of the irrationalities of
current Reclamation administration policy.

Brief Background to the Current Situation
In 1902 Congress established the Reclamation program
to achieve two different policy goals. On one hand, it
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but eliminated the effectiveness of the residency and acreage requirements, and has thereby disregarded the broad
social and distributional goals that remain part of its
legal mandate. These administrative procedures, in combi·
nation with the growing magnitude of the water subsidy,
have led to the construction of increasingly expensive
water projects that impose considerable costs on the taxpayer, misallocate water resources, and give highly concentrated benefits to a few landowners.
The discrepancy between the Reclamation program's
stated goals and its actual implementation has received
considerable attention from public interest groups, who
have forced the issue on Congress and the courts in recent
years. Congressional hearings and reports by public
agencies have documented the abuses of the current administration of the program and have led to the introduction of legislation to enforce more strict compliance
with the intention of the existing law. Moreover, recent
court decisions require the enforcement of acreage restrictions in the previously exempted Imperial Valley and
Army Corps of Engineers' districts in the Kings River
Basin. Consequently landowners in these regions face
divestment of about 750,000 acres (which are held in
excess of the 160-acre requirernent). 2 In response, these
landowners, through sympathetic legislators, have introduced legislation to repeal the offending requirements.
Another court order (National Land for People vs. the
Bureau of Reclamation) required the Department of the
Interior to issue a set of written regulations on the adm.lnistration of its Reclamation program in order to achieve
greater congruence between the practices of the USBR
and the law's stated objectives. In August 1977, the department issued a set of regulations that would have
ended many of the procedures now used by the USBR to
avoid enforcing residency and acreage restrictions. Predictably, these regulations stirred bitter debate. Landowners obtained an injunction against the implementation of the new regulations until completion of an environmental impact report. Meanwhile, legislation has been
submitted on their behalf to legalize the status quo. For
its part, the Department of the Interior has modified its
original proposed regulations and had its own bill placed
before Congress. Thus at present about 30 pieces of legislation are before Congress, containing at least six major
alternative approaches to modernization of the 1902 Reclamation law.

procedures constitutes an unfair use of public power since
most project participants based their decisions to accept
federal water on past practices and interpretations of the
law.
Proponents of a stricter interpretation respond that
smaller 160- to 320-acre farms are economically viable
and efficient enough to produce food at current prices.
This position has considerable academic support. 4 They
also contend that the broad social and economic development goals encouraged by the original Reclamation Act of
1902-widespread land ownership and family farms-remain important and relevant policy objectives today, and
can be implemented only by returning to the strict enforcement of existing acreage and residency requirements.
Neither side of the debate has given the subsidy issue
much attention, mainly because neither side wants the
subsidy eliminated. In the fmal analysis, however, the
most important question confronting Congress is whether
or not to continue subsidizing water.

The Magnitude of the Water Subsidy
As noted above, the major subsidy to Reclamation water
users is the exemption from paying interest on the costs
of irrigation facilities. Most house buyers are aware that
interest costs account for the major portion of total mort·
gage payments. Thus over 40 years, at the modest interest
rate of 7 percent, the interest on a project amounts to
about 7 5 percent of total project costs. If water users had
to fmance their irrigation development privately, assuming
the same interest rate and cost of development, they
would have to pay roughly four times as much for their
water as under the federal system.
This is an additional subsidy to water users, for they are
not required to repay the full construction costs, less
interest. For example, on those projects completed between 1903 and 1976, the total irrigation construction
costs (excluding costs of flood control, recreation, and
wildlife refuges) amounted to $3.62 billion. However,
water users were originally liable for only 60 percent of
the $3.62 billion, or $2.09 billion, with the rest to be paid
out of revenues from hydroelectricity sales.
But water users have not even been repaying the $2.09
billion because of the impact of inflation on project
operation and maintenance costs. On most projects, it
has been the practice to sign a 40-year repayment contract with the irrigation district; during this time the price
of water is fixed. The price is initially established to provide sufficient revenues to meet the costs of operating and
maintaining (O&M costs) the project as well as the repayment liability for construction costs. As inflation increases the O&M costs, fewer and fewer project revenues
are available to meet the repayment liability for construction costs. Thus if total O&M costs accruing between
1903 and 1976 are subtracted from total payments made
by water users during the same period, it is found that
only about $0.07 billion of the $2.09 billion of construe-

The Issues in the Congressional Debate
Much of the debate over the future administration of
Reclamation projects centers on questions of efficiency
and fairness. Large landowners have argued that a stricter
interpretation of the Reclamation law, forcing a reduction
in farm size, would be out of step with modem agricultural technology and would therefore increase production
costs, reduce farmer welfare, and raise food prices. 3 They
further contend that any reversal of current administrative
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distribute the extra economic benefits remaining, after
full repayment of irrigation costs, to as many family
farmers as possible in order to stimulate western rural
economic development.
As the high costs of western water development became
more apparent, Congress was forced to recognize that
irrigation in the West could not expand rapidly if development was restricted to only those projects capable of
paying their own way. Therefore, in amending the law to
increase the irrigation subsidy and permit the more rapid
development of western water resources, Congress made a
decision to sacrifice some efficiency in order to create
more important nonefficiency benefits. The justification
for expanding the subsidy has generally been the promotion of widespread land ownership and rural economic
development based on small family farms. Congress may,
of course, have had other less noble reasons for sacrificing efficiency. For example, the greater subsidy permitted an expansion of the pork barrel. In summary, nonefficiency goals may outweigh efficiency goals in the
formulation of public policy and provide a legitimate
rationale for the water subsidy.
Policy-makers today need to ask whether the sacrifice
of efficiency in water resource development is still justified, given different social and economic conditions.
Does the subsidy create enough nonefficiency benefits to
warrant its existence? Those who would repeal or modify
the acreage and residency requirements argue that these
provisions must be changed to meet the needs of modern
agriculture. In other words, these requirements are
alleged no longer to provide sufficient social or economic
benefits to justify their existence. But if this is true,
similarly, there would also be little justification for a
subsidy or for continued inefficient resource development.
Yet the proponents of reform would retain existing water
pricing practices and hence the subsidy.

tion costs for which water users are liable have actually
been repaid, or 3 3 percent. Moreover, at current collection rates and costs (even assuming no further inflation) it
would take 432 years for water users to repay their share
of construction costs. This means that of the irrigation
construction costs of $3.62 billion, roughly 56.7 percent
will be paid from electricity sales, 40 percent from general
tax revenues, and the modest remainder by farmers. It
might be added that since inflation also increases farm
prices and incomes, water users could afford to pay the
inflated O&M costs as well as their share of construction
costs with no significant loss.5
In summary, an explicit subsidy in the form of the interest exemption and the use of hydroelectric revenues is
granted to water users, which reduces their share of total
construction costs to about 15 percent. Inflation adds an
unintentional subsidy by further reducing this share to
about 5 percent. Using conservative assumptions, these
figures imply that the present value (1976 dollars) of the
water subsidy throughout the Reclamation program averaged at least $500 per acre and was probably twice that
figure. A more definite estimate for this subsidy is available for the Westlands, the newest of the irrigation projects, where water users repay all irrigation construction
costs and receive no explicit subsidy from electricity
revenues. Nevertheless, the estimated present value of the
subsidy is between $1 ,800 and $2,200 per acre, depending
on the outcome of water price negotiations between the
. government and the water district. This means that the
total public cost of irrigating 160 acres averages $77,000
throughout the program and about $353,000 in the Westlands.
The Rationale for Water Subsidies
Public-sector involvement in water resource development
is frequently rationalized with the justification that a
variety of institutional reasons-e.g., the right of eminent
domain, access to cheap fmancial capital, and the ability
to spread risk-enable the government to build large-scale
projects more cheaply than the private sector. Therefore,
it is argued, governmental involvement increases overall
economic efficiency. But this efficiency argument only
justifies government intervention, it does not justify the
provision of water at below its cost of production. Under
this rationale, government should undertake only those
projects that the private sector would produce, were it
not impeded by the above restrictions. If efficiency is to
be maximized, the government would develop only those
projects capable of producing a profit, and it should
charge the user the full cost of water.
The originators of the Reclamation Act believed that
irrigation would create so much productivity that the Reclamation program would easily repay itself and still
provide additional economic benefits, hence the program
was originally set up to be self-fmancing. In imposing the
acreage and residency requirements, Congress wanted to

The Nature and Magnitude of Project Benefits
As indicated earlier, there is no necessary relationship
between the economic benefits created by irrigation and
the overall costs of irrigation projects. Efficient resource
development consists of funding only projects whose total
economic benefits are greater than their costs. These were
the kinds of projects that Congress originally envisioned in
1902 and that modern resource development policy guidelines are intended to foster. Under such conditions, water
users would experience benefits from project development, even if they were required to repay full project
costs. If such projects are subsidized, the water user
simply earns an even greater benefit at someone else's
expense.
As already implied, many Reclamation projects do not
meet these efficiency criteria. Inefficient projects would
not be built if water users were forced to repay their full
costs (including interest) because the benefits received
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existence. 8 It is contended that irrigation projects produce substantial indirect benefits in terms of additional
employment, secondary development, and higher taxes,
and that these are more than enough to justify the large
subsidy.
But this is a fallacious line of reasoning. That is, when
the choice is made to irrigate a region such as the Westlands, a choice is implicitly made not to irrigate some
other area, not to commit the tax revenues to some other
government project, or not to allow the private sector to
use the funds by lowering taxes. In other words, if the
project were not built, the funds released would be used
for other investment or consumption. This would have in·
creased income, raised taxes, and added to employment,
thus producing the same kind of alleged indirect benefits
elsewhere in the economy. Consequently unless a case
can be made that the indirect benefits of the Westlands
were greater than those which might have accrued in some
other project, these cannot be taken as a measure of pro·
ject effectiveness.
In summary, the subsidy favors the selection and development of inefficient projects. It helps the USBR to
maintain an ever-expanding program, although the efficient irrigation sites have long since been exhausted and
the nation continues to face agricultural surpluses. It also
encourages the inefficient use of water, which is in short
supply. Moreover, since the inefficiencies are often substantial, once projects are in being any attempt to eliminate the water subsidy would lead to economic hardship
and possible bankruptcy for many producers. In a sense,
we are trapped by our past mistakes.

through increased land productivity would not compensate for the higher repayment obligations. But when
water users are not required to repay a very significant
portion of project costs, this means that highly inefficient
projects will nevertheless provide landowners with substantial benefits. For example, as noted above, the Westlands subsidy amounts to $2,200 per acre. The writer's
research shows that this expenditure creates benefits equal
to about $1 ,000 (or less) per acre. If landowners were required to pay the full costs of irrigating this region, they
would not have supported the project, since they would
have been worse off with the project and better off without it, even though contending with declining ground
water supplies.
The Westlands example does not appear to be an anomaly in the Reclamation program. As pointed out above,
the early projects did not support themselves. Moreover,
most recent economic analyses of the Reclamation program also conclude that wa~er resources have been pre·
maturely and inefficiently developed, and have been misallocated between agriculture and the rest of the economy.6
Subsidized irrigation has encouraged expanded crop
production in the arid West, and has thereby imposed
increasing costs on the taxpayer through the effects of
expansion on the creation of surpluses, and on farmers in
competing rain-fed agricultural regions who have lost their
competitive position in some crops. For example, after
the cotton quotas were eliminated in 1972, cotton production expanded rapidly in California, especially in the
Westlands, to the detriment of smaller southern farmers
and the related rural economies that lost a profitable
market. This shift in location would have been much less
pronounced without the public subsidy. Also, since 40
percent of Reclamation cropland is planted in crops subject to government commodity programs, the irrigation of
the West has encouraged greater production of crops already in surplus supply. This in turn has helped force the
government to impose price supports and supply controls
throughout the nation (at considerable taxpayer expense)
in order to maintain farm prices at politically acceptable
levels. 7 In short, the expansion of irrigation in the West
has several invisible but nevertheless costly side-effects. If
these were accurately estimated and incorporated into our
cost-benefit analyses, the overall inefficiency of Reclamation would be seen as even greater than is generally understood. Briefly, subsidized water permits lands of lesser
quality ("scrub lands") that would otherwise not be culti·
vated, to be put into production. But once they are in
production with subsidized water, they have a "heritage"
and as time goes by it is difficult if not impossible to stop
the subsidy. Yet it is a wasteful use of good water, which
is increasingly in short supply. Thus, the subsidy encourages putting good water on bad land, and on a long-term
basis.
Supporters of Reclamation, including the USBR itself,
attempt to justify the subsidy by arguing that even inefficient projects can create sufficient benefits to justify their

The Distnoution of Project Benefits
Under the Current Regulations

It could be argued that, despite the project inefficiencies
noted earlier, Reclamation subsidies might still be justified
if they facilitate achievement of the nonefficiency goals
described by the Reclamation Act. This leads to the questions of whether these goals have been fulfilled in the
past, and whether they can best be achieved through the
use of water development policies. Before attempting to
answer these questions, it is first necessary to discuss the
nature of project benefits in more detail.
Benefits to Initial Owners
Providing irrigation water increases arid lands productivity and value. The capitalized value of the annual increment to income, equivalent to the rise in overall land
values within a project produced by water deliveries, is
generally taken as the measure of project benefits. These
benefits accrue to owners who had purchased land before
its price rose to reflect the increased productivity made
possible by project water. These owners who have
acquired land within the projects before authorization or
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The second most important practice that allows the
original owners to capture project benefits is the ten-year
grace period for the sale of excess land, during which time
the original owner is allowed to purchase subsidized project water for his entire holdings. In the Westlands, the
total value of access to subsidized water and the additional income created over a ten-year period was estimated to
be $950 per acre. In addition, when a landowner sells
during the grace period, the USBR has permitted selling
prices well in excess of the true "non-project" land price,
thereby allowing the seller to capture additional project
benefits. In the Westlands this has amounted to an additional benefit of about $400 per acre. Finally, the USBR
has permitted land sales whereby all price controls were
effectively avoided and the original owner captured the
entire capitalized value of the subsidy.
In 1968, when water deliveries began, there were
approximately 2,500 individuals and corporate landowners in the 545,000 acre Westlands Water District.
About 84 percent of this land was held by 280 individuals
or corporations, with an average holding of 1,650 acres.
The_average benefit received by this group was therefore
about $1.6 million per owner. On the other hand, the
2;!00 other owners, with holdings averaging about 40
acres, received about $40,000 each in benefits from the
subsidy.
In 1968 the Westlands was organized into 97 farms
(with "farms" defmed in terms of production units).
Absentee landowners leased their holdings in these farms,
which are generally run by hired management and labor.
Today, with only half of the land classified as "excess"
and possibly available for subdivision into smaller farms,
there are only about 216 farms (also mostly leased)
averaging about 2,200 acres each.9 Even if the remaining
excess land were subdivided in a similar manner the district would not have more than 350 to 400 farms when
the last of the excess land had eventually been sold.
In short, under the current administration of the Reclamation Act, a project has been built whose costs exceed benefits by a ratio of two to one. The public will
have spent over $1 billion to irrigate 545,000 acres and
create about 300 new farms ($3 3 million per farm).
Moreover these farms will be run mainly by hired managers and workers. The benefits of this project will have
been captured by a small number of individuals and corporations, many of whom have little interest in or contact
with farming, and certainly could not be called "family
farmers."
The Westlands experience, though perhaps the most
extreme of all Reclamation projects, helps demonstrate
the irrationality of the way the Reclamation program has
been administered. The large subsidy, never intended by
Congress, is used to make an inefficient project politi·
cally desirable. USBR administrative practices give a
major share of project benefits to the original landowners,
helping insure their active support for the program. This
arrangement allows the expansion of the Reclamation program, thereby satisfying the agency and select members of

construction are the primary beneficiaries of project
water. As long as these individuals are able to sell their
land at the increased market price, they will be able to
capture the entire windfall benefit associated with the
project.

New Buyers
Anyone purchasing land after the authorization of a
project will take the increased eamin~ potential into
account and will pay a price for the land such that the
expected profit on the investment will approximate that
on other investments of comparable risk. The water project does not provide a windfall for such an investor, as it
does for the original landowner. Of course, if water prices
were unexpectedly raised, or if future regulations were to
prohibit the new landowner from using the land in some
way, he would experience a net loss of his income or
wealth, not compensated by a prior windfall benefit.
One of the critical issues in the Reclamation debate
hinges on whether benefits conferred by past administrative practice can be recaptured by new public policies and
made available to a different set of beneficiaries. In fact,
once the land has changed hands, recapture of benefits is
virtually impossible. Policies intended to achieve recapture would redistribute income, but only at the expense
of owners who purchased the land at higher prices that
reflect its new productivity made possible by subsidized
irrigation. In short, bygones must be bygones.

Westlands' Benefits
The writer has investigated the distribution of project
benefits in the Westlands Water District, fmding that
under the current administrative practices of the USBR,
virtually all project benefits accrued to the original landowners of record at the time of water deliveries in 1968.
This accrual of benefits to original owners has been facilitated by the USBR's administrative interpretation of the
Reclamation law, which has led to several questionable
practices.
The most important of these practices is the agency's
failure to impose the residency requirement, allowing
absentee owners to keep their land and lease it out. These
actions have all but eliminated the incentives for owners
of excess land to place their holdings on the market for
new family farmers. Instead, owners can redistribute their
holdings under new titles, using the names of family
members, relatives, or corporations, in order to conform
to the 160-acre restriction on ownership. Next they can
lease the land to large agricultural management firms that
farm the land in major tracts, using hired managers and
laborers. If residency were required, most of this reorganization of titles would be pointless, since the new
"owners" do not live on the land, and could not qualify
for water.
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TABLE
Proposed Reclamation Legislation (1978)

S.2925
Key Provisions

National Land
for People

s. 1812

H.R.13473

Nelson-Haskell

Administration

Maximum land ownership
for water eligibility

20-640 acres; average
of 200 acres overall;
lower average in productive regions

160 acre~ per adult and
160 acres per one dependent

320 acres per adult involved in significant farming
activities

Maximum size of farm
(owned and leased land}

unlimited

320 acres

960 acres

Leasing

not allowed

not allowed

maximum 160 acres
per owner

Residency

farmer must reside
within 15 miles
of farm

farmer must reside
on or near
the land

farmer must reside
within 50 miles
of farm

Method of establishing
price of excess land;
duration of price
controls

sale price of excess
land equals market
value less project
benefits for duration
of project life

sale price of excess
land equals seller's
cost plus consumer
price indexing for 10
years after initial sale ;
then no price controls

Secretary sets excess
land price to reflect
market value less
project benefits, for 15
years after initial sale;
then no price controls

Compliance period 1

3 yea,rs

1 year

5 years

Selection of buyer

lottery 2

seller selects buyer

lottery 2

Exclusions and exemptions from acreage and
residency

none; requirements apply
to all users receiving
water by or through
federal facilities

none; requirements apply
to all users receiving
water by or through
federal facilities

certain districts when
contract payout is
complete and others
when payout is completed if family farms
are established

Other provisions

government land
purchase equal to 20%
of excess land sold each
year for lease to new
farmers

government land
purchase and lease
program and loan
guarantees; water
prices reviewed every
five years

accepts the concept
of "commingling" and
thus implies regulations
apply to any joint statefederal projects

1. Refers to excess landowners. Leased land, foreclosed or inherited land may have different terms.
2. Lottery arrangements grant preferences to certain groups such as family members, neighbors, and employees who otherwise meet
remaining criteria.
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S. 2606; H.R. 11638
Church; Baucus

H.R.l3404
Krebs

S.2818;H.R.13350,
13480
FARM/WATER Alliance

S. 2867; H.R. 11944,
12187, 12552,
12708
Goldwater; Stump

1,280 acres owned or
leased per family

640 acres owned
per family; owner(s)
involved in day-today farming with 50%
of income from
farming

320 acres per owner

no limit

1,280 acres

1,920 acres

unlimited

unlimited

only within the
1,280 acre limit

only within the
1 ,920 acre limit

no maximum

no maximum

not required

not required

not required

not required

no controls
mentioned

Secretary sets excess
land price to reflect
market value less
project benefits, for
15 years after initial
sale; then no control

sale price of excess
land equals seller's
cost plus consumer
price indexing for I 0
years after initial sale;
then no controls

no controls

10 years

5 years

not given

not applicable

seller selects buyer

seller selects buyer

seller selects buyer

seller selects buyer

no controls after
repayment of project
costs with termination
of contract

Kings River districts
exempted; no other
provisions for relief

district repayment of
project interest costs
(lump sum or annual);
restrictions do not
apply to underground
water beneficiaries

not applicable

water prices reviewed
every five years
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Tightening Current Interpretations

Congress, while giving large windfall benefits to those who
are fonunate enough to own land in the right places at the
right time.
On the other hand, the would-be family farmer in whose
name this large expenditure is justified receives few benefits. The general public pays much of the bill, both
through taxes and through the less visible costs of malallocated resources.

The second set of bills includes those that would enforce
a stricter interpretation of the spirit of the existing law
than is currently observed by the USBR. These bills
would place a ceiling on land ownership (ranging from
160 to 1,280 acres) and also on farm size (ranging from
320 to I ,920 acres). They would require most benefits to
go to landowners who were also farmers (by restricting
leasing and in some cases requiring residency). They
would control the price of land to prevent speculative purchases. Several would also provide for periodic review and
adjustment of water prices. These bills include those of
Nelson-Haskell, the Administration, Krebs, and Church
and Baucus.
Although there are major differences among these bills,
all would have two effects of varying impact. They would
(1) reduce incentives for construction of projects like the
Westlands, and (2) force a wider distribution of project
benefits than has occurred in the Westlands. The flrst
effect is the more important of the two.
All the proposals except the Administration bill would
reduce the time period for compliance with excess land
provisions. The Nelson-Haskell and Church bills would
require landowners to sell their excess holdings within one
year, while the Krebs bill requires sale in five years. The
current ten-year period would thus be shortened, and the
benefits made available to excess landowners reduced by
varying degrees, depending on the ownership maximum
established (Nelson -Haskell would be the most restrictive).
All of these bills would require the project beneficiary
to be an active farmer, thereby eliminating the current
practice of conferring benefits on absentee owners who
otherwise meet the acreage restrictions. In· short these
bills would reduce the incentives for the original owners
to support a large program, because many would be
forced to give up most of their holdings, in return for
which they would receive relatively small benefits. This
would be particularly true for potential projects wherein
landholding is highly concentrated, as in the Westlands.
The establishment of a maximum on farm size and
ownership would force a broader distribution of project
benefits. The Nelson-Haskell measure would produce the
most progressive distribution of benefits, but even under
this bill, the distribution of project benefits would not be
adequate to justify continued subsidy of water. This can
be illustrated by the impact of the Nelson Haskell bill on
a project like the Westlands. If farm size were restricted
to 3 20 acres, there could have been at least I, 700 farms in
the Westlands, instead of the projected 400 farms that will
eventually be formed under the current administrative
practices. The increase in number of farms would appear
to imply a major change in the nature of the region's
farming.
Upon closer inspection, however, the actual impact of

The Effects of Pending Legislation
A number of bills have been introduced in Congress
dealing with Reclamation policy (see Table). None of
the proposals would remove the water subsidy. With one
possible exception, none of them would increase the
social or "nonefficiency" benefits of water resource
development-e.g., widespread ownership and family
farms-enough to justify the continued subsidy of water.
Several of the bills would, however, reduce the incentives that encouraged inefficient water resource development. To illustrate these points, the pending legislation is
discussed in three categories, each analyzed with reference
to its possible impact on the development of a hypothetical project like the Westlands.

Removing Acreage and Residency Requirements
The fu:st set of bills comprises those that would repeal
the acreage and residency requirements outright, thereby
in effect legislatively approving the current administrative procedures described above. These bills include those
of the FARM-WATER alliance, Goldwater, and Stump.
Obviously if acreage and residency requirements were
dropped, but the subsidy continued. projects like the
Westlands would become even more attractive to those in
a position to benefit, and the benefits would be as concentrated as the initial concentration of ownership.
In short, while the water subsidy remains, such bills
will simply assure continuation of the irrationalities of
water resource development. They would also allow large
landowners to consolidate their existing project benefits
and prevent any further dispersal of these benefits to new
farmers. In older projects, this fegislation might insure a
measure of fairness to landowners who never benefitted
from the original project windfalls. But this policy would
be inappropriate for new projects such as the Westlands,
where the original owners are still in possession of much
of the land, as well as for future projects where it would
encourage inefficient development.
The problem of older, established projects and fairness
of administrative treatment could be handled more effectively through exemptions. That is, each of the projects
could be examined and exempted from new legislation
where conditions warrant.

50

•

If this bill were imposed on the Westlands, it would distribute the subsidy benefits to a relatively larger number
of households and stimulate more overall rural development than any of the other bills. For example, a study of
the impact of enforcing a 200-acre average maximum on
farm size concluded that population and employment
would roughly double in the Westlands, and household
income would rise by about 75 percent and be much more
concentrated in the middle income groups than under the
existing system. The average farm family income would
be about $30,000 per year, and with this greater purchasing power there would be more retail purchases and
hence new jobs, more community development, and a
doubling of nonagricultural employment. 11
If one can accept the Bass/Kirshner analysis of the
impact of the 200-acre restriction and its implications for
the Westlands, the NLP bill appears to offer Congress an
alternative that would help to re-establish the original
purpose of the Reclamation Act, i.e., stimulating rural
development. The author has reservations concerning the
economic feasibility of this bill in its present form, but
does not doubt that an agricultural system of interdependent production units could be devised to_ support even
more families than estimated by Bass and Kirshner.l 2
Admittedly, if enacted the measure would probably restrict water resource development, especially in regions
of high concentration of land ownership. If, however, the
law were enforced in such projects as the Westlands, it
could help to make the best of a bad investment by
helping transform the agrarian system and providing new
economic opportunities for individuals who have not
shared in the past benefits of agricultural and water resource development.

imposing the 320-acre limit on a region such as the Westlands appears less profound than may be thought. For
example, on a 320-acre farm the family could provide the
management as well as perhaps some of the field labor for
certain crops, but the farm would continue to be dependent on hired, seasonal labor. Thus at least 40 percent of
the labor required by a 320-acre farm would be supplied
by low-wage, temporary farmworkers, the same proportion as under the current system. 10
In other words, the structure of the rural economy will
not be fundamentally changed. Resident family farmers
would displace hired managers and permanent farmworkers, but the reliance on seasonal farmworkers, the
chief source of rural poverty, would continue. Moreover,
such a change in farm management does not imply a new
increase in the number of families associated with the agricultural system, so there is little reason to believe that the
Nelson-Haskell bill would encourage rural economic
development.
Equally important, under the Nelson -Haskell bill the
subsidy will remain highly concentrated. It is estimated
that a 320-acre farm in the Westlands would derive about
$320,000 in windfall benefits under existing water prices.
This benefit amounts to about $20,000 per year, in
addition to the normal return on management and labor,
estimated at between $15,000 and $50,000, depending on
prices and crops grown. In short, the subsidy would
create a new wealthy landowner class, but would leave the
sources of rural poverty untouched. Given these considerations, it seems clear that the water subsidy cannot
be justified under even such a strict interpretation of the
existing Reclamation Act.

Encouraging Widespread Rural Development
Conclusion
The third category of bills includes only one-that of
National Land for People (NLP)-which would attempt to
restructure the Reclamation Act to make the most beneficial use of the subsidy in supporting widespread rural
development. The NLP bill proposes an average parcel
size of between 150 and 200 acres, with minimum parcels
of 20 acres and maximums of 640 acres. It would require
a lottery to distribute excess land, and include a 15-rnile
residency requirement to force farmers to live near their
land. The bill would also provide for a perpetual subsidy
through indefinite control over land prices in the district.
Finally, the bill apparently would require compliance with
the acreage and residency provisions within three years.
It seems certain this bill would render a project like the
Westlands politically infeasible, because it would require
landowners to give up most of their land with little in
return. Such a bill would therefore likely rule out much
of the additional planned water resource development in
California, whether the resource development were efficient or inefficient. This might be preferable to the
current situation, but obviously might also restrict useful
development.

Large water subsidies are the source of most of the
problems in the current Reclamation program. Unfortunately, these effects are not well understood, and have
been lost in the current congressional debate over acreage
and residency requirements. The subsidy has created
political incentives encouraging the construction of "pork·
barrel" projects which, in turn, require the overdevelopmen! of rivers and streams and the overconsumption of
water by agriculture at a very high public cost.
The subsidy was originated to facilitate the rural development goals of the Reclamation Act. But in fact the
record shows that under the program's current administration the subsidy has increased the economic and
political power of the original landowners. It has not
promoted small family farms or rural development. Instead, the subsidy has contributed to inefficient water
resource development and regressive social development.
What is to be done? The previous analysis suggests the
following approaches.
First, the subsidy should be withdrawn from all future
projects. Rural development no longer is the most press51

ing issue. instead, the main concern is efficient resource
development. No matter how widely distributed the
subsidy might be, its benefits cannot justify the continued
inefficient overdevelopment of irrigation facilities. Where
rural development is desirable, other kinds of public
policy can achieve these goals more efficiently. If the subsidy for new projects is withdrawn, it is unlikely that
there will be any large-scale water development projects
in the future, at least until agricultural prices have risen
to much higher levels than now prevail.
Second, with respect to projects already completed or
under construction, the minimum appropriate reform
would reduce the subsidy by requiring water users to
repay their share of construction costs, plus orration and
maintenance costs, within a reasonable time. 1
Third, with respect to restrictions on acreage and resi·
dency, appropriate reforms would depend on the extent
of the subsidy and the age of the program.
(I) Future projects are considered first. If the subsidy
were eliminated from future projects, the case for such
restrictions would be weakened. Moreover strict acreage
and residency requirements might prevent efficient pro·
jects from being built, because of landowner reluctance.
Even if the subsidy should be continued for future pro·
jects, however, strict requirements would still inhibit construction of water projects, both efficient and inefficient.
Accordingly, removal of the subsidy seems clearly pre·
ferable to acreage and residency restraints, although the
latter would be better than continuation of present practices.
(2) With respect to projects under construction or
completed in the comparatively recent past, if partici·
pants are willing and able to make full repayment of costs
plus interest, an exemption from acreage and residency
requirements would seem appropriate. But the situation
is different if a substantial subsidy continues indefinitely
and the land remains in the hands of the original ownersas is true of Westlands. ln these cases strict acreage and
residency requirements-like those in the NLP bill-can
appropriately be imposed without unduly penalizing such
owners, who would already have benefitted from landvalue appreciation.
(3) Finally, in older projects like those in the Imperial
Valley, we must acknowledge that to impose acreage and
residency restrictions would inflict large uncompensated
losses on existing owners, who are not the original owners
and beneficiaries from the initial land-value appreciation.
Accordingly, such old projects should either be exempted,
or if restrictions are imposed they should be accompanied
by some form of compensation.
To sum up, the greatest opportunity for experimenta·
tion is with future projects yet unbuilt, where elimination
of the subsidy seems the most appropriate policy. Substantial experimentation is also possible with projects
under construction or recently completed-such as the
Westlands-where strict acreage and residency requirements are appropriate policies, along with other measures
to encourage rural development.
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stringent rationing programs. These results are encouraging,
especially as the Pacific Southwest and many other areas
suffer permanent water shortages or deficits, accentuated
from time to time by periodic droughts. If people can thus
dramatically cut down the use of residential water, conservation as a strategy for dealing with chronic shortages
can be much more effective than previously believed.
The research was done in nine selected San Francisco
Bay Area water districts shown in Table 1, chosen as
follows.2 Three districts were selected from those having
rigorous conservation programs (a conservation goal of 30
percent or more below previous use, coupled with stringent
regulations and penalties). Three districts were selected
from those having moderate conservation programs (a
conservation goal of 25 to 30 percent below previous use,
and less stringent regulations and penalties). And fmally
three districts were selected from those with mild conservation programs (a conservation goal of 25 percent or less
below previous use, and with few if any penalties or regulations).
The investigation had four major objectives: (1) to
determine how co'l:;umers rated the equity and effectiveness of the water conservation program they had experienced, (2) to evaluate the effectiveness of each conservation program in terms of water actually consumed, (3) to
investigate relationships between consumer beliefs and
behavior, and (4) to assess opinions about regionalization
of the San Francisco Bay Area water supply. The fmdings
are presente_d in full in a report for the National Science
Foundation;3 highlights and policy implications are offered
here.

RESIDENTIAL WATER CONSERVATION:
POLICY LESSONS FROM THE
CALIFORNIA DROUGHT*

William H. Bruvold
Depanment of Social and Administrative Health Sciences
School of Public Health
University of California, Berkeley

Introduction
How do residential water users respond to severe water
shonages? Are they willing and able to conserve, and if so,
to what extent? What are the implications of water users'
behavior for long-term conservation in California, a state
with a permanent water deficit? Some answers are found in
a study of actual experiences during the recent California
drought.
In the winter of 1976-77 Central California got far less
than average precipitation. I Thus a very dry year followed
the relatively dry winter of 1975-76. In the San Francisco
Bay Area these two successiye years of short supply meant
that, to get through the summer of 1977 and prepare for
the possibility of a third dry season in the winter of 197778, water districts had to adopt emergency conservation
programs involving their residential users. Fortunately the
rain and snow returned in abundance during the winter of
1977-78. Accordingly conservation and rationing programs
were removed early in 1978.
Experience with the water districts' different kinds of
residential conservation measures during 1977 represented
a "natural experiment," whereby the equity and effectiveness of these various programs could be evaluated and
compared. Research on water conservation programs in
the Bay Area has revealed a remarkable reduction in residential consumption. People actually saved more water
than they were requested to, even in areas like Marin
County where a critical shortage forced the imposition of

Ratings

In rating the programs, respondents focused on equity or
fairness, as well as effectiveness and overall performance of
the water districts' conservation measures. In general, all
ratings were quite positive. The three rigorous programs
were rated as fair, effective, and quite satisfactory overall.
Exceptions to the generally positive evaluations were (1)
the fairness ratings of the three moderate programs and (2)
the effectiveness ratings of the three mild programs.
Respondents rating the moderate program districts
recommended improving fairness by basing rationing allotments on numbers of people served, rather than on past

*This material is based upon research supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant Number ENV77-16171.
Any opinions, fmdings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation.
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Table 1
Major Residential Surveys

County

Conservation
program
rating

Percent
reduction
sought

Basis
of
allotment

City or area surveyed

Water service agency

San Rafael and Southeast
Marin County

Marin Municipal
Water District

Marin

Rigorous

57

Per capita

San Leandro, San Lorenzo,
Castro Valley

East Bay Municipal
Utility District

Alameda

Rigorous

35

Per capita

Concord

Contra Costa County
Water District

Contra Costa

Rigorous

30

Prior use

Palo Alto

Palo Alto

Santa Clara

Moderate

25

Prior use

San Francisco

San Francisco

San Francisco

Moderate

25

Prior use

San Mateo

California Water
Service Company

San Mateo

Moderate

25

Prior use

Southeast San Jose

Great Oaks Water
Company

Santa Clara

Mild

25

Prior use

Napa

Napa

Napa

Mild

20

Prior use

Vallejo

Vallejo

Solano

Mild

10

Prior use

moderate programs were even better than those sought,
while the mild programs did not quite reach their stated
goals. In short, this ability of residential consumers to
reduce daily water consumption exceeded stated conservation goals, and in fact caused the water districts financial
problems when revenues declined more than anticipated.s

use, size of lawn, or ability to pay. This recommendation
on fairness is a major finding of the study. Thus the per
capita allotment system adopted by the rigorous programs
probably accounts for their positive fairness ratings,
because they were seen as equitable despite their stringency;
Respondents rating the three districts with mild programs emphasized improving effectiveness by making
rationing mandatory rather than voluntary. They seemed
to be saying "Something worth doing is worth doing well."
Respondents from all nine water districts also recommended (1) improved communication between the district
and its customers. (2) stricter enforcement of rationing
rules and prohibitions, and (3) avoidance of ambiguous
"double messages" that actually promote greater use while
ostensibly encouraging conservation. Points one and three
are discussed more fully below in the section on communication.

Beliefs, Behavior and Use
Beliefs measured in the survey included views of the
seriousness of the drought crisis and the need for longterm conservation. The analyses of self-reported conservation behavior produced an "overall weighted conservation
behavior score," based upon number of conservation
actions undertaken from the onset of the drought, e.g.,
installing a shower flow restrictor, use of "grey water,"
installing toilet tank dams. and so on. The actual number
of gallons of water used per person per day during the
summer of 1977 was figured directly from respondents'
water bills. When measures of belief were correlated with
the weighted conservation score, and then with water use,
it was found that socio-demographic variables of income
bracket and education level did not materially affect the
correlations. Further, beliefs about the seriousness of the
crisis correlated with the weighted conservation behavior
score, but not with per capita daily use. Beliefs about the
need for long-term (non<risis) conservation correlated with

Effectiveness
The evaluation of program effectiveness requires a statement of program goals or objectives, and comparisons to
determine whether desired changes were obtained.4 For
these water conservation efforts, program goals were
expressed in percent reduction of water consumed residentially. (See Table 2.) The results of rigorous and
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Table 2
Effectiveness of Water Conservation Programs
Daily per capita water use in gallons
City surveyed

Summer 1976

Summer 1977

Percent reduction
Sought

Obtained

Rigorous Program

San Rafael
San Leandro
Concord

86
151
220

35
61
100

57
37
30

59
60
55

213
109
156

112
59
92

25
25
25

47
46
41

172
160
128

144
129
120

25
20
10

16
19
6

Moderate Program
Palo Alto
San Francisco
San Mateo

Mild Program

San Jose
Napa
Vallejo

per capita daily use, but not with the overall weighted
conservation behavior score noted above.6
These results are quite provocative and do not fit in a
simple way with the notion that response to a crisis situation produced the low consumption figures of the summer
of 1977. The people who believed in a continuing longterm need to conserve water actually used less water per
person per day than the others. Those who believed the
drought to be only a serious short-term crisis, even though
they changed many behaviors after the drought began and
did conserve, nevertheless used as much water as those who
doubted that the drought was a crisis.
Regionalism
Regional organization for a variety of purposes in the
San Francisco Bay Area is a persistent issue that was raised
again by the 1977 drought.7 Wide differences in conservation programs mounted by the many water districts
around the Bay raised questions of inter-district fairness.
Would it be better to share water among districts and adopt
one overall rationing and conservation plan? The worsening
drought made the conflicts apparent during preliminary
interviewing in the spring of 1977.
Accordingly a question on regionalization of the Bay
Area water supply and related rationing programs was
included in the major survey during the summer of 1977.
The data in Table 3 show that all areas surveyed, except
one of those with a rigorous conservation program (San
Leandro), favored local rather than regional water supply
systems and conservation plans. Respondents from the
other two districts with rigorous conservation plans, while
giving a modest edge to local plans, nevertheless also voted
for regional approaches in higher percents than in districts
with moderate or mild programs. Apparently the respon-

dents residing in the districts having more stringent rationing programs, even though they judged their own programs
to be fair, may have desired greater equity between districts
in rationing programs, since they were under the most
pressure to conserve.
Recommendation: Policy for Acute
Drought Rationing Programs
The major fmding on equity provides the first policy
recommendation for rationing programs in acute droughts:
Water allotments should be based upon number of people
served, not last year's use, size of lot, square feet in the
house, or any other similar criteria.
It would be administratively easier for water districts to
ask for a percentage reduction based on prior use, but as
many respondents pointed out, this penalizes prior conservation and rewards prior excessive use. Also, it causes
other problems because all consumers must know their
prior use level in order to comply with such a program.8
Additionally, both consumer comments and our evaluation
of program effectiveness strongly support a per capita
allotment. In an acute drought, priority must be given to
people and their ingestive, culinary, sanitary and cleaning
needs. During a real emergency all other uses of water,
e.g., agricultural or industrial, become secondary compared
to the health and safety of individuals.

Recommendation: Mandatory Rationing
A second important policy recommendation: Rationing programs for acute droughts should be mandatory,
even if restrictions and penalties are not severe. Major
support for this assertion comes from the consumer ratings
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Table 3
Attitudes Toward Regionalization of the San Francisco
Bay Area Water Supply System by Percentage

Clearly favors
regional plan

Leans toward
regional plan

Can't decide

Leans toward
local plan

Clearly favors
local plan

No data

Percent
Total

Rigorous Program
San Rafael
San Leandro
Concord

38
52

6

46

5
0

2
3

7
2

4

47
38
45

2

51
42

4

55

2

65
62

0
.,

54

0

1
1

100
100
100

Jfoderare Program
Palo ...\lto
San Francisco
San .\1ateo

25

14

4

5

36
. 29

3

9

4

8

6
2

27

2

2

26

1

21

9

3
3

100
100
100

Mild Program
San Jose
Napa
Vallejo

and comments upon effectiveness. People living under the
voluntary programs were particularly vocal. fmding it
incongruous to hear continually :J.bout the seriousness of
the acute drought :J.tTlicting the San Francisco Bay Area.
while only being :J.Sked to try to reduce their own use. in
effect. "if this were not too much of a personal hardship .. ,
...\lso. the data on amounts actually conserved shown in
Table :::. demonSLr:ne the mandatory programs· much
g:re:ner ef:e:::::ver:ess. .'>1anC.:uory rationing by the stringent
and moderate programs seemed to reinforce media information that the drought was indeed serious, and that people
must cut back water use in order to avoid potentially severe
future problems and shortages.
Further. if rationing programs employ rules and prohibitions, these should be enforceable, and in fact enforced.
When flagrant rule breakers are not punished, this lowers
the morale of consumers who carefully follow the rules
and abide by the prohibitions. Water district staff may find
the idea of enforcement repugnant, since they see their
mission as providing services. Nevertheless, if rules and
prohibitions are needed to deal with acute drought, these
should be vigorously and widely enforced.
If, however, a water district does not wish to become
involved in policing door-to-door to ensure compliance, it
should adopt rationing rules and regulations that do not
require close surveillance. Perhaps pricing penalties or
fines, along with a clearly stated quota for each residence,
followed by regular feedback to customers on consumption, will suffice in all but the most extreme drought conditions. Even though an individualized system of feedback
and penalty for each residence would be difficult to imolement, it might nevertheless involve less effort than widespread surveillance programs.

4
5
13

.)

100
100
100

Recommendation: Communication

A third poiicy recommendation for rationing programs
in acute droughts: Gear and consistent communication

between a water district :md irs residential consumers is
essennal. ~any comments urged that the communication
process be improved. and the survey results suggested that
districts were not accustomed :o communicating with their
customers on an individualized. ::asis. Also. some consumers did not understand their diSLrict's overall program.
partly because it was put together quickly, and was subject
to change as the drought worsened.
In short, information on the water situation and on
rationing programs needs to be communicated as clearly,
simply, accurately and consistently as possible, with individual feedback to customers on amounts used compared
to allotments. Of course, it helps if the rationing plans are
as simple as possible-consistent with equity and effectiveness-and it should again be noted that water districts'
informational feedback on use may be more acceptable as
an aid to "self-enforcement" than vigorous door-to-door
enforcement programs, which would cast water district
personnel in the role of special police.
"Double messages" should be avoided. The data show
that many residential consumers used less than their stated
allotments, especially in the three moderate rationing
program districts, thus causing !1nancial problems for the
water districts when revenues began to decline sharply. 9
Presumably the unanticipated success of conservation
presented the districts with an unexpected fmancial problem, causing some of them to issue messages that seemed to
imply that conservation, while desirable, "could be carried
too far."
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These double messages and lack of vigorous enforcement apparently disturbed respondents who were con·
vinced that the drought was acutely serious, and were
trying to follow conservation measures at considerable
personal expense and inconvenience. Following are some
suggested ways for water districts to avoid the unantici·
pated double bind that prompted the double messages.

that the best and most effective approach to reduced residential use may come from steady, long-range, methodical
programs carried out in a non-emergency atmosphere.
This idea augurs well for long-term residential conservation
of water. Probably a crisis is not needed to get people to
follow substantial conservation practices.
In fact, an
approach that focuses on a short-term crisis may not be as
effective as preparing for long-run reductions.

Principles and Policies for
Long· Term Conservation

Recommendations: Specific Steps

Four major principles should be kept in mind when
considering policies for long-term conservation. First,
residential water conservation will probably have to be
stepped up rather than decreased in California and the
western United States over the coming decades. No longer
does it seem sufficient to plan in terms of 200 to 300
gallons usage pe.r person per day. Rather, as this research
shows, the figures could drop to 100 gallons per person
per day or even less. (See Table 2 for per capita water use
in the summers of 1976 and 1977.)
There is plenty of evidence of the need to conserve
water .10
California's population continues to increase
(though more slowly than many had projected earlier);
energy costs for treating and transporting water are rising;
the new large-scale inter-basin water transfers are becoming
less desirable or feasible; and there is strong support for
conserving environmental quality by maintaining wild rivers
rather than damming them. Moreover both Californians
and immigrants from wetter regions need to be made to
recognize the impact of heavy water use in semiarid regions
like California.
Second, under the typical district fiscal fotrnula, with
most funds coming from water sales, we have seen how
conservation places districts in a double bind. Thus conser·
vation reduces water district revenues, and when people
conserve dramatically, revenues also fall dramatically .11
Something must be done to deal with this problem equi·
tably, if necessary conservation measures are not to cause
water districts severe fmancial distress.
Third, residential consumers can and will conserve water.
The many individual conservation efforts, going beyond the
goals set by the districts, were unanticipated. The results
suggest a different basis for future planning of residential
water use. Many people found that living on 100 gallons
per person per day was not too difficuJt.l2 Changes
required in watering outside plants, as well as in use of
indoor plumbing, and in related conservation behavior. were
usually not unduly vexing or expensive. In fact, despite the
emergency's end when heavy precipitation came in the
winter of 1977-78, conservation practices developed
during the summer of 1977 appear to have been carried
over into the summer of 1978. In· any event daily per
capita use has remained lower than it was during the
summer of 1976.13
Fourth, the people with the lowest per capita daily use
of water were those who saw the drought as a harbinger of
a longer-term need to live with less water in the future.
People who believed only in a serious shon·term crisis
reported adopting many new conservation behaviors but,
surprisingly, their belief in the seriousness of the crisis did
not correlate with per capita daily use figures. This implies

What are the implications of these fmdings for longrange residential water conservation programs? What
specific steps should be taken? First, a water meter of
some sort should eventually be provided for every separate
dwelling unit. A responsible person in each unit should be
informed regularly on actual consumption in relation to
targeted allotments based on the number of people per
dwelling unit. Thus, each responsible person for each
residential meter ought to know his or her targeted allot·
ment in understandable terms, and get monthly informa·
tion on how well he or she has performed in relation to
that allotment. A landlord or apartment manager could
act as the responsible person for multiple-family dwellings.
Admittedly such a program would require changes and
additional operating expenses, as well as costs for installing
and monitoring more meters. There is also the problem of
determining the number of people served by each meter.
One simple way would be to assume that the number of
people per meter is three, unless demonstrated otherwise,
and using standard procedures for adjusting this number
when necessary. Once additional meters have been installed
and the basic allotments established, modern computer
technology could ease the burden of issuing individualized
reports regularly with the water bill. In fact, such reporting might not cost much more than the modern com·
puterized billing procedures already established.
With respect to enforcement, pricing should be the
major regulatory mechanism employed to encourage conservation, penalize over-allotment use, and provide the
water utility with a reliable income. A good method would
be a flat rate or minimum monthly service fee for con·
sumption below and up to the basic allotment. Ideally
the minimum charge would provide a reasonable income for
the water district without imposing a burden on any con·
sumer, for example $10 per month for water use up to but
not exceeding 10,000 gallons for the "standard" family of
three. While a minimum monthly service charge for consumption that is less than the basic allotment probably
would not encourage extremely low levels of conservation,
it would promote reasonably frugal use while guaranteeing
fmancial support for the water district.
A steeply inclining block rate structure would apply to
amounts used above the basic allotment, to discourage
such consumption.I 4 For the "standard" family example,
the second-block rate ($5 .00/1,000 gal.) for use over the
basic allotment, up to double the allotment, might be five
times the rate for the first or basic allotment block ($1.00/
1,000 gal.). The third block rate ($10.00/1 ,000 gal.) might
be ten times the rate for the basic allotment (for use from
two to three times the allotment) and so on. Excess use
would thus automatically be penalized regularly, without
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efficient appliances, and also make solar heating of water
and rooms more attractive fmancially.
As with water conservation, such programs would
require a change in the utilities' marketing approaches.
Instead of trying to sell more services, they would have to
promote conservation. In fact, electricity and natural gas
suppliers may already be closer to accepting this idea than
are the water utilities. There is much to recommend the
concept of allotment quotas noted on bills, along with
information on amounts used during the previous month or
billing period, with penalty costs clearly stipulated. iS The
initial costs for beginning such programs could be lower for
electricity and natural gas suppliers than for the water
utilities, as many dwelling units already have gas and
electricity meters and monthly billing is computerized on a
regional basis. Highlighting information on amounts of
energy used, in the context of a clearly stated conservation
goal, and using an inclining block pricing structure, with
penalty costs for uses over the allotments, might be more
effective than rolling black- or brown- outs.

involving water district personnel in door-to-door enforcement.
Admittedly, many details of a conservation plan would
need to be worked out, such as: (1) the number of gallons
in the first block basic allotment and the flat rate associated
with it, (2) providing for reasonable exceptions and appeal
procedures, and (3) the steepness of the inclining rate
structure. Also, people should be instructed on types of
landscaping suitable to California's semiarid Mediterranean
climate. Fortunately, the drought of 1977 may already
have demonstrated to many residents the need for less
exotic and more water-conserving landscaping.
In any event, the inclining block-rate structure has the
following merits:
1. recognizes the need for long-term residential conservation of water;
2. can provide a fair fmancial return to water districts,
even when people conscientiously conserve and reduce
use substantially;
3. considers the number of people within each dwelling
unit when establishing basic allotments;
4. provides for water districts' communication with each
residential consuming unit on a regular basis;
5. involves no restrictive regulations or direct enforcement, thus taking advantage of the users' willingness and
ability to conserve: and
6. emphasizes the more effective, long-run planning
approaches to conservation.
Other advantages include ease of adjustment: The
rate structure could be tightened for drier periods and
relaxed for wet cycles, simply by modifying the basic
allotment. For example, during extended dry periods,
the basic allotment of 100 gallons per person per day for
the "standard" three-person family could be lowered to
75 gallons per person per day. During extended wet
periods, it could be raised to perhaps 125 gallons per person
per day. Adjustments could also be made for climatic
differences in sub-areas like those around San Francisco
Bay. Allowing for such differences could help make
regional planning for water conservation more acceptable
to the public, while still maintaining a single basic type of
conservation program.

Conclusion
In conclusion, research on v.:ater conservation in the
recent California drought demonstrates that people can and
will save a scarce resource-water-a good deal more effectively than may have previously been believed. These
encouraging results suggest that conservation of water and
other scarce resources, such as electricity, natural gas,
gasoline, heating oil, and coal, will be enhanced if consumers receive convincing evidence of the need for conservation over the long run. Further. the study indicates that
conservation programs will be more effective if (1) they are
viewed as equitable by those so governed, (2) the need for
the programs, including their details, are clearly and consistently communicated, (3) individuals receive regular,
periodic information regarding their consumption in relation to their allotments, and (4) there are economic
penalties for amounts used over the allotment.
Finally, the research indicates that conservation would
be encouraged if current marketing practices were restructured to reward-or at least not penalize-efforts by the
consuming public to use less. The "lifeline-inclining block"
structure suggested here might also work well for other
resources such as electricity, natural gas, heating oil and
coal. In any case, economic penalties for excessive use, and
rewards for conservation (or at least non-punishment),
should apply to the suppliers and consumers of our scarce
natural resources.

Implications for Long-Term
Energy Conservation
Now that the drought has abated, contemporary events
place residential energy conservation in the forefront of
our thinking, even more than residential water conservation. Some of the ideas developed here for the long-term
residential conservation of water appear to be adaptable to
other scarce resources, e.g., electricity, natural gas, and
other energy sources. The goal of a meter for every dwelling unit and basic allotments on the monthly gas and
electricity bills, indicating each consumer's use over or
under a basic allotment, appear quite feasible. An inclining
block rate could be instituted, and already has some
precedent in the so-called "lifeline" rates for certain utility
customers. High penalty costs for heating in the winter and
for cooling in the summer might convince energy bill payers
of the value of insulation. Also, penalty costs for electricity usage could help persuade consumers of the value of

NOTES
1Mark Hoffman, "Urban Drought in the San Francisco Bay
Area: A Study of Institutional and Social Resiliency" (Berkeley:
Teknekron Incorporated, October 1978), Fig. 1-3, p. 22. Prepublication draft.
2During the spring of 1977, and while the selection of water
conservation programs for study was underway, a five-part schedule
was developed, covering respondent identification. beliefs about the
drought, conservation behavior, equity and effectiveness, water
consumed, and socio-demographic data. After pre-testing, it was
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administered as a person-to-person interview to 100 randomly
selected voting age respondents from each of the nine districts
surveyed, yielding a total of 900 respondents for the overall study.

Swe found that requiring a percent reduction from last year's
use may seem simple and logical, but it is not really a good approach
because: (1) last year's use is usually unknown to consumers, (2)
usages vary widely during the year due to differing vacation
schedules and seasonal demands, and (3) consumption may be expressed in units of 100 cubic feet, a term not familiar to most
people.

3
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(March 1968). Advanced statistical analyses, stepwise multiple
regressions, were used to analyze the relation between beliefs and
conservation behaviors.

13 see Hoffman, note 1 above, Fig. 7-2, p. 291.
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7 See John T. Knox, "Regionalism in the Bay Area," in Paul W.
Gates, Ronald B. Robie, John T. Knox and Norman Y. Mineta,
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THE CALIFORNIA WATER SYSTEM:
ANOTHER ROUND OF EXPANSION?

provide an intro'duction to: (1) the political alignments
and arguments pro and con regarding expansion of the
California Water System; (2) the principal features of
Phase II; (3) the central issue dividing opinion, i.e., whether
water quality in the San Francisco Bay and Delta can be
safeguarded; (4) the more basic question whether additional
water transfers are needed, or economically rational; and
(5) suggested policy alternatives to Phase II, which follow
from our conclusion as to the economic and environmental
unsoundness of further water supply expansion at this time.

Richard Walker and Michael Storper
Dep~mentofGeo~phy

University of California, Berkeley

INTRODUCTION

ISSUES AND ALIGNMENTS

After two years of bitter wrangling, the California Legislature adjourned in September 1978 without authorizing
"Phase II" of the State Water Project.! This monumental
$7 billion undertaking2 would almost double the size of
the present California water storage and transportation
system, already the largest in the world. Its central and
most controversial feature is a Peripheral Canal, which
would cross the Delta formed by the Sacramento and San
Joaquin rivers at the head of San Francisco Bay. Although
strongly backed by the Brown administration, which tried
to satisfy project opponents by including certain environmental safeguards and water conservation measures, the
project bill (SB 346) died when it returned to the Senate
in August, 1978, for concurrence with Assembly amendments. But the idea of expanding the state water system is
far from dead. Pressure for a cross-Delta transfer facility
and increased movement of water to the south has been
building for over a decade, and proponents of Phase II
believe its time is overdue. A new project authorization
bill (SB 200) was submitted to the Legislature this year,
and complex political maneuvering is now taking place)
Since Phase II would be perhaps the largest new capital
commitment by state government at a time when the need
for fiscal austerity is being widely proclaimed, it is impor·
tant for the people of California to be apprised of the issues
surrounding the proposal.4 To this end, this report will

The main support for Phase II of the State Water Project (SWP) comes from the water-short areas of Southern
California: urban users represented chiefly by the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD) and
San Joaquin Valley growers and their local irrigation
districts. These areas receive massive transfers of water from
Northern California's Sacramento River system by means
of the SWP, Phase I, operated by the Department of Water
Resources (DWR), and the Central Valley Project (CVP),
operated by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (USBR).
Over the years the water users to the south have been per·
sistent and successful in securing new supplies. They won
authorization of the CVP in the mid-1930s, the SWP in
the late 1950s, and are now fighting for the third genera·
tion expansion of the state water system.
Supporters of Phase II make four basic arguments.
First, they claim that the SWP was never compieted as
authorized, since a cross-Delta transfer facility was included
in the California Water Plan (1957). Second, the MWD
fears that Arizona will begin to divert its full legal entitle·
ment from the Colorado River in 1985, cutting into MWD's
draft.S Third, many growers in the Valley are faced with a
falling water table, which makes drilling and pumping in·
creasingly expensive and causes ground subsidence in some
places. Finally, both MWD and Valley irrigation districts
point to contractual obligations incurred by the state and
USBR that cannot be met with existing storage and delivery
capabilities. Behind all these arguments, of course, lies a
claim of "need" for more water, which rests on an assump·
tion of the invariability of present day use and pricing
practices.

The writers wish to acknowledge the help of several readers,
that of Ronald B. Robie, Director of California's
of Water Resources. While we are not in agreement on
a number of points, his knowledgeable comments and queries
helped clarify a number of questions, and are appreciated. We, of
course, are solely responstble for the information, interpretations
and conclusions presented in this paper.
p~icularly
Dep~ment
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the Peripheral Canal as the desired transfer mechanism, an.d
it· has been embroiled in controversy ever since. Reaction
was so strong against the Environmental Impact Report
issued in 1974 by the Reagan administration that the incoming Brown administration undertook a new "Delta
Alternatives" study, which went through several drafts
between 1975 and 1977. In the end, the Peripheral Canal
emerged once more as the official favorite.lO
Water planners face a basic geographic discrepancy in
water supply and demand: the area of greatest rainfall
and the largest rivers is the northern third of California,
where the main storage dams of the State Water Project
and Central Valley Project are located-CVP's Shasta,
Trinity and Folsom, and SWP's Oroville.ll To the south
lie the arid regions, with much of the state's arable land and
the majority of its population. In the middle of the state,
however, lies a major obstacle to water transport: 1,100
miles of meandering channels and 738,000 acres of islands,
comprising the largest inland delta in the United States,
outside Alaska.
Some 5·6 million acre-feet (MAF)l2
of water per year are pumped out of SWP's Clifton Court
Forebay and the nearby CVP Tracy pumping station
(both on the south edge of the Delta) into two man-made
rivers, the California Aqueduct (SWP) and the DeltaMendota Canal (CVP), for delivery to 76 contracting
agencies. The purpose of the Peripheral Canal, then, is
to span the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta with an effi·
cient, large-scale conduit to move more water from the
northern part of the state to the south.
When the giant project pumps are operating at capacity, water does not so much move across the Delta as
around it, traveling down the main channel of the Sacra·
mento River and then being pulled back around the west·
emmost island. This "reverse flow" drags salt water back
with it from the tidal zone where the Delta's fresh water
mixes with the San Francisco Bay's salt water. In summer,
lower river flow and maximum water demands coincide to
make the problem worse.
Saline intrusion into the Delta has four major impacts:
(1) Water users to the south do not want salty water,
so the agencies are limited in the amount of water they
can pump.13
(2) Delta farmers are directly affected by saline conditions. Very low water during extremely dry years such as
1976-77 already seriously jeopardizes agriculture in the
western and southern Delta.l4
(3) Homes and industries in northern Contra Costa
County are serviced with water drawn from the Delta via
the Contra Costa Canal. In the spring of 1977, during
the drought, water quality was seriously lowered. With
the exception of only four days, intake water at Rock
Slough daily exceeded health standards of not more than
25 milligrams of chlorides per liter. Thereafter, the state
built emergency rock barriers across several channels to
keep back the salt water.15
(4) The Delta and adjoining Suisun Marsh are, variously,
home, breeding ground, and migratory way station for
many waterfowl and fish, including King Salmon and
Striped Bass. High salt levels affect the success of these
species in ways not well understood, but very likely detri·
mental. In addition, the "reverse flow" confuses migrating
fish and the project pumps ingest millions of fry and eggs.
Together, these effects have had a negative impact on fish

Arrayed against the water industry is a loose coalition in
Northern California opposed to further water development.
The principa1 opponents are the farmers of the rich agri·
cultural Delh region. They presently draw water directly
from the Delta channels to irrigate their crops, and fear
that further diversions south will jeopardize water quality'
when salt water from the Bay penetrates the Delta in the
summer because of low runoff from the Sacramento and
San Joaquin rivers.6
Additional opposition comes from Bay Area munici·
palities concerned about the detrimental effects on the Bay
of reduced freshwater outflow from the Delta. They
worry about the loss of Bay "flushing" and possible neutralization of gains in water quality achieved through large
investments in pollution control.
Environmentalists echo the fears of others regarding Bay
and Delta water quality, more from an ecological point
of view than a fmancial one. Particular concern attends
the possible degradation of Suisun Marsh, with its con·
siderable birdlife, and reduction of large migratory and
in-Delta flsh populations. In addition, environmentalists
question the long-range plans of the water industry to
develop the last remaining wild rivers in California, North
Coast rivers such as the Eel, Trinity and Klamath.? Environmental arguments in this case coincide with the
regional interests of the northern third of the state, for
which the rivers are the main natural amenity and basis
for any further local development.
The environmentalist camp has developed an important
schism. In 1978 the Sierra Club supported the Brown
administration strategy of incorporating legal protections
for Delta water quality within the Phase II package. The
club's leadership argued that unless the compromise legis·
lation were accepted, a worse bill with no environmental
safeguards whatsoever might be enacted in years to come.
On the other hand, Delta farmers and other environ·
mental groups, such as Friends of the Earth, put little
faith in government promises about water quality protection after the Peripheral Canal is completed, removing
the principal obstacle to greater water withdrawal. Indeed,
opposition within the ranks of the Sierra Club itself has
subsequently forced the leadership to retreat to a neutral
position.&
At the same time a split also emerged among forces
normally pro-development. Many Valley water districts,
the California Farm Bureau Federation, and several Republican Senators representing Southern California, refused to
support the Phase II package in 1978 because they felt that
Delta environmental protections were too strong and could
prevent delivery of water. Thus, the governor's attempt
to satisfy interests on both sides of the controversy -by
enlarging the California network while providing legal
safeguards for Delta water quality-was not successful.
The interests in conflict were not resolved.

PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF PHASE II

The Peripheral Canal
Some kind of facility to transfer water across the Delta
has been envisioned since the drawing up of the California
Water Plan in 1957.9 In 1966 DWR officially designated
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populations.
The water agencies hope that the Peripheral Canal will
solve all the above difficulties, as well as fulfilling their
primary purpose of moving the water south. The Canal
would be an unlined ditch, 43 miles long, 400 feet wide
and 30 feet deep, with a capacity of 16.3 MAF per yearenough to carry over 70 percent of the average flow of the
Sacramento River. It would skirt the east side of the
Delta, pumping water directly from the Sacramento near
Hood and delivering it to Clifton Court Forebay. Along
the way it would have 12 gates from which water could be
released into the channels of the Delta to create a westward flow.

The debate over Phase II centers on the ability of
certain water management measures and legal safeguards
to offset the effects of increased withdrawals from the
Sacramento-Bay Delta system. Many backers of the project, including administration officials, see it as an environmentally sound alternative to the present degradation
of the Delta.18 Project opponents claim that these measures are insufficient to protect the Bay and Delta, arguing
(1) that the environmental impacts of Phase II are poorly
understood and (2) that the formal protections to be
erected would be unable to withstand future political
pressure for their relaxation or elimination.

Remainder of the Phase II Package
Unresolved Environmental Problems
By itself the Peripheral Canal cannot solve the problems
of the Delta, let alone meet the goals of the water industry
for supply expansion to meet an estimated export demand
of 7.5 MAF by the year 2000. As a result, a complementary system of storage and conveyance facilities has been
proposed by DWR to go along with the Canal. These are:
1. Storage components north of the Delta: Cottonwood
Creek project (2 reservoirs) and Glenn Reservoir and
diversion complex (or, alternatively, the Colusa Reservoir
complex). All three are off-stream storage located on the
west side of the Sacramento Valley. Glenn would be the
state's largest reservoir at 8.7 MAF (cf. Shasta's 4.5 MAF
capacity).
2. Facilities in the Delta: the Peripheral Canal; relocation of the Contra Costa Canal intake to Oifton Court;
southern and western Delta water quality improvement
structures; and Suisun Marsh protective structures.
3. Components south of the Delta: the Mid-Valley
Canal to offset groundwater overdraft in a federal service
area; Los Vaqueros unit (2 reservoirs west of Clifton
Court); if needed, Los Banos Grandes Reservoir, near
San Luis Reservoir; unspecified additional service to the
Bay Area; and groundwater storage works and wastewater
reclamation projects.
In all, Phase II would cost over $7 billion, of which
approximately $1 billion would go to the Peripheral Canal.
The federal government would pay for half the Peripheral
Canal and provide water for the Mid-Valley area.l6
The system would augment the delivery and storage
capability of the CVP and SWP by about 3 MAF and make
it easier to meet commitments during water-short years.
Phase II also contains certain innovations its proponents
herald as differentiating it from all previous water projects.
Most crucial here is the stipulation that, for Phase II to
proceed, Congress must order the USBR to operate in
accordance with California state Delta water quality
standards-although exact standards are not specified by
statute. In addition, water conservation and wastewater
reclamation are declared to be goals of state water policy
and some money has been targeted for agricultural conservation loans and reclamation facilities. Finally, the
package includes as goals groundwater restoration and
storage, and the state government is pushing for reform
of water rights laws to achieve conjunctive use management.l7

The Peripheral Canal would probably solve the problem
of "reverse flow" in the Delta, as planned,19 but it leaves
unanswered questions regarding performance of flsh
screens, sufficient water releases to protect water quality
in the Delta and Bay, and increased agricultural runoff.
The Peripheral Canal will shift the point of intake 40
miles north to the Sacramento River, but will not eliminate
one basic problem. As noted, millions of fish eggs and fry
are now sucked into the Delta pumps every year, despite
attempts to devise a preventive system of screens. In
recognition of this, DWR proposes that a secure screen
be installed at the head of the canal. Furthermore, the
DWR proposes that the canal be constructed in three
segments that could not be connected until effective
screens were developed and demonstrated. The state
Department of Fish and Game, which supported SB 346,
claims that development of an effective fish screen is close
at hand but the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service disagrees.20
Project opponents ask why it is assumed that such screens
can be invented if specialists have thus far found it an
impossible task. In addition, they point out that it is
unlikely that the absence of a suitable fish screen would
realistically be expected to hold up a $7 billion project
once it is nearly complete.
A second difficulty arises concerning the requirements
of the Delta for freshwater flows from the Sacramento.
Satisfactory scientific knowledge is lacking as to the longterm impacts on the wildlife and soils of the area of greater
saline penetration. Researchers are gradually discovering
the serious implications for the Delta environment of
progressively larger water diversions. In the last 12 years,
estimates of the amount of riverine inflow required to
maintain minimum summer water quality in the Delta
have risen significantly from 1800 to 4000 cubic feet
per second. Further research could raise these estimatesthe 4000 cfs figure is currently under challenge by Delta
farmers and municipalities unhappy with· the latest water
quality standards.21
The water circulation patterns and flow requirements
of San Francisco Bay are even more poorly understood.
It is not known how much Sacramento River flows can
be diminished and at what times of the year, without
degrading Bay water quality. This question is particularly
important for the portion of the Bay south of the San
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Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, an area with little natural
runoff and one that experiences only weak tidal action.
The South Bay receives significant amounts of fresh water
"flushing" only when there are relatively large volume,
rapid outflows from the Sacramento River. Otherwise, a
threshold apparently exists under which almost all river
water bypasses the South Bay and goes directly out the
Golden Gate.22
South Bay water has been seriously
polluted by urban wastes and has only begun to improve
as the result of large expenditures for municipal sewage
treatment systems; but the margin of safety for dissolved
oxygen levels in summertime remains narrow. At the same
time, the North Bay relies on steady freshwater outflows
to clear its heavy load of industrial and municipal wastes,
so even the reduction of average flows could lower overall
Bay water quality.
The Bay and Delta are further jeopardized by Phase II
because as more water goes south to irrigate farmland, more
runoff laden with salts and chemical pollutants is generated.
A growing dilemma for San Joaquin Valley farmers is what
to do with their wastes. The proposed solution is called
the San Joaquin Valley Agricultural Drain, already partially
completed. The State-Federal Interagency Drainage Program recently recommended that the drain be continued
to the Delta, where its load of pollutants would be discharged.23
Thus, in spite of the long effort to market Phase II as
an environmentally sound alternative to the present situation, serious questions about its ultimate impact upon
the unique Bay-Delta environment remain unanswered.

when they were not inconsistent with "clear Congressional
directive" for operation of the Project. Secretary of
the Interior Cecil Andrus recently announced that the
Bureau would voluntarily comply with the state Delta
standards in years of sufficient water supply, but here
again the federal government gave away nothing: the
Secretary reserved the right to challenge the consistency
of state standards. In any event his decision could be
reversed by a subsequent administration.27
The SWRCB is also empowered to undertake basin
planning for pollution control.28 Objectives for the Delta
are contained in a Water Quality Control Plan for the
Sacramento-San Joaquin Basin. In August 1978 SWRCB
released a new Basin Plan that replaces Decision 137929
and continues the historic trend with upward revision of
minimum standards for Delta protection. At the same
time, the board now believes that with fme tuning of
fresh water releases from upstream dams a higher level of
protection can be achieved while another million acrefeet of water are exported. This finding appears to be an
attempt to please all concerned, but its feasibility is questionable.30
The Basin Plan is supposed to guide operation of the
CVP under sections 502 and 313 of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, which say
that all federal facilities must comply with state plans.
Nonetheless, the Bureau of Reclamation claims that because the CVP has prior water commitments authorized
by Congress, it is exempt.31 Because of the Bureau's
intransigence, the Phase II package includes a provision
that Congress require the CVP to be operated in accordance with state regulations before Phase II can begin
service.
Will this assure compliance? Several unfortunate scenarios can be foreseen, such as: Congress does not agree but
state legislation is amended to eliminate this provision;
Congress agrees, but fails to provide airtight requirements,
so that a court challenge overturns the agreement; Congress
agrees and all political pressures are focused on the SWRCB
standard-setting process.
What is the security of state standards? We already have
evidence of how poorly they hold up under pressure.
Twice during the drought year of 1977 Decision 13 79 was
amended to lower Delta water quality standards on an
"emergency" basis in the face of inadequate upstream
storage (owing to normal drawdown in 1976 which was
not replenished when the drought continued into 1977,
the driest year on record).32 But if standards can be set
aside precisely when they come into play-during periods
of lowest flow-then their protective powers are an illusion.
If we are to believe proponents of Phase II, laws governing operation of the CVP and establishing Delta water
quality minima are expected to work in the future when
they have not worked in the past. Unfortunately, powerful political forces, armed with actual dams and canals,
can often find ways around seemingly airtight agreements.33

Legal Safeguards
The crux of the Brown administration plan for Phase II
is a set of legal safeguards designed to govern operation of
the expanded State Water Project and to force the USBR
to tailor management of the Central Valley Project to meet
state Delta water quality standards. By physically bypassing the Delta, the Peripheral Canal would preserve the
quality of water going south, regardless of possible deterioration of Delta water quality. Therefore the Delta is
especially vulnerable and needs firm guarantees as part
of any compromise package. Project supporters believe
in the efficacy and permanence of legal regulations, while
opponents hold that-in the words of former California
Senator Peter Behr-"A thirsty beast cannot be contained
in a paper cage."
The State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB)
presently sets standards for the Delta. These emerged,
after years of intense conflict, in the form of Decision
1379 in 1971.24 The State Water Project attempts to
meet SWRCB standards, but the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation does not. The Bureau's Regional Director set CVP
policy in 1957 when he informed the state: "I consider
that the obligations of the Central Valley Project are
satisfied when a satisfactory quality of water is provided
at the intakes to the Contra Costa and Tracy pumping
plants. "25
The controversy recently came to a head in the Supreme
Court decision in California v. United States.26 The
court, however, begged the question by ruling that the
state could impose conditions of operation on the CVP

WATER NEEDS AND SUPPLY ALTERNATIVES

The debate over expanding the State Water Project has
centered on considerations of environmental and regional
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interests. Yet the need for additional surface water supplies
has never been clearly demonstrated. In this section we answer the major arguments proponents use to justify Phase II,
and question the rationality of present water use and
pricing practices. By thus showing that water use does
not expand inexorably, we point the way to alternatives
to Phase II.

the promotion of further irrigated agriculture. In developing the SWP, however, DWR contracted more than I MAF
to the Kern County Water Agency (KCWA). Unfortunately, groundwater proved cheaper for Kern County
farmers than project water, despite falling water tables,
so KCWA had to seek out buyers in previously unirrigated
areas. As a result, much of the agricultural supply of the
SWP went to expand irrigated agriculture.39
We conclude that such divergences between intent and
result are likely to be repeated as long as groundwater
pumping remains unregulated. Nor will the demand for
genuine water-table rescue operations end as long as the
future implications of competitive pumping are ignored
in favor of short-run gain.
Despite extensive evidence of the need for and possibility of successful groundwater management,40 the
agricultural lobby remains officially opposed to even the
moderate program proposed by the recent governor's
commission to review water rights law. One of the principal water industry lobbyists argued before a recent
hearing of the Senate Agriculture and Water Resources
Committee that: "there is no groundwater overdraft ...
[but] simply a shortage of imported surface water." In
short, the water users have not been interested in conserving and managing California's water resources rationally
because so far it has been more protltable for them to
secure imported water41 (see below, regarding subsidies).

Contractual Obligations

•

DWR claims that it requires Phase II in order to meet
the contractual obligations incurred as part of the SWP
-4.23 MAF vs. 2.5 MAF now being delivered. This
discrepancy says less about the need for water than about
the overly optimistic predictions of DWR planners, who
promised more than they could feasibly deliver with the
system built under the original SWP authorization. In
fact, current DWR contracts have clauses that limit delivery and construction obligations to cases where they are
"physically and tlnancially feasible," and it can be argued
that the contracts are not binding if adequate facilities
for delivery do not exist.34 We consider it to be selffulfilling prophecy for the state to promise more than it
can deliver and then to use those promises to justify further
supply expansion.35
At the same time, USBR wants the Peripheral Canal
so that it can incur new contractual obligations.36 Here
again agency optimism overrides wise planning, so that
contractual commitments are made and expectations of
water supply created, which cannot be met.37 On one
hand, the bureau makes promises of "tlrm" water, based
on predictions of supply that underestimate climatic
variability and overestimate the ability of its storage dams
to serve as a hedge against drought. On the other hand,
the bureau delivers "interim" water, which cannot be
assured in dry years, yet which the bureau always hopes
to convert to tlrm contracts, and which creates economic
dependence on outside water in the contracting areas.
So long as these practices continue, there can neJ,-:er be a
water supply system big enough to meet demand, and
there will always be a built-in lever for supply expansion
in the form of unfulfilled contractual "obligations."

Colorado River Water
The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California
(MWD) currently draws much of its water from the Colorado River aqueduct.42 But MWD could lose several hundred thousand acre feet per year, because Arizona won a
Supreme Court decision in 1963 entitling it to a larger
share of the Colorado River. and the USBR is now constructing the Central Arizona Project (CAP). MWD has
a projected demand of 2.1 11AF for the year 2000, and a
minimum supply of 1.2 MAF at that time. Present use is
about L3 MAF per year. Does this mean, as the district
argues, that additional Northern California water must be
imported?
Perhaps not. First, MWD has consistently overestimated
water demands.43 In fact, MWD has- never yet taken its
full tlrm entitlement from the SWP. As a consequence,
large quantities of water earmarked for the Los Angeles
basin have actually been sold as "surplus," at bargain
prices, to landowners in the San Joaquin Valley. Now it
looks as if the same mistake will be made again. If we
look at MWD's predicted demand and supply for the
year 2000, it appears that additional SWP water will not
be needed. MWD predicts a demand of 2.1 MAF per year.
On the supply side it will have a guaranteed 1.0 MAF
from the SWP, even in dry years; between 0.4 and 0.55
MAF from the Colorado River, even after CAP diversions;
and 0.3 MAF from wastewater reclamation. This means
a tlrm supply of 1.7 to 1.85 MAF per year. With 15
percent conservation-a tlgure DWR itself thinks reasonable
(see below)-MWD will be able to eliminate the difference
between demand and supply.44
In addition, the SWP is an expensive source, because
the water must be pumped over 3,000-foot-plus elevations

Groundwater Overdraft
Presently over half of water withdrawals in California
come from the ground. Supporters of Phase II argue that
groundwater overdrafts threaten the future of irrigated
agriculture in portions of the San Joaquin Valley unless
the project is undertaken.38 The problem is undoubtedly
serious, but the question is whether further water imports
will actually solve the problem. History suggests they
will not.
When the Central Valley Project was proposed in the
1930s, one major rationale was to replace the use of
groundwater in the San Joaquin. Nonetheless, after the
CVP was constructed, the groundwater problem remained
because excessive pumping now extended to the West and
South Valley, as irrigated agriculture expanded into these
areas. The State Water Project was then promoted to
help alleviate this overdraft; but it was not intended for
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is fmancially solvent, but it also gives subsidies. The
principal sources of subsidy are: local water district property taxes on urban nonusers; hydro-power revenues;
revenues transferred from Tidelands oil leases; and capital
In short, despite
provided at below market rate.52
apparent fiscal soundness, Bain, Caves and Margolis judged
the benefit-cost ratio of the SWP to be below 1:1.53 At
the same time, as noted above, water demand is artificially
inflated because the amount users pay does not reflect
the costs of the water they use.54

through the Tehachapi range. MWD must therefore pay a
power cost of over $60 per acre-foot. As economists
Bain, Caves and Margolis45 suggested more than ten years
ago, a cheaper alternative supply lies near at hand: Colorado River water currently allocated to irrigators in the
Imperial-Palo Verde-Coachella valleys. Since the latter
pay the federal government only $7.50 per acre-foot,
MWD could compensate the farmers handsomely and
still come out ahead. Less than a 20 percent diversion of
their roughly 4.4 MAF entitlement would make up the
shortfall in water rights lost to Arizona. as estimated by

MWD.
~

Water Use Efficiency and the Potential
for Conservation

A further consideration of cost that weighs against
expanding water imports from the north is the demand for
energy. The SWP is the largest single user of electrical
power in California, owing to the tremendous pump-lift
over the mountains. The planned increase in water shipments to the southern coastal basin will very likely double
present energy consumption, which already equals the
electricity used by the entire City of Los Angeles in 1965.
DWR will have to construct several new power plants
to provide this power. Where will these be sited?46

There is an alternative "source" of water-other than
supply augmentation- Le., conservation through reduced
and rationalized use.55 But given current policies and
practices-such as excess contractual obligations, groundwater mismanagement, and government willingness to
supply low cost water to meet all demands-users have
little incentive to conserve. Under these circumstances,
substantial water conservation without significant dislocation would be made possible by: (1) cutting unnecessary losses in storage and transfer, (2) investing in
improved equipment, and (3) paYing closer attention to
efficiency of use, not to mention eliminating low-value
uses.
The potential for urban residential water conservation
was demonstrated in the great drought of 1976-77, where
unprecedented cutbacks of 50-75 percent were achieved
with water rationing, and 10-25 percent on a voluntary
basis in less hard-hit communities.S6 While one need not
advocate such extreme reductions, 25-33 percent no longer
seems unrealistic, and can be secured by a few basic technical modifications, without significant changes in habits.
Indeed, the permanent efficiencies in urban water use
realized as a result of efforts during the drought have put
demand well below previous estimates of growth, forcing
local water agencies to raise prices to meet their fixed
costs. A Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory study has concluded that 1.8 MAF per year could be obtained from
urban conservation, while DWR itself sees 1.2-2.4 MAF
of potential urban water savings statewide. 57
The potential importance of agricultural water saving
is much greater, of course, since 85 percent of California's
water withdrawals go to irrigation. Although blanket
condemnation of agricultural practices is not justified,
there is considerable room for improvement by cutting
delivery and application losses (through seepage and evaporation) and reducing excessive consumption by the crops
themselves (plants can actually consume more water than
needed for optimum growth). For example, many canals
are unlined and uncovered; the Coachella Canal alone
loses some 300,000 acre-feet of the 1.2 MAF sent down
it each year. (Ironically, the Peripheral Canal would
also be unlined.) Some 82 percent of California's irrigation is by gravity methods, chiefly open-ditch, which
use much more water than other techniques. For example,
sprinkler irrigation uses only 18 percent as much water
as open-ditch (gravity) and drip irrigation only one percent
as much.58 Although the latter are not applicable to
all situations, no one-including DWR-believes that their

Pricing and Subsidies

Must all new demands for water be met? Water demands
are not water requirements dictated by nature.47 Nor
are all demands economically rational, since water is
costly to supply and is no more to be dispensed carelessly
than any other economic commodity. This is particularly
true where water is used in an industrial process, as it is
in California agriculture, the state's biggest business. Agricultural water demands derive from the demand for food,
fibre and forage crops. and the potential for growth in
such markets.
Yet agricultural water is heavily subsidized in California,
making it appear very cheap to growers. The low price
of water artificially inflates demand and offers little incentive to make wise use of existing water supplies.48
Among other things. water subsidy promotes the irrigation
of low-value crops: e.g., forage crops such as alfalfa
account for fully 63 percent of all agricultural water used
in the state. Far from being naturally given, water demand
is flexible and responds to price changes: Economic
studies have repeatedly shown acreages of low-value,
water-intensive crops being reduced as water prices rise.49
In granting subsidies, the federal reclamation program
is the worst offender. Average prices to irrigators are
$3.50 to $8 per acre-foot for USBR water, compared with
$18.50 to $30 for SWP water; prices to cities are considerably higher. Actually, the state system only nominally charges its posted prices. "Surplus" water is priced
with capital costs removed; and since up to 50 percent
of this "surplus" water is mixed in, the average cost paid
by agricultural customers drops much closer to USBR
rates. SO
The pricing and repayment policies of the USBR are
so generous that irrigators pay less than 5 percent of total
costs of supplying the water they use.Sl They pay so
little, in fact, that the CVP could not even cover its operating costs recently. In comparison, the state's water
program is a model of fiScal responsibility, and at least
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potential has been fully tapped. Similarly, possibilities
have scarcely been touched with respect to scientific
management of irrigation, especially careful scheduling
related to soil moisture and crop growth patterns. The
USBR began an advisory irrigation management service
for this purpose within the last t1ve years, and it has shown
good results.59
DWR's rather conservative estimate of potential water
saving in agriculture is 1.2 MAF.60 Of course, water
conservation measures are not without cost, but they
may cost society less than massive water supply projects.
The problem is that under current arrangements-particularly government subsidies for water supply but not for
water conservation-the rational solution for the whole
populace is not presently rational for the fanners.61

NOTES
1 We choose to call the proposals "Phase II" rather than merely
.. completion of the State Water Project," as proponents of the
proposals would have it, for several reasons, amplified in the rest
of the paper. For example, (1) the cost is over three times the
original SWP bond issue; (2) the authorization of the Peripheral
Canal in the Bums-Porter Act is questionable; (3) the addition of
many new features besides the Canal would double or triple SWP
storage capacity; and (4) much time has lapsed since the SWP was
authorized. Perhaps a better name for the project would be "Stage
ill of the California Water System."
2 $3.4 billion in capital costs plus $3.8 billion in interest charges,
with a 5.84 percent weighted average interest rate over a 30-year
repayment period. Sources of capital are: California Water Fund,
60 percent; Tidelands oil reserves, 5 percent; State Central Valley
Project Construction Fund, revenue bonds, 20 percent; miscellaneous receipts, 10 percent; unexpended Bums-Porter bonds
(general obligation), 5 percent.

SUGGElJnONSFORREFORM

•

Proponents of Phase II have promised conservation,
water quality agreements for the Delta, and now a series
of expensive water conservation policy studies originally
proposed by the environmentalist opposition. Nevertheless, the preceding discussion should make it clear that a
high priority for conservation is not part of the California
water industry's prevailing philosophy. We believe basic
reforms are needed in the state's water law, policies and
practices before further authorizations for expansion
of supply. Otherwise, the process of building more water
transfer systems to slake the thirst of the agricultural and
urban water industries seems likely to continue.
Reforms should include: (1) a t1rm acre-foot limit on
Delta exports; (2) congressional reauthorization of the
Central Valley Project to make it conform to state water
quality objectives in the Delta; (3) further research on the
Bay-Delta system's water requirements before building
the Peripheral Canal; (4) federal Wild and Scenic River
protection for the North Coast rivers; (5) reform of state
and federal repayment practices so that water users contribute their fair share of project costs; (6) following the
SU&,aestion of the General Accounting Office, authorizing
no further projects in areas with groundwater overdrafts,
unless management programs are in force; (7) well-fmanced
research and funding programs for diffusion of water
conserving techniques; (8) changes in agency contracting
practices to eliminate overcornmitment of supplies; and
(9) making all water use rights contingent on demonstration of good management practices.
The real answer to the need for environmental protection, economic eft1ciency, and safeguards for water
supply lies in wise use of the water resources already
at hand. But forceful and effective conservation policies
will not be adopted and implemented as long as the alternative of government subsidies and rescue operations are
available. If Phase II of the State Water Project is approved
without the reforms we have suggested, the water industry
will continue to operate in the future as it has in the past.
Demand will once again outrun supply, and even larger
projects will be proposed to meet the inevitable "need"
for more water. We argue that Phase II will not solve California's water problems, but will simply recreate them
again on a larger scale;

3 As of this writing (5/7/79) several bills are under consideration:
-SB 200 (Ayala). Introduced as a duplicate of Brown's SB
346 (77-78), it is now significantly amended and allows the state
to construct the Peripheral Canal without federal participation;
it has also removed appropriations, enabling the bill to pass with
only a majority vote, rather than the normal 2/3 required for
appropriation acts. Presumably, DWR will issue revenue bonds,
thereby avoiding the need for a 2/3 vote in the Legislature or the
need to consult the electorate.
DWR Director Ron Robie has pledged DWR's support for the
bill, so long as it requires state protection of, and a federal commitment to, Delta water quality before any federal water is allowed
through the state-constructed Peripheral Canal If the federal
government refuses to meet Delta standards, Section 11460 of SB
200 (as amended in Senate, 4/30/79) allows the state to meet
standards alone, but requires the standards to be reconsidered
when appropriate permits for the Peripheral Canal have been issued
by the SWRCB.
The push for a state-only canal co= primarily from the Metropolitan Water Dist:rict:. which had earlier proposed its own legislation (Resolution 7768 and accompanying dia.ft legislation, MWD,
2/13/79). MWD accurately perceived that federal approval of
a facility would take years, if it occurred at aJ.J. given Washington's current untavorable view of expensive water projects. Senator Ayala apparently acceded to MWD's strategy in amending
his bilL

-AB 442 (Kapiloff). Introduced by the Chair of the Assembly
Committee on Water, Parks and Wildlife, AB 442 is a general policy
bill Kapiloff held a series of hearings to reexamine the basic
questions of California water management, including subsidi!l.$
and groundwater management. The committee staff is preparing
an extensive bill to include both management reforms and construction of Phase II. This language will be amended into AB 442.
-Several minor bills to authorize the Peripheral Canal have also
been introduced, e.g., AB 303 (Lehman).
-Several water management bills, including: SB 47 (Nejedly)
to establish a groundwater management procedure, following the
recommendations of the Governor's Commission to Review California Water Rights Law. AB 1147 (Filante) would authorize water
transfers and establish tighter fiscal controls. AB 1209 (Gage)
would set up a task force to establish the potential for agricultural
water conservation in the state.
Politically, the battle will be between the Senate-sponsored
bill, which most closely reflects the priorities of the water industry,
and the more reform-minded Assembly bill(s).
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to include, along with the canal, the whole package of storage,
transfer and mitigation features that comprises Phase II.

4 Under SB 346, the capital costs of the project would have
been borne by the State Water Project and the Federal Central
Valley Project, but may be carried by the state alone under current
legislative proposals (see note 3, above).

11 The Sacramento River carries an average flow of 23 million
acre-feet per year, but the San Joaquin only 6.3 million acre-feet.
Together they carry roughly 40 percent of total runoff in the state.
The North Coast rivers, on which only one major dam (Trinity)
has been constructed, carry another 40 percent of the runoff.
Less than 15 percent of California's river outflow occurs south of
San Francisco.

5 MWD's contract was amended in 1964 to add .5 MAF from
the SWP to substitute for losses anticipated from CAP diversions.
6 It should be noted that the Delta experienced very high
saline penetration prior to the construction of the water projects.
The upstream storage reservoirs of the SWP and CVP allow releases
of fresh water in summertime that keep salt water at bay. This is
necessary both for Delta agriculture, which has been established
since the Delta islands were reclaimed by levees around the turn
of the century, and because the water quality at the SWP and CVP
pumping stations in the south Delta must be maintained.

12 An acre-foot is the amount of water necessary to cover one
acre of land one foot deep, or about 325,000 gallons. The average
water used in irrigated agriculture in California is three acre-feet
per year, though the amount varies widely according to crop,
climate, soil and method of irrigation.

7 Plans for North Coast development have long been on the
books of the water agencies (see Sidney Twichell Harding, Water
in California, Palo Alto: N-P Publications, 1960; and Johannes
Humlum, Water Development and Water Planning in the Southwest
United States, [Denmark], Aarhus Universitet, Kulturgeografisk
Institut, 1969). The state Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1972
currently restricts development in the Eel, Trinity and Klamath
watersheds. But it should be noted that Sen. Ayala introduced a
companion bill to SB 346 in 1977-78 which would have repealed
the Scenic Rivers law. Ayala dropped the bill to push SB 346.
Nonetheless, many water agency officials are frank about their
eventual plans to repeal the protection law and dam the Eel In
any case, the status of the Eel River must be reconsidered in 1983.
The storage and conveyance facilities of Phase II, it should be said,
only make the next step of tapping the North Coast much easier,
physically and !mancially.

13 The USBR's operating standard is 750 parts per million
dissolved solids.

8 A similar reversal occurred within the Planning and Conservation League, another Sacramento environmental lobby. The PCL
Board of Directors narrowly voted to endorse SB 346 in 1977, at
the urging of their executive director, who had helped to draft the
bill In 1979, PCL reversed its position, with the appointment
of a new executive director and shifting sentiments on the part of
board members.

17 See California, Governor's Commission to Review California
Water Rights Law, Final Report issued in December 1978.

14 Another threat to Delta agriculture is the scouring of protective levees by project-induced currents. This would very likely
not be solved, but merely shifted to a new location by the Peripheral Canal.
15 In 1977 water quality at Emmaton, near the middle of
Sherman Island in the west Delta, regularly exceeded the 10-day
mean salinity standards of 1000 milligrams per litre chlorides.
16 There is maneuvering underway to have the state assume the
entire cost of the Canal, so that federal approval would no longer
be required. See note 3, above.

18 The ostensible purpose of the Peripheral Canal has been
changed over the years from merely a water conduit to an environmental protection measure. We believe that the basic impetus for
the Canal is the same as ever, but that backers have been forced into
trying to mollify opponents on environmental grounds.

9 California, DWR, Div. of Resources Planning, Bulletin No. 3,
The California Water Plan, May 1957. The Burns-Porter Act of
1959, submitting the bond authorization for the SWP to state
voters, is the key legal document. It mentioned "channel improvements and appurtenant facilities in the Sacramento-San Joaquin
Delta for water conservation, water supply in the Delta, transfer of
water across the Delta. . .and related functions." (Chapter 17 62,
Cal Statutes, 1959). During the 20 years since, three major questions of interpretation have arisen: (1) does Burns-Porter specifically indicate the Peripheral Canal as the Delta Facility? (2) does
Burns-Porter constitute an authorization for the whole Phase II
project? (3) Is any action required by the Legislature to construct
Phase II? Whatever the legality, however, it would be politically
impossible to proceed without legislative approval.

19 sB 346 required federal participation in the construction and
operation of the Peripheral Canal. This year's bill, SB 200, authorizes the state to construct the Peripheral Canal without federal
participation in !mancing or use of the CanaL It would allow the
federal government to wheel water through the Canal under specified conditions. This is important because under the SB 346 plan,
the federal government and the state would have drawn all their
water from the lower end of the Canal, at Clifton Court Forebay.
However, should the federal government not use the state-only
Canal, a situation could conceivably develop where the state is
pumping its water from the Canal at Clifton Court Forebay, and the
CVP is pumping its water directly out of the Delta through its
Tracy Pumping Plant. With this even more complex pumping
situation, it is not known whether the Canal would correct the
existing reverse flow patterns in the Delta. Thus, a state-only canal
might not satisfy even the most obvious environmental requirements.

10 The EIR drew 836 negative public comments. When Gov.
Brown was elected, he promised to reconsider the whole proposal,
in order better to include environmental considerations. He appointed two strongly pro-environmental protection people to be
Director and Deputy Director of DWR. Nonetheless, the only
"Delta Alternative" ever seriously considered in the DWR study
was the Peripheral Canal. See Kelly Robinson, "Project Report:
Delta Alternatives Study," Department of Geography, U.C. Berkeley, June 10, 1977. The main change produced by the study was

20 · William D. Sweeney, Area Manager, U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service in a statement to Assembly Committee on Water, Parks and
Wildlife, 4/4/79: "the present state of the art in flsh screening does
not allow us to endorse the project as being of overall benefit to a
total fish management program for the Delta. ... "
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21 On the historical evolution of standards, see John MacLeod
MacDiarmid, "The California State Water Project: Development,
Description, Current Conflicts," speech presented to the 62nd
Annual Conference of the National Council for Geographic Education, San Francisco, November 27, 1976. DWR maintains that
up to 5,000 cfs are built into its current plans. Our point here is
that this is an area where knowledge is not sufficient and thus
estimates are subject to significant change. ln light of water com·
rnitments now being planned, there is serious risk to the Delta.
As we have attempted to illustrate, we believe it unlikely that,
once these commitments have been made, new scientific knowledge
of outflow requirements would be reason enough to curtail use of
the expensive new facilities.

I

26 California v. United States, 46 LW 4997, July 3, 1978 (Docket No. 77-285).
27 Andrus' decision memo, dated December 29, 1978, reads
in part:
•..Interior would reserve, and the state would recognize, our
right to challenge the consistency of the state standards, whenever meeting those standards impairs Interior's ability to fulfill
other project purposes.
Andrus also proposed to have legislation introduced in Congress
amending CVP authorization to include Delta protection as a project purpose, but the fate of such legislation and its ulthnate impact
remain to be seen. Hearings are now underway to determine the
new scope of CVP authorizations.

22 Hugo B. Fisher Associates, "A Preliminary Report on the
Effects of Density Stratification in San Francisco Bay," Report to
the Association of Bay Area Governments, Oakland, California,
June 1977. See also D.S. McCulloch et aL, "A Preliminary Study
of the Effects of Water Circulation in the San Francisco Bay Estuary-Some Effects of Freshwater lnflow in the Flushing of South
San Francisco Bay." U.S. Geological Survey Circular No. 637A
(Washington, D.C.: 1970).

28 Under Section 303 of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972 and the state Porter-Cologne Water
Quality Control Act of 1969.
29 When combined with Decision 1485 (1978) to coordinate
the plan with water rights.

°

3 Criticisms of the SWRCB Basin Plan and Decision 1485 are
too numerous and complex to be explained here. A number of
water districts in the Delta. environmental groups, and the EPA
have all raised serious questions about the board's plan. The EPA
has not yet approved the SVlRCB plan and has asked for several
revisions. One important area of dispute is the "relaxation provision," which operates as follows: the Plan sets water quality
standards for the Delta. The standards vary according to the hydrological year, Le., in a wet year, water quality is maintained at a
standard higher than in a dry year. The quantity of project def".lciencies in firm water supplies is used to determine the quality of
water that will remain to protect Delta water quality. As C:urrent
USBR surplus water is convened into firm supplies, once the
Peripheral Canal is built, and as DWR contract entitlements increase,
potential project deficiencies in firm supplies will be larger for the
same water year type. This means lowered water quality. For
instance, if a drought in 1979 had caused 2 MAF in firm water
deficiencies to project users, sufficient water would have had
to be released between April 1 and May 5 to meet an electrical
conductivity standard of 4.4 millirnhos at Antioch, in the Delta.
Based on the board's proposed relaxation provision, if the exact
sr:rme conditions occurred in 1988, when commitments may be
2 MAF higher than 1979, there would be a 4 MAF deficiency, but
only the Delta would suffer. See "Petition of Friends of the Earth
appealing SWRCB's approval of Water Quality Control Plan and EIR
and Decision 1483," September 11, 1978.

23 San Joaquin Valley Interagency Drainage Program. "Agricultu.ral Drainage and Salt Management in the San Joaquin Valley,"

January 1979.
This has given rise to several criticisms and concerns: (1) Some
observers question whether it is possible to meet salt standards
safely while discharging 300 cfs of drain water into Suisun Bay,
when total Delta outflows are sometimes less than 10 times that
amount. (2) Discharges of chemicals such as DDT, dieldrin and
toxaphene are predicted, but no specific mitigation or control
measures are suggested, and no discussion is offered as to whether
federal and state water quality standards would be violated. (3)
The Environmental Impact Report on the drain makes assumptions
of adequate knowledge about the impacts of wastewater discharge
on the stimulation in growth of algae and other organisms {owing
to high nutrient levels). But as the EPA pointed out, there is a
"paucity" of information on the subject.
24 N egot:Janons
. .
between proJect
.
sponsors and Delta growers
produced the first water quality standards for the Delta in 1965.
These standards called for a Delta outflow of 1,800 cfs. This meant
that at least pan of the Delta would have had to find an alternative
water supply, due to salt incursion. But Congress passed the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act in the same year, instructing the state
to establish water quality standards. The standards proposed by
the state in 1967 (Res. 68-17 of the SWRCB) were rejected by the
Secretary of the Interior. The SWRCB then held hearings and
eventually produced the ftrst comprehensive water quality standards
for the Delta, embodied in Decision 1379. The water quality under
this decision would be maintained at roughly twice the level of
the 1965 standards.

31 Section 502 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
identiftes those pollutants subject to cleanup. Salinity incursions
were included in discussions on the Senate floor-particularly those
between Sen. Muskie, author of the act, and Sen. Bayh. Section
313 requires federal facilities to meet the effluent limitations.
ln addition, Pres. Carter has issued an executive order (No. 12088,
10/18/1978) that requires all federal facilities to comply with
section 313.

25 There is a long history of conflicting purposes for Delta
salinity controL The CVP was originally a state project that included salt water repulsion as a function, but it could not be ft.
nanced on account of the Great Depression. When the federal
government assumed respollSI.bility for the project, salinity control
did not appear in the congressional authorization. Nonetheless,
the building of Shasta Darn markedly improved conditions in the
Delta, so the Bureau of Reclamation continued to publicize its
success in this regard, especially in its annual appropriations hearings before Congress. Over 125 references to Delta salinity control
by the USBR have been documented, despite their official refusal
to meet standards. See MacDiarmid, note 21 above.

32

But the recent drought years of 1976 and 1977 were not the
driest years in the long-run record taken from tree-ring data. In
fact, the 1976-77 drought was by no means extraordinazy eli·
matologically. Such periods in the future must be anticipated and
planned for-not, however, by expanding supplies under present
institutional arrangements, which assure that climatic variability
will not be sufficiently taken into account (see notes 34-35 below).
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3 3 Phase ll also calls for a Four-Agency Fish and Wildlife Administrative agreement. This rompact between USBR, DWR,
California Department of Fish and Game and the U.S. Fish and
WJldlife Service, would specify that fish and wildlife populations
be maintained at ..average historical levels" in the Delta. Quite
apart from the impossibility of objectively determining the meaning
of ..average historical levels" in an erosystem that has been drastically altered by hwnan beings (including the introduction of the
Striped Bass from the East Coast), the same basic argwnent about
the inherent malleability of such standards under political pressure
holds here as well
34 It has been argued that constructing Phase II rould create
the obligations to deliver all 4.23 MAF of contracted water, but
that, in the absence 1lf faeilities, the contracts are not binding.
The contracts have not been tested in the rourts, however-so
the argument at this point is one lawyer's opinion against another's.
SWP contracts are made in accordance with the "Governor's Contracting Principles," which are guidelines only, not statutory requirements.

35 In the October 1972 update of its Delta Alternatives study,
DWR even proposed expanding its contractual obligations further,
but this has been dropped from current plans.
36 USBR currently delivers 0.9 MAF on an "interim" basis
which it proposes to ronvert into a permanent or "ftml" commitment. At the same time, it proposes firm new rontractual rommitments of 0.25 MAF to the Westlands Water District, and 0.115 MAF
to the Tehama-Colusa service area. The bureau may be unable to
make these commitments and ronform to Delta water quality
standards, without new facilities. But there is more. If USBR
makes commitments to the Delta, as proposed by Secretary Andrus,
and the Westlands and Tehama-Colusa rontracts are executed,
it will not have sufficient water to supply the proposed West Sacramento Valley Canal (0.148 MAF), the Folsom South service area
(0.7 MAF), and the Mid-Valley Canal (0.550 MAF). New storage
and conveyance facilities would have to be constructed to meet
this significant new build-up in commitments.

issued a formal report saYing that the best solution to groundwater depletion is surface imports, not rontrolling groundwater
use. "Report Urges Importing Water.•." San Francisco Chronicle,
March 14, 1979, p. 5, coL 1.

42 The MWD includes the City of Los Angeles, but the latter
does not use its share of Colorado River water because it has a
better source in Owens Valley. MWD serves the suburban areas.

43 The original Colorado Aqueduct was built at least 10 years
too soon. See Jack Hirshleifer, James C. De Haven and Jerome W.
Milliman, Water Supply: Economics, Technology, and Policy
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).

44 Sources: 1.3 MAF (memo from MWD General Manager to
Board of Directors, 4/4/79); year 2000 demand (same memo);
supply, year 2000 (letter from DWR Director Robie to Planning
and Conservation League, 4/3/79); conservation, 15 percent (same
letter); reclamation (Orange and Los Angeles Counties Water Reuse
Study, October 17, 1978); Colorado River supply (memo, MWD
General Manager to Board, 4/4/79).
45 Joe S. Bain, Richard E. Caves and Julius Margolis, Northern
California's Water Industry: The CorrrparatiJJe Efficimcy of Public
Enterprise in Developing a Scarce Natural Resource (Baltitnore:
Johns Hopkins Press for Resources for the Future, 1966), p. 721.
Cf. Hirshleifer et aL (note 43) who originally suggested the idea.
46 As the recent ronflicts over power plant siting in Californiae.g., Sun Valley and P. G. & E.'s plans for a roal-fued plant in the
Central Valley-attest, finding sites will not be easy. Nuclear
plants are opposed by the Brown administration, while roal plants
almost invariably violate air quality standards.
47 See Steve H. Hanke and John J. Boland, "Water Requirements or Water Demands?" Journal of the American Water Works
Association (November 1971), 677-681.
48 This holds for groundwater, too, since it is replenished by
surface imports-which are regularly brought in to "rescue" irrigators from their own poor groundwater management practices.
See above, note 38.

37 Even with existing rommitments, USBR had to make delivery cutbacks of up to 75 percent of rontract entitlements in
1977. California, Resources Agency, DWR, The Continuing Califomi.a Drought (August 1977) p. 24.

49 See e.g., Siegfried Berle, Irrigation Agriculture in the Southwest United States, Marburg University Geographic Institute, 1976,
Figure 5, p. 68. 1n fact, a 1978 DWR report indicated a rapidly

38 The Mid-Valley portion is openly acknowledged to be a
"rescue" operation. California, Resources Agency, DWR, Phase II:
Alternative Courus of Action, to Provide Delta Protection and
Adequate Water Supplies for California (March 1976) p. 14. DWR

falling demand for water used to irrigate forage land in California.
See Kenneth Turner, "Feed and Forage Crop Projections: Review
and Analysis," California, Resources Agency, DWR, Office Report, May 19, 1977, revised October 1977.

admits, moreover, that groundwater levels will still fall an average
of 140 feet with the project. Ronald B. Robie, Director of DWR,
letter to Assemblyman Gualro, dated August 11, 1977.

SO Many users even have built into their contracts a commit·
ment for continued surplus water at low prices.
"Surplus" water is so designated because each year the total
yield of the SWP is allotted to the various contractors in accordance
with a formula contained in the rontracts. When a contractor does
not take the entire share of that year's fmn yield, that water
becomes part of the surplus. The contractor, however, still pays
the capital costs on the water, as set forth in the contract. Hence
MWD actually subsidizes San Joaquin Valley growers, primarily
in the Kern County Water Agency service area, where many of the
largest agricultural corporations have their holdings.
We believe this indicates that the SWP already has built-in
overcapacity.

39 MacDiarmid, note 21 above.
40 The big success story in this regard is in Orange County,
where conjunctive use management has been in effect since 1933,
and a previously declining water table has stabilized. See Stephen
C. Birdlebough and Alfred Wilkins, "Legal Aspects of Conjunctive
Use in California," in David Seckler (ed.), California Water: A
Study in Resource Management (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1971), pp. 263-270.

41 For example, the San Joaquin Valley Agricultural Water
Committee, an organization of valley water districts, recently
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51 E. Phillip LeVeen, "Reclamation Policy at a Crossroads,"
Public Affairs Repon, 19:5, October 1978, p. 3.

an average capital cost of $89.11 per acre-foot plus a $74.55 electric
power cost. Adding about 10 percent operations and maintenance
costs, this totals about $180 per acre-foot. Thus, if conservation
options are compared to the costs of new water developmentwhich is the relevant comparison-conservation would be more
attractive.
Subsidies in the SWP distort this choice. For example, artif'Icially low interest rates undervalue the total cost of borrowing.
Capital costs at 5.84 percent interest, as in SB 346, make water
worth $90 per acre-foot. At a market rate of interest, say 10
percent, water would cost $132/AF. Second, financing of electric
generation for the SWP is done at low interest rates (approximately
6 percent), which Willey estimates to add another $7.50 subsidy
per acre-foot. The two subsidies together amount to nearly $50/
acte-foot.

5Z See the essentially correct, but now outdated, treatment of
the problem in Robert C. Fellmeth et al, Politics of Land: Ralph
Nader's Study Group Repon on Land Use in California (Grossman:
New York, 1973).
Property taxes are levied on all land in a water district, regardless of whether the owner actually purchases water. Urban land
has a disproportionately high value, but accounts for relatively
little water use, so "captive" cities pay more than their share of the
costs, e.g., Bakersr1eld in the Kern County Water Agency service
area. A similar situation obtains in Los Angeles, where the city of
L.A. uses only 2 percent of MWD's water but pays 21 percent
(1978) of the total taxes; hence the city subsidizes the suburban
purchasers of MWD water.

•

53 Bain, Caves and Margolis, note 45 above, p. 570.

Readers' Window
54 Cf. Willey, "Financial Impacts on the State Water Project of
New Supply Projects Compared to Water Conservation, Reclamation, and Management." Testimony before the California Assembly
Committee on Water, Parks, and Wildlife, ~arch 28, 1979.

A copy error on p. 6 of the April 1979 PAR produced an erroneous statement suggesting that sprinkler and drip irrigation
methods are much more efficient in using water when compared
with gravity methods, than is actually the case. The authors had
intended to compare the numbers of each system in use, not their
relative efficiency in conserving water.
The error was called to the attention of authors Richard Walker
and Michael Storper by Ray Coppock. Communications Specialist,
Agricultural Information, Cooperative Extension, U.C. Davis.
They responded by submitting the following correct version of the
statement: ~Gravity methods make up some 82 percent of California's irrigation systems, sprinklers 18 percent, and drip 1 percent."
Walker also commemed: "Although sprinkler and drip methods
are more efficient than gravity methods (chiefly open ditch and
flooding), their efficiency and appropriateness vary by crop, so
general averages are not very helpfuL The more water-saving methods could be more widely adopted, but they are expensive and the
incentive is lacking where water is cheap."
The authors and editors regret this error.

55 DWR recognizes this and maintains that conservation is an
important part of Phase II. But we do not believe this can be
sustained. No conservation is actually required in DWR's plan and
the comparatively small $50 million loan fund for water conservation equipment contained in SB 346 has been eliminated in the new
bill, SB 200. In any case, if one contrasts a proposed $50 million
for conservation with $7 billion for supply expansion, with subsidies
intact, Phase II seems to embody major disincentives to water
conservation.

56 See William H. Bruvold, "Residential Water Conservation:
Policy Lessons from the California Drought, n PublicA[fain Repon,
19:6, December 1978. Of course. where water restrictions were
severe, some real hardship resulted but the achievements were far
greater than anyone had previously predicted.. EconomisU advoca:ting as little as 10 percent demand redllct:ions through metered
pricing had previously been viewed as unrealistic dreamers.

A Reader's Response
... I wish to thank you for publishing a most interesting and
informarive article on the California Water System and situation.
the April !979 Report on "The California Water System: Another
Round of Expansion?" by R. Walker and M. Storper. It is the
clearest and most to the point article I have read in many years on
this problem. The authors are to be commended highly for so clear
and understandable a presentation.
Future subjects in the PAR could include (1) the actual value
of busing and its influence on the quality of education and (2)
the question or problem of voter turnout, reasons for the low
response, relation to age, economic status, and influence of any of
the multilingual ballots, etc., in California.

57 California. Resources Agency, DWR, Water Conservation in
California, Bulletin 198, May 1976, p. 38, Table 8; see also Peter
Benenson, A Water Conservation Scenario [or the Residential
and Indusrriai Seeton in Caii[omia: Potenrial SavtnK$ of Water
and Related Energy, Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory Report No.
6817,August 1977.
58

DWR Bulletin 198, pp. 42-45.

59

Ronald L. Ritschard and Karen Tsao, Energy and Water Use
in Irrigated Agriculture During Drought Conditions, Lawrence
Berkeley Laboratory Report No. 7866, June 1978, Appendix A,
pp. 57-59.
60

-Lionel Farber, Mill Valley, California:

DWR Bulletin 198, p. 3.

61
Willey, note 54 above, argues that conservation options
are economically viable, but that evaluations of "conservation
hardware" as an alternative to water supply projects are distorted
by using current market costs for the one but undervalued, historical costs for the other. He points out that water could be conserved
at a cost of $23-43 per acre-foot (using a discount rate varying
from 5-10 percent) while on Phase U yield, customers would pay
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California has small earthquakes every day. These minor
events are recorded, located and cataloged by seismographic
stations, but are rarely felt and cause little or no damage.
Every two or three years, however, California has a magnitude 5 or 6 earthquake that can cause appreciable local
damage, especially if its epicenter is in or very near an
urbanized area, with poor construction or with soil conditions or underlying geologic formations that make it unusually susceptible to strong shaking. In the San Francisco
Bay region, for example, the most recent earthquakes in
the 5 to 6 range were the magnitude 5.3 Daly City earthquake in 1957, the 5.6 and 5.7 magnitude Santa Rosa
earthquake in 1969 (two jolts close together), and the 5.9
magnitude Coyote Lake earthquake in the vicinity of
Hollister in August 1979.
All these shocks were widely felt and resulted in damage ..
The smaller Daly City and Santa Rosa quakes, however,
caused a good deal more damage than the higher-magnitude
Hollister event, principally because the epicenters were
more centrally located within urbanized territory. Partly
because the affected area's underlying formations tend to
magnify shaking, the Santa Rosa eanhquake caused by far
the greatest amount of destruction (estimated at $10
million).
Magnitude 6 to 7 earthquakes are much less frequent
but much more damaging than the 5 to 6 events. Indeed,
earthquakes of 6 to 7 magnitude can be about as damaging
locally, in the affected areas, as the really big ones-i.e.,
large or "great" earthquakes of 7.0 magnitude and higherthat are the central focus of this article. The principal
difference lies in the total amounts of energy released and
hence the size of the areas affected by severe or violent
shaking.

Introduction

In trying to reduce seismic hazard in vulnerable regions
like California, it is essential to understand the kinds of
damage and other consequences that earthquakes can
produce. Of course, detailed projections of future casualties
and allied losses cannot be made without accurate, reliable,
and rather specific forecasts of the size, location, and timing of major earthquakes. At present we lack the capability
for such forecasting, even though a few successful predictions have been made in recent years. Moreover we must
expect that specific predictions of very large earthquakes
will be especially difficult to achieve. For now, therefore,
we must continue to judge future earthquakes on the basis
of the historic earthquake record, geodetic measurement of
crustal strain, and evidences of geologic activity along
earthquake-generating faults during the past few thousands
of years.
As might be expected, smaller earthquakes are much
more frequent than the larger events:
Editors' Note: Seismologist Bruce A. Bolt and geologist Richard
H. Jahns, recogrtized authorities in their respective fields, and both
members of the Califorrtia Seismic Safety Commission, have long
been active in advising on public policy needs for earthquake safety.
We. are gratified that they have collaborated in this essay, pooling
then resources to make up-to-date estimates of the seismic hazard
in Califorrtia, and to reassess the implications of future earthquakes.
Their conclusions are based on interpretations of present knowledge
and recent fmdings about fault displacement, seismicity and earth·
quake phenomena, as well as judgments on the significance of available information about past casualties and earthquake damage.
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considerable damage, and an earthquake estimated at 7.5
magnitude occurred offshore about 80 miles west of
Eureka in 1922.
In southern California, the great Ft. Tejon earthquake
(estimated magnitude 8.3+) occurred in 1857 on the San
Andreas fault, which appears to have ruptured from points
north of the Carrizo Plain to San Bernardino, a distance of
at least 400 kilometers (250 miles).3 Extensive surface
displacements near the easterly base of the Sierra Nevada,
along a quite different zone of faults, attended the 1872
Owens Valley earthquake. Although judged by some
investigators to have been the greatest among all recorded
shocks in the state's history (estimated magnitude 8.3+),
this earthquake was in a remote region and hence did not
affect urbanized areas significantly .4 In 1940 a 7 .I magnitude earthquake in the Imperial Valley caused $8 million
in damage. The shaking in this earthquake was long used as
the basis for seismically resistant design standards, until
later evidence proved the standards to be inadequate. In
1952 the severe 7.2 magnitude earthquake in Kern County,
on still another fault system, caused major damage in
Bakersfield. At this writing, the 1952 Kern County earth·
quake is the most recent one in southern California of
magnitude 7 or greater.
It may also be appropriate to note such smaller damaging southern California events as the 1925 offshore
earthquake of 6.3 magnitude that caused S8 million loss
mostly in the Santa Barbara business district, and the 1933
earthquake of 6.3 magnitude that caused $60 million loss
in the Long Beach area and severely damaged or destroyed
many public school buildings. The 1971 San Fernando
earthquake, with a magnitude of 6.5 or less, was accompanied by fault rupture approximately 15 kilometers long
(about nine miles) and was destructive in relatively small
parts of the San Fernando Valley and Los Angeles. 5
Despite these and other damaging shocks, no major (7+
magnitude) southern California earthquake has occurred
in or near present metropolitan areas for more than a
century, i.e., since the Ft. Tejon earthquake of 1857.
In fact, because southern California was then only sparsely
settled, it is justifiable to say there has never been a major
earthquake (magnitude 7 or greater) in or near heavily
urbanized territory in the southern California region.
This fortunate accident of fate does not, however, mean
that there is no serious threat in that region. To the contrary, the evidence shows that major earthquakes have
severely shaken parts of southern California that have
subsequently become heavily settled. In time, this kind of
earthquake activity is sure to recur.

Thus earthquakes of 7 to 8 and greater magnitudes may
seriously affect regions 50 to 100 .kilometers long (roughly
30 to 60 miles) and many kilometers wide. If their epi·
centers are anywhere near urbanized territory they can
cause significant casualties and economic losses, and when
they occur in or near large metropolitan areas, damage and
casualties can be greatly increased.

When Can We Expect a Large Earthquake?

In anticipating the next big California earthquake of
magnitude 7 or higher, we must conclude that time is
running out. The evidence strongly suggests that such an
event must now be considered imminent. Until recently
there has been a tendency to think of such an occurrence
in terms of "the next 10 or 20 years." But now, for several
reasons, we can no longer keep pushing this ..time window"
into the future. In short, present evidence that a large
earthquake is imminent in California is much stronger now
than 30 years ago-or even 10 years ago.

Historical Events
What is the basis for this conclusion? Tne first line of
evidence comes from the historical record that, for California, goes back to about 1800. In the period since 1800
there have been ten very large earthquakes in this state of
magnitude 7 or greater (see Table, .. Large Historic Earthquakes ..."). Looking first at northern California, the record
shows a major earthquake in 1836; it was centered on the
Hayward fault, which extends along the foothills east of
San Francisco Bay. From what we know now, the 1836
event probably should be classed as "great," with an
estimated magnitude of 7+. Two years later, in 1838,
another large earthquake also with a magnitude estimated
at 7+ was felt strongly in San Francisco and was accompanied by rupturing along many kilometers of the San
Andreas fault.
In 1868 another big (7+) earthquake occurred on -the
Hayward fault with surface ruprure reaching at least from
Berkeley to San Jose. This earthquake caused destruction
in San Jose, Hayward, and downtown San Francisco,
and until 1906 was referred to locally as "the great earthquake." A group of laymen wrote a report on the 1868
event, but this report seems to have been suppressed; no
copy of it has been seen in the present century. In 1906,
however, some people who had experienced the 1868
earthquake were asked to give their recollections (these
will be referred to later).
In the great 8.3 magnitude San Francisco earthquake
of 1906 the San Andreas fault broke from San Juan Bautista to Humboldt County, a distance of 450 kilometers
(280 miles). The attendant life loss and damage (estimated
at $1 billion) in the San Francisco Bay region are matters
of record for this catastrophic event, which still ranks as
the only great earthquake to occur in a thickly settled part
of the United States.z Since then, no major land-based
earthquake of magnitude 7 or greater has occurred in northem California, although several smaller ones. have caused

Historic Record Too Short
Historic records like those just summarized provide some
of the most helpful data we have for judging the seismicity
of California. But the historic record is all too short -for
fme-grained estimates of when and where the next major
earthquakes are likely to occur, especially when some
recurrence intervals are as long as or longer than the entire
historic record itself. For example, knowing that a single
great earthquake occurred along a portion of the San An-
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Large Historic Earthquakes in California Since 1800
(Magnitude 7 or greater)
Region

Year

Magnitude

Causative Fault

1836

San Francisco Bay

7.0+ (?)

Hayward

1838

San Francisco Bay

7.0+ (?)

San Andreas

1857

Carrizo Plain-Ft. Tejon-Palmdale

8.3+ (?)

San Andreas

1868

San Francisco Bay

7.0+(?)

Hayward

1872

Owens Valley

8.3+ (?)

Sierra Nevada

1906

San Francisco Bay

8.3

San Andreas

1922

Cape Mendocino

7.5+ (?)

Mendocino Escarpment (offshore)

1927

Pt. Conception

7.3

Offshore fault

1940

Imperial Valley

7.1

Imperial

1952

Kern County

7.2a

White Wolf

j

a. As revised, based on new analyses of the 1952 seismograms and accelerograms. See B. Bolt, "The Local Magnitude. ML. of the Kern
County Eanhquake of July 21. 195::,fl Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America, 68(2): 513-515 (1978); Hiroo Kanmori and Paul
Jennings, "Determination of Local Magnitude, ML' from Strong Motion Accelerograms." Bulletin of the Seismological Societ_v of America,
68(2): 471-485 (1978).
Source: Adapted with minor modifications from Charles F. Richter, Elementary Seismology (San Franciscc: W.H. Freeman, California
Institute of Technology, 1958), pp. 466-5 37; H.O. Wood and N. Heck, "Stronger Earthquakes of California and Western Nevada," in Earth·
quake History of the United States: Part II (Washington, D.C.: Environmental Science Services Administration, 1966). Several of the magnitudes given here differ from those appearing in other recent sources. Some of the "new" magnitudes have been reckoned differently from the
classic Richter m<~eunitudes. The authors preferred to use the latter-except where otherwise indicated-reasoning that it would not be appropriate to make further changes unless all the events were reappraised according to the newer means of analysis.

dreas fault, if it is the only big one historic records show for
that area, tells us little about when the next great earthquake will occur there. For some large active faults, like
the Garlock in southern California, the entire historic
record is no more than a portion of the gap between the
most recent earthquake, which presumably happened in
very young prehistoric times, and the next event that has
not taken place yet. Small wonder that scientists are
actively seeking evidence of datable prehistoric earthquakes,
to round out the past record and help us understand better
what to expect in the future.

record back significantly to include an impressive series of
past great earthquakes. Displacement and liquefaction
effects of such paleoearthquakes have been preserved in
beds of sand and peat. Important measurements of this
kind recently were made by Kerry Sieh of Stanford University (now a professor at the California Institute of Technology).6 One site was at Pallett Creek, which crosses the
San Andreas fault 50 kilometers northeast of Los Angeles.
Sieh found evidence of at least nine paleoearthquakes
extending back more than 1400 years to A.D. 545. The
dates, all but one of them approximate, are as follows:

Going Back in Geologic Time

1857 1745 1470 1245 1190 965 860 665 545
(1857 is the date of the historically documented Ft.
Tejon earthquake noted earlier; the 1745 event was prob-

One method of extending our information back into
prehistoric time is to make highly detailed geological
studies of earthquake-related features along individual
faults. In the past two decades, such work has led to important breakthroughs. Thus in some parts of California
the studies have revealed and dated features ascribable to
specific large earthquakes that appear to have occurred
during past millenia. Interpretation of the findings indicates
that, for the San Andreas and some other large faults, the
average recurrence intervals of major earthquakes are measured in hundreds rather than thousands of years.
Trenches recently excavated across the San Andreas
fault in southern California have extended the historical

ably from a rupture of the San Andreas fault southeastward from Sar1 Bernardino.)
Two conclusions follow from this work. First, large
earthquakes along the southern reach of the San Andreas
may break different segments of the fault at different
times. Second, the average recurrence interval for these
past earthquakes is approximately 165 years, but there is
a good deal of variation from one pair of events to another.
The greatest interval was nearly 300 years and the smallest
perhaps as short as 55 years. (It should be noted that the
Pallett Creek site gives information on earthquakes caused
by rupture along only one large segment of the San Andreas
fault in southern California-and not its whole extent even
there.)
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Probability and Timing

Geodetic Measurements and the Buildup
of Crustal Strain

In addition to historic and prehistoric earthquake
information, there is an important third source of data.
Successive surveys measure horizontal and vertical displacements between points on the earth's surface, and those
made in California since the middle of the 19th Century
give us important clues as to what is happening underground and what to expect in the future.
In the San Francisco Bay region, for example, the
surveys show a northwestward movement of the Farallon
Islands, about 30 kilometers (20 miles) offshore, with
respect to «fixed" points on the mainland, i.e., Mt. Diablo,
Mt. Sonoma and Mt. Ross. 7 This movement was going on
before the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, and has continued since, at an estimated average annual rate of between
2 and 3 inches per year, leaving no doubt that strain is
building up in the intervening crustal rocks, somewhat like
the tightening of a watch spring when a watch is wound.
The level of strain that had been reached prior to the 1906
San Andreas fault rupture is known from geodetic measurements made in the 19th Century. A comparison suggests that a sudden slip will again have to occur along one
of the main faults in the Bay region in order to relieve the
growing strain.
One or More Major California Earthquakes Due

In California, more than a dozen faults are known to
be capable of generating major earthquakes. Recurrence
intervals for such events probably range from about a century to many centuries, depending upon the fault in question. But an estimated or calculated average interval has
limited meaning in terms of the probable elapsed time
between two successive events on a given fault, which can
be considerably shorter than the long-term average. Geologic studies provide a reasonable basis for suggesting that
some of California's faults are "due" or "nearly due" for
major earthquake ruptures, although this must be expressed
as a probability rather than a certainty. Several of these
faults traverse areas of dense urban populations, or are
within moderate distances of such areas. In fact, uf California's principal urban concentrations, all except the
Sacramento and San Diego areas appear to be exposed to
fairly high levels of seismic risk.
For further illustration, let us consider four parts of the
San Andreas fault system that could produce great earthquakes: (1) central California, (2) the Hayward fault, (3)
Ft. Tejon-Palmdale, and (4) San Bernardino and southeastward. On the latter two sections, the average time
between great earthquakes may well be about 160 years.
In central California, the geodetic surveys show that it took
about 100 years for the rocks to strain enough to produce
the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and fault displacement,
and there is no reason to suppose that this rate of strain ac·
cumulation is not about the same in the other sections. It
has been 122 years since the last great earthquake on the
San Andreas fault in southern California, and 73 years in
central and northern California. Moreover it has been 27
years since the last major earthquake on any fault in the
state.
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What does this evidence tell us about the imminence of
damaging earthquakes of magnitude 7 or greater? When all
sections of major earthquake-producing faults are considered jointly, a rough estimate of the odds fmds them now
about even-50-50-that an earthquake with a magnitude
greater than 7 will occur in California during the next
decade. With every passing year, these odds will steadily
increase. In any event, present knowledge supports as a
reasonable working hypothesis that we should anticipate
a great earthquake somewhere in California during the
next ten years. (See "Explanatory Note ...." at the end
of this article.)

Earthquake Prediction?
What about more precise earthquake forecasts? Obviously more specific earthquake predictions would help prevent
loss of life from collapsing structures, but seismology has
not yet advanced to the stage of practical and precise
earthquake prediction. In some countries that experience
earthquakes, among them Japan, China, the United States,
New Zealand, the USSR, and Italy, effons have been made
to forecast precisely the time and place of damaging shocks.
No more than limited and partial success thus far has attended these efforts. The Chinese, for example, did not
predict the devastating 1976 Tangshan earthquake, near
Beijing (Peking) that is estimated to have caused 650,000
deaths. In short, earthquake prediction may have a long
way to go before it becomes a practical means for trying
to deal with many large earthquakes. Moreover, we should
not forget that even if valid and relatively precise earthquake prediction were feasible, making it possible to get
people into positions of relative safety prior to an event,
the hazard to unsafe srructures would continue and therefore the threat of physical damage and economic loss would
not be mitigated.

Earthquake Casualties and Damage: Worldwide
What is known about earthquake losses? It is believed
that there have been approximately 13 million deaths from
earthquakes, worldwide, during the past 4,000 years.
Some 3.5 million of these deaths occurred in the past
400 years, and nearly 2 million of them in the last 100
years. s The sharp increase observed in the rate of earthquake-related life loss is due partly to world population
growth per se, and partly to increasing concentrations of
people in some of the world's vulnerable seismic areas. It
should be recognized, however, that there have been many
departures from the broad trend, and that the occurrence
of a single great earthquake in or near a metropolitan area
can cause the statistics on casualties and economic losses to
change dramatically.
The recent year 1976, with less than the average annual
number of large earthquakes worldwide, nevertheless
saw about 700,000 people killed, most of them in China's
Tangshan event. In fact the heavy losses from the Tangshan
earthquake, which drastically affected the globai statistics

for the present century, provide a special Jesson for residents of the United States and other urbanized nations
that may experience major earthquakes. This lesson is that
statistical data on earthquake losses are themselves vulnerable and can undergo drastic upward revision after a single
great earthquake in a heavily populated area.

person for earthquake damage during the past century
(or less than 55 cents per person as reckoned in 1971
dollars) also seems small when compared with the average
of nearly $25 per person for all damage from natural hazards in the United. States during the same period. 16 But,
as we shall see, these data are not satisfactory for longterm predictions of future costs.

Earthquake Casualties and Damage:
California and the U.S.

•

The Future: Higher Losses Must Be Anticipated

Since the beginning of the 19th Century, only about
1,700 lives have been lost in the United States because of
earthquakes. But let us look closer at the distribution of
casualties in space and time. Approximately two-thirds of
the total can be assigned to California, and nearly one-half
is attributed to a single California event, the San Francisco
earthquake of 1906. 9
Although more than 100 damaging events have occurred
in California since 1800, essentially all of the related death
toll has derived from only 17 of these earthquakes, with an
average life loss of about 65 persons per event, and with
the events occurring at an average rate of once every ten
years. 10
Admittedly these averages are of limited meaning,
partly because the life loss has been unevenly distributed
among the earthquakes, and also because the earthquakes
have been unevenly spaced in time. For example, if the
San Francisco earthquake is excluded from the reckoning,
the average death rate from the other pertinent California
earthquakes drops from 65 per event to Jess than 20. The
skev.'i.ng effects related to concentrations of people are
further emphasized by a drop to 4 deaths per event by the
exclusion of only four additional earthquakes: 1812
Capistrano, 1868 Hayward, 1933 Long Beach, and 1971
San Fernando.
Looking at more recent times, we see that in the United
States during the period 1925-1975,590 deaths were attributed to earthquakes.ll This is only about 3 percent of the
combined life Joss from floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, and
earthquakes during that half-century period,t" and little
more than 1 percent of the loss from all natural hazards in
that same period. The corresponding worldwide percentage
for earthquake deaths is four times as high as that of the
U.S., 13 owing to differences in seismicity, topographic
and climatic conditions, concentrations of population,
styles of living, construction practices, and other factors.
Earthquake-related deaths in the United States have
amounted to about 15 percent of the death toll from
hurricanes, and to less than 10 percent of that from floods
and tornadoes. 14 They have been at about the same level
as losses of life from snow avalanches, but only 7 percent
of those from lightning strikes. As a sobering comparison,
it can also be pointed out that life loss from all natural
hazards in the United States during recent decades has
amounted to only about 2 percent of the deaths from
vehicular traffic.
Cumulative physical damage from United States earth·
quakes has been reckoned at approximately $2 billion since
1800. 15 This total seems small when compared with the
$4 billion price tag for a single recent non-seismic event,
Hurricane Agnes in 1972. The average cost of 10 cents per

It should be emphasized that four-fifths of the U.S.
earthquake costs noted above were associated with only
three events: San Francisco (1906), Alaska (1964), and
San Fernando (1971). As a hint for the future, we should
heed the significance of the $1 billion in direct damage and
indirect costs resulting from the San Fernando event, a
moderate earthquake located in a metropolitan area. Both
physical and demographic factors were considered by the
California Division of Mines and Geology in projecting
for this state a startling $21 billion in earthquake shaking
damage during the period 1970-2000, assuming a continuation of present kinds of responses to earthquake
hazards. 1'
The record of earthquakes and their effects in the
United States leads thoughtful, responsible people to
conflicting views. Some, using the comparative data noted
above, regard seismic hazards as relatively modest threats
when contrasted with other physical hazards. To be sure,
major earthquakes in this country are infrequent, and the
costs associated with historic events have been relatively
low. Reasoning from past history, some have argued that
earthquake risks should have relatively low priority in the
allocation of our attention and resources.
Admittedly the historical statistics, taken alone, can be
interpreted to support this notion. But the data also con·
tain another and quite different message. Life loss and
property damage are influenced not only by the magnitude
and duration of a strong earthquake, but also by the
numbers of people involved and the nature of the buildings and other structures affected. The only major earthquake in the United States to occur in a heavily populated
region with modern structures was the San Francisco event
of 1906. Consequently this single earthquake has dominated the nation's statistical record of seismic losses. But
substantially higher losses must be anticipated when an·
other great earthquake occurs in a U.S. metropolitan
area. Is Moreover, there is a high probability of just such
an occurrence. Indeed, metropolitan areas in both northern
and southern California are certain to be hit by major
earthquakes in the future.

How Well Prepared ... ?
To sum up, future earthquakes are inevitable in California, and the damage potential is high in the likely event
that a big one strikes an urban region fairly soon. Earthquake preparedness therefore should be prominent on the
public agenda for attention. So what is the present state
of earthquake preparedness?
Until recently at least, California has not been very
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times greater than that released in the Santa Barbara shock.
Sixty-five people were injured by falling objects and
glass in the Santa Barbara earthquake. The most serious
residential damage occurred in mobile home parks, with
263 units affected.2o The earthquake also damaged anumber of buildings built after 1952, thus refuting any idea
that only old buildings from another era should be considered in assessing earthquake dangers in California.
Reports from the University of California, Santa Barbara,
note evidence that the building code and building designs
were not invariably followed, and that errors seemed to
have been made in construction. These findings raise
questions about the need for improved inspection, during
construction, of both publicly and privately owned buildings in California.

consistent or methodical in its approach to seismic safety.
The style has been one of reaction rather than action, with
responses that have tended to focus on single specific
problems highlighted by the results of actual earthquakes.
Perhaps the best example of such ad hoc response was
enactment of the Field Act in 1933, immediately after the
Long Beach earthquake heavily damaged or destroyed
many public schools, in order to enforce safety standards
for all public schools built thereafter. Over time this ad hoc
process has brought some important improvements in
earthquake safety, but it has left other significant hazards
relatively unattended.
Earthquake safety began to get appreciably more attention after the great Alaskan earthquake in 1964. This
prompted renewed interest in California. and led in 1969
to creation of a joint legislative committee on seismic
safety, headed by State Senator Alfred E. Alquist, and in
1972 to establishment by Governor Ronald Reagan of the
Governor's Earthquake Council. The 1971 San Fernando
earthquake provided further strong stimulus that eventuated in several elements of earthquake-related legislation and,
perhaps even more important, establishment of the California Seismic Safety Commission in 1975.
The commission has brought together different kinds of
interests and expertise, and has stimulated more effective
efforts toward seismic hazard mitigation. It has broad
independent advisory powers to formulate earthquake
safety policy, including proposals for needed legislation.
In our view, establishment of the commission represents
the greatest single public accomplishment on earthquake
hazard mitigation in California since the landmark study of
the 1906 earthquake by the State Earthquake Investigation
Commission, a temporary body set up specifically to study
that one event.
Meanwhile some help is also coming from the federal
government, stimulated in part by the 1964 and 1971
earthquakes, and also due to the efforts of key individuals
such as California's U.S. Senator Alan Cranston. This resulted in the Earthquake Hazard Reduction Act of 1977, a
law designed to encourage efforts to reduce risk to life and
property in future earthquakes.

Preparing for a Great Earthquake
in California
If a magnitude 5.6 earthquake is able to produce significant destruction in a limited area, what is the likely damage
from a great earthquake and what preparations are needed?
First, we need a careful reexamination of earthquake
hazards and risks in California. We need a broader framework than in the past, a framework that considers earthquakes in relation to the whole economic system. We
should find out how building codes are being applied, how
communities are responding to suggestions that they
prepare for earthquakes, and how we can best assess the
costs and benefits from properly carrying out earthquake
mitigation plans.
While elements of a comprehensive hazard mitigation
program already exist at the state and local levels and in the
private sector, little has yet been done to link them in
mutually supportive ways or to insure comprehensive
attention to seismic hazard. Increasing efforts should be
made to involve and activate the private sector more
effectively.
Because the private sector owns most of our buildings
and other structures where future damage and casualties
will occur, and because the economy may be drastically
affected by a great earthquake, this sector cannot escape
the social and economic consequences of a great earthquake. Thus it is good policy as well as practical selfinterest for the private sector to be concerned.
We obviously must become more deeply involved with
earthquake preparation and emergency preparedness in the
future than we have been in the past. Although the fear
of added expense is often an excuse for inaction, much can
be done at a very reasonable cost if proper forethought is
given to the problem.
Today more people in California are concerned about
earthquakes than ever before. Local community groups
are beginning to ask: What can we do in this particular
neighborhood if a big earthquake occurs? What can we
do to see that hazards are reduced before the next earthquake strikes? Will adequate fire-fighting facilities be
available? What other responses should we consider? What
is government doing?

Progress ... But We Are Still Vulnerable
Despite advances in seismic studies, earthquake policy
formulation, and pertinent legislation, California continues
to be seismically vulnerable in many ways. Even in the
absence of great recent earthquakes, this vulnerability has
been periodically reemphasized by relatively modest but
damaging earthquakes. An excellent example is the Santa
Barbara shock of August 1978, which was comparatively
small, with a magnitude of only 5.6. The strong ground
motion in this earthquake lasted 2 to 3 seconds and shook
only a limited area, yet it caused approximately $9 million
in public property damage, and another $2.3 million to
the private sector. 19 By comparison, the strong ground
motion in the great 1906 San Francisco earthquake lasted
about 40 seconds. The released energy, spread over most
of central and northern California, was perhaps 10,000
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was very generally damaged. So, probably, were
frail partition walls and chandeliers, crockery and
fragile household furnishings. Such effects were
typical of large sections of the city. There were
relatively small districts, however, in which brick
and frame buildings of ordinary construction were
badly wrecked or quite destroyed. Pavements were
fissured, buckled, and arched. Sewers and watermains were broken. In places, portions of streets
were moved laterally several feet out of place. Wellballasted street-car tracks, equipped with 8, 10, or
11 inch rails, were arched and flexed or thrown into
shallow wave forms . . . . Effects of this degree of
violence were pretty closely confmed ... to areas of
"fllled" or "made" land. 23

What is Ukely to Happen?

•

The Seismic Safety Commission and other groups should
encourage this grassroots activity throughout the state.
On April 18, 1979, the University of California, Berkeley,
observed an "Earthquake Awareness Day." Planning for
this program involved many meetings of administrative
officers, clerical staff, laboratory managers, officials and
representatives from student groups, all concerned with
environment, health, and safety. The organizing committee
met frequently with no lag in interest. In short there is
clear evidence of a desire for concrete, reliable information
about just what is likely to happen during and after another
earthquake.
California has extensive experience with earthquake
effects, including eyewitness accounts and reports based on
direct observation. Reviewing some of this past experience
can give a feel for "what it is like to be there," and may
. help prepare people on what to expect in the future. The
following accounts, for example, are based on experience
with two large earthquakes, the 7+ earthquake on the
Hayward fault in 1868, and the 83 earthquake on the
San Andreas fault in 1906:

About the Ferry Building, at the foot of the Market
Street, is a district of "made" land . . . in which
high intensity was manifested . . . . Wooden buildings, 1 story to 3 stories high, with brick or stonework fronts, were interspersed among ordinary brick
buildings from 2 to 6 or 8 stories in height. Mingled
with these was a considerable number of modem,
class A, office buildings. Here the fire burned fiercely
and caused great havoc .... After the fire had past,
standing walls revealed ugly, sinuous cracks, in rudely
parallel systems, which were not due to fire nor to
dynamite. Masonry blocks in the walls of excellent
modern buildings were broken as by a blow. Rivets
were sheared off in parts of the framework of steel
structures, and tension rods in such frames were
badly stretched. Tubular cast-iron columns, support·
ing floor girders, were broken off near their bases
in cellars where they rested upon piling. The concrete
casing [s] of piles were frequently broken. Wherever the
intensity was high, the tendency to crack or crush
near the base, as tho a sharp blow had been struck
there, [was] notably conspicuous. In spots the streets
sank bodily, certainly as much as 2 feet, probably
more .... The surface of the ground was deformed
into waves and small open fissures were formed,
especially close to the wharves. Buildings on the
water side, along East Street, generally slumped
seaward in some cases as much as 2 feet. The damage
was greatest close to the water's edge .... 24

1868, near San Leandro.
I managed to get out of the building ... when the
shaking started. The house was thrown from its
foundation, the chimney was torn from the roof,
and the porch was wrenched away, dishes were
broken and everything was in confuswn. I found that
most of the houses were in the same condition as
my own-thrown from their foundations, with
chimneys down, porches knocked sideways, etc.
All the while the ground was shaking and continued
to shake for days, even weeks.2l

1868, near Irvington.
I was then about 15 years of age and my home was
near Irvington. When the shock came I was alone
in the house with my baby brother and my mother
called to me to get the baby. I managed to get the
child over my arm, face down with a pillow on top,
then falling and crawling I worked my way to the
kitchen door. My mother was on the ground, and
every time she tried to get up she was thrown again.
As I sat there I could see the ground in waves like
the ocean. After the main shock I think we had a
hundred shocks during the first 24 hours, not a house
was left with a chimney on it.22

In the neighborhood of the crossing of Steiner and
Sutter Streets, there is an irregularly bounded district
a little larger than a city block in which several
buildings not conspicuously weak were totally
destroyed. St. Dominic's Church, at the corner of
Steiner and Bush streets, was a complete ruin ....
Its steeple towers were ruined, its roof fell in, and all
its walls were so badly cracked that it became a
menace to the neighborhood. If the shock had
occurred during the hours of religious service, few
would have escaped from the building alive. Probably it was not a building of the most excellent
construction; but, on the other hand, it did not
appear to be built flimsily. It certainly suffered a

1906, San Francisco.
To some extent the earthquake caused damage to
buildings and other structures in all pans of the city
and county of San Francisco .... Almost everywhere
chimneys were thrown down or badly broken, but
in a few small localities most of the chimneys withstood the shock . . . . Plaster on walls and ceilings
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most violent shaking.2s

quake risk in California. Many widespread dangers persist.
Many old hazardous buildings, for example, should be
strengthened or removed, even though such actions will
take major commitments of time and effort to achieve
long-term solutions. Meanwhile, short-term efforts must
be increased, because present state and local ability to
respond to major disasters appears highly questionable
compared with the magnitude of resources that a large
earthquake will call for. In weighing both short- and longterm needs, a Seismic Safety Commission report comments
on existing hazards and disaster preparedness:

1906, Stanford University.
I came suddenly awake, as if someone had given me
a very strong shove. Nothing happened for a moment,
and then I found myself clutching at the blankets
to keep from being tossed out of my wildly shaking
bed. Between the big pulses of movement, I struggled
upright and into my slippers, and then groped my
way to the door in the faint morning light. The building was rocking in a most violent way, and I fell more
than once as I moved down the hallways. What I
remember best, though, was the frightful noise-an
overall dull roar, with the groaning of timbers and
the cracking and falling of masonry. I made it to the
end of the hall in spite of the pulsating motions,
and looked out the window to see other buildings
swaying like so many trees in a high wind. Then the
big stone chimney of the power plant collapsed with
an awful roar. 26

Given the great number of hazardous structures in
use today . . . built prior to any consideration of
lateral force requirements [to resist sideways shaking] , any program of rehabilitation and strengthening
. . . must be directed toward ... long-term solution[s]. There is a general consensus, however, that
in the short term (within the next ten or fifteen
years), disaster preparedness can provide the greatest
degree of hazard mitigation in terms of lives saved
•••• 27

Despite this, less than 2.0 percent of the state's expenditure for seismic safety is going into disaster preparedness.
In short, we clearly need to be thinking and doing more to
understand and prepare for what will happen in another
great earthquake. During the next few years we should try
to reduce the hazard to an acceptable or minimal level of
risk statewide, for time is no longer on our side.

Need for Earthquake Education
Such first-hand accounts give people a chance to reassess
their thinking about what to do when the next great
earthquake occurs. Some now make highly unrealistic
assumptions that they can put through emergency calls
on the telephone, or, if at work, get in their cars and go
home to join their families!
In short, there is a wide gap between what many people
think they are going to do, and what will actually be
possible during and immediately after heavy earthquake
shaking. Such unrealistic perceptions are one of the uncertainties involved in reassessing the possible consequences
of the next great earthquake.
Obviously more effective earthquake education will be
very important in trying to achieve an adequate defense.
We must get the attention of a large portion of the population in describing the kinds of earthquake experiences to
be expected, so that individuals are prepared to respond in
sensible ways. While the public appears presently to lack
knowledge about earthquake safety measures, a recent
survey of public attitudes toward earthquake prediction in
southern California, as made by Professor Ralph Turner of
UCLA, found that people would like to know more about
earthquake preparedness.
It seems extremely unfortunate that most California
public schools no longer provide disaster education programs for students, because over the years imaginative
programs could contribute significantly and improve basic
public awareness of the nature of earthquake disasters and
what to do about them. The Department of Education did
conduct a federally funded disaster program a few years
ago, but it was discontinued when the federal funding
ceased.

Conclusion
In assessing preparedness, we have argued that in the
not-distant future California must expect major earthquakes in thickly settled areas, causing large losses. Moreover, without being over-pessimistic, it seems sensible that
our precautions should anticipate what has not yet happened in California: (1) highly unfavorable timing of earthquake occurrence with respect to the activities of people,
(2) periods of heavy rainfall prior to an earthquake in the
affected area, and (3) other factors known to increase
losses. With a combination of adverse circumstances, the
death toll could become heavy, and in a single earthquake
property damage caused by ground shaking, landslides,
soil liquefaction, and other kinds of ground failure could
exceed by an order of magnitude the total of all earthquake damage recorded in the United States so far.
In sum, we cannot simply extrapolate the historic
earthquake record into the future if we wish to make
realistic estimates of future losses. Instead we must take
into account the several unfavorable physical and demographic factors of the present social and economic situation, i.e., we must plan for events that will drastically
change the actuarial base for appraising seismic hazard and
risk. This is a crucial justification for devoting special,
wide-ranging efforts to the reduction of seismic hazards.
The situation causes increasing concern to scientists and
engineers, and fortunately also to key prime-movers of
seismic legislation such as the Alfred Alquists in Sacramento and the Alan Cranstons in Washington. All these

No Cause for Complacency
Clearly there is no cause for complacency about earth-
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efforts are helping to raise seismic safety issues to the
level of attention they deserve in the eyes of California's
citizenry.

Explanatory Note on Probability Estimates
for a Major Earthquake in California
The record of recurrence for major quakes in California
is too short for any detailed or defmitive analysis of probability. So let us look at the record of earthquakes of
Richter magnitude 7 or greater (M 7+) in a simple way.
As shown in the Table, "Large Historic Earthquakes ... ,"
ten M 7+ events have occurred in California during the past
150 years (in 1836, 1838, 1857, 1868, 1872, 1906, 1922,
1927, 1940 and 1952). This means that the average recurrence interval from 1820 to 1979 has been 15 years-if
we include the time since the latest event, in 1952, plus
adding an arbitrary seven years prior to the 1836 event to
make a 150-year period. (The average recurrence interval
would drop to less than 13 years if we considered all ten
earthquakes and used the shorter 116-year period, 18361952, between the earliest and latest events.)
Let us now tum to recurrence intervals between successive M 7+ earthquakes. Since 1836 these have been 2, 19,
11, 4, 34, 16, 5, 13, 12 years-a minimum of2 years and a
maximum of 34 years. It has been 27 years since the latest
big one (1952 in Kern County), a length of time exceeded
only once since 1836. And 27 years is almost twice as long
as the estimated average of 15 years (or less than 13 years).
We conclude that California is "due" or even "overdue,"
unless we assume some sort of long-term fluctuation in the
intervals between California earthquakes. But there is little
or no justification for assuming such fluctuation: the
crustal plates that meet in California are moving steadily
\\ith respect to each other, and most of the large earth·
quakes discussed here are associated with major rupturing
along the boundary zone between the plates (i.e., the
San Andreas fault system).
In any event, data available from the historic record
suggest that odds of 50-50 for a major earthquake in the
next 10 years are by no means too great. One might argue
that the likelihood is even greater. If by 1989 no M 7+
quake has occurred in California, it would then have been
37 years since the 1952 event-and that would be an
historic record-breaker for length of a quiet intervaL Such
a continuation of the current quiet period for another 10
years is possible, of course, but unlikely.
Now let us go back in time beyond the historic record
for evidence from a longer-term period, and use that to
extrapolate. We can examine a single reach of the San
Andreas fault-from Paso Robles to the Coachella Valleyand consider Kerry Sieh's fmdings, which go back nearly
1500 years. 28 As noted earlier, there have been at least
nine major earthquakes from about 545 A.D. to 1859.
The average recurrence interval has thus been approximately 165 years, with intervals between successive events of
about 120, 195, 105,225,55,225,275, and 110 years. 29 It
has been 122 years since the most recent event, in 1857.
. These time intervals estimated by Sieh apply to only
one reach of one quake fault. Naturally they are consider-
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ably longer than would be the case for California as a
whole, with a record involving major events on several
faults. Accordingly let us now begin extrapolating by
adding the more northerly section of the San Andreas
fault-while still leaving out other segments in the Imperial Valley-Gulf of California region. Inclusion of the
northerly San Andreas roughly cuts the estimated time
interval in half, and doubles the estimate of earthquake
frequency for the San Andreas fault. On this basis the
estimated average recurrence interval since 545 A.D.
drops to about 80 years.
In addition, other faults of the San Andreas system
(Hayward, Calaveras, San Jacinto, Elsinore, Imperial)
also must be reckoned with, as some of them have contributed to the record of M 7+ historic earthquakes (see
Table). So we can argue that extending Sieh's findings to
the other parts of the San Andreas system justifies further
reducing our estimate of the average recurrence interval
to the order of 70 years, and to even less if we include two
major events that have occurred in the Colorado River
delta region of Mexico.
The estimate is reduced still further, to about 25 years,
by including the faults of the Transverse Ranges, the
Sierra Nevada, and adjacent Basin Ranges, along with
other faults that have shown a capability for M 7+ earth·
quakes. Moreover, this does not exhaust the list of major
faults that are likely to produce M 7+ earthquakes felt in
populated areas (e.g., the Garlock fault).
In short, the historic record with its 15-year average
interval is in fairly good agreement with the probable
longer-term record, with an average interval of 25 years
or less, as extrapolated from information about one reach
of the San Andreas fault. In this light, 50-50 odds can be
viewed as a modest, perhaps even conservative appraisal of
the likelihood that California will experience an earthquake
of magnitude 7 or greater during the next 10 years.
NOTES
1. Bruce A. Bolt, Eanhqw:zkes: A Primer (San Francisco: WR.
Freeman, 1978), p. 195.
2. [California], State Earthquake Investigation Commission,
A.C. Lawson, Chairman, Report of the State Earthqw:zke Investigation Commission: The California Earthquake of April 18, 1906
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1908),
vol. I, pt. ll. Hereafter cited as Lawson,SEIC.Also see Bolt,Earthqw:zkes: A Primer.
3. This estimate is based on field studies conducted by Kerry
Sieh and Richard H. Jahns.
4. Charles F. Richter, Elementary Seismology (San Francisco:
W.H. Freeman, California Institute of Technology, 1958), pp. 466·
537.
5. Fault rupture measurement by Richard H. Jahns.
6. Kerry E. Sieh, "Prehistoric Large Earthquakes Produced by
Slip on the San Andreas Fault at Pallett Creek, California," Journal
of Geophysical Research, 83(B8): 3907-3939 (August 10, 1978).
7. C.A. Whitten, personal letter quoted in Earthquake Engineering, ed. R. Wiegel (Englewood Oiffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall,
19 70), p. 34.
8. Estimates by Richard H. Jahns, based on information com·
piled from a number of sources.
9. J.L. Coffman, Earthqw:zke Investigations in the United States
(U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey, Specific Publication No. 282,
1969); J.T. Alfors, J.L. Burnett, and T.E. Gay, Jr., Urban Geology,
Master Plan for California: The Nature, Magnitude and Costs of
Geologic HaztUds in California and Recommendations for Their
Mitigation (Sacramento: California Division of Mines and Geology,

Bulletin 198, 1973); [U.S.] Office of Emergency Prepareilness,
Report to the Congress: Disaster Preparedness (Washington, D.C.:
Executive Office of the President, January 1972), 3 volumes.
10. Estimates by Richard H. Jahns, based on information compiled from a number of sources.
11. R.S. Ayre, Earthquake and Tsunami Hazards in the United
States: A Research Assessment (Boulder, Colorado: Institute of
Behavioral Science, University of Colorado, 1975), Monograph
no. NSF-RA-E-75.()05; Coffman, Earthquake Investigations . . . .
12. G.F. White and J.E. Haas, Assessment of Research on Natural HaZilrds (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1975).
13. T.C. Nichols, Jr., "Global Summary of Human Response to
Natural Hazards: Earthquakes," in Natural Hazards: Local, National, Global, ed. G.F. White (New York: Oxford Press, 1974).
14. White and Haas,AssessmentofResearch on Natural HaZilrds.
15. Coffman, Earthquake Investigations ... ; Ayre, Earthquake
and Tsunami Hazards . .. p. 27.
16. Hazel Visvader and Ian Burton, "Natural Hazards and Hazard Policy in Canada and the United States," in Natural Hazards ...
ed. G.F. White; White and Haas, Assessment of Research on Natural
HaZilrd.s.
17. Alfors, Burnett, and Gay, Urban Geology . . . pp. 4-7.

18. Committee on Earthquake Engineering Research, Division
of Engineering-National Research Council, National Academy of
Engineering, Earthquake Engineering Research: A Report to the
National Science Foundation (Washington, D.C.: National Academy
of Sciences, 1969); Alfors, Burnett, and Gay, Urban Geology . •..
19. Richard Buck and Bruce Baird, Staff Report to the Seismic
Safety Commission on the Santa Barbara Earthquake (Sacramento:
Seismic Safety Commission, September 13, 1978).
20./bid., p. 3.
21. Lawson, SEJC, vol. I, pt. II, p. 442.
22. Ibid., p. 444.
23. Lawson, SE/C, vol. I, pt. I, pp. 222-223.
24./bid., p. 233.
25./bid., p. 231.
26. Richard H. Jahns, unpublished manuscript.
27. California, Seismic Safety Commission, Report on State
Agency Programs for Seismic Safety (June 4, 1979), pp. 7-8.
28. Sieh, "Prehistoric Large Earthquakes .... "
29. The intervals and the average have been rounded to the nearest 5 years, as the dating techniques used do not permit greater precision.

81

Vol. 22, No. 1 February 1981

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL
DECISIONS: WATER REUSE

•

suggest ways to involve the public more fully in wastewater reuse and related environmental decisions .

William H. Bruvold
The Study

School of Public Health
University of California. Berkeley

The study used face-to-face interviews, including full
presentations of real wastewater treatment and reuse
options for the community under study, intended to obtain thoughtful evaluations of these options by the
respondents. This approach-presenting specific options
to residents of communities in which such options had
actually been proposed-changed the frame of reference
of "somewhere" to one's own community, and from
"sometime" to one's own immediate future.
The interview schedule was deliberately made different
from those employed in most survey research, each respondent receiving an individualized educational presentation
describing and comparing three wastewater treatment
and reuse options tailor-made to the community under
study. At the end of the presentation, respondents were
asked to rate each treatment option with respect to
environmental impact, health impact and economic impact. Respondents were also asked for statements of the
option liked best and why. Perhaps most important,
respondents were asked if they would vote for each option
if it were later offered to the local community in the form
of a bond issue. The option statements in the educational
presentation were carefully developed for each of the ten
communities surveyed. The cities and towns were chosen
to cover as wide a range as possible. A complete and
detailed description of all research procedures used is
available in a technical report. 3

Introduction
Water reclaimed from municipal wastewater can be a
significant source of supply in California and elsewhere in
the semiarid western United States. I But public opinion
about such uses is, of course, a controlling determinant,
as was recognized several years ago in a number of studies
that attempted to assess attitudes.2
Unfortunately all of the previous research on wastewater reclamation dealt with hypothetical uses of reclaimed water that might occur at some unspecified time
in the future. There is a lack of studies assessing attitudes
toward specified uses of reclaimed water proposed for the
actual communities under investigation. Such research is
needed to give policymakers more reliable guides to
public responses; it is based on citizens' personal attitudes
to concrete proposals, rather than only impersonal projections or speculations.
The major purpose of the work discussed here was to
study voters' evaluations of several wastewater reclamation and reuse options that were actually proposed for
selected California communities. Uses assessed ranged all
the way from {I) minimal treatment followed by ocean
disposal, to (2) advanced treatment and subsequent reuse
for drinking, and were evaluated by people immediately
affected by the options under consideration. The rather
surprising results found that respondents did not favor
either (I) minimal treatment followed by discharge, or (2)
very high levels of treatment followed by domestic use.
Instead they preferred relatively high levels of treatment,
followed by a "middle" level of use, e.g., for park and
greenspace irrigation. The research findings also further

Principal Findings: Water UseContact Combination Preferred
The major findings are summarized in Table I.
None of the ocean discharge options received a favorable vote, nor did any of the proposals for using reclaimed
water for drinking. Each of the options proposing conventional waste treatment and disposal by a bay or ocean
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TABI.E I
Voter Preferences for Reuse Options Analyzed by Ltvel of Treatment, Type of Reuse and Decree of Human Contact
lcvd of Treatmcnl:
Type of use:
Dcarce of Contact:

Community
Livermore

CWT
Discharge

cwr

None

Low

Reuse

AWT
Discharae
lligh

Reuse

AWT
Reuse

Moderate

Hiah

Groundwater recharp

Food crops

Drink ina
(li-U)

Watsonville

Bay our fall
No coni act
(J(l-67)

lrriaation
Food crops
(84-13)

San Luis Obispo

Bay ourfall
No contact
(14-81)

Food crops

Swimmina

(76-17)

(62-31)

Irrigation

lrriaation
Urban arcenbeltt
(65-27)

Irrigation
Fodder crops
(4H6)

Oxnard

lrriaation
Turf nunery
(4(1.55)

Drinkina

(41-49)

(28~)

Food crops
(49-40}
Groundwater rccharae
Food crop irriaation
(Sl>-41)

Irrigation
Food crops
(JJ-61)

River discharae
Swimmina
(41-55}

(H-40)

lrriaation
f:ood crops
(SI-41}

Industrial use
raper milia
(S9-J4)

lrriaation
l'ood crops
(27-66}

lrri1a1ion
Turf nursery
Strum discharee
Swimmine
(J6-S•}

Pomona

Reservoir

Aqua culture

lrriJIIion
Food crops

Fairfield

Recreational lake

Food production

(46-H)

Irrigation
Fodder crops
(61-JJ)

Recreational lake
Swimmina
(3(1.66)

Irrigation

Stream discharae
Swimmina
(S6-J6)

Ocean outfall
No contact
()6-59)

Modeato

AWT
Rcu.e
Very Hiah

lrriaation reservoir
(71-24}

Santa Rosa

vJ

AWT

Bay ourfall
No contact
(21-77)

San Dicao

00

AWl
Reuse
l.ow

Groundwater recbarp
Drink ina
(26-M)

Irrigation
Oolf courael

Fountain Valley

Ocean outfall
No contact

Overall Succeu Ratio

0/S

Ill

1/3

4/4

4/9

2{3

Of)

Overall Suueu Percentaae

.00

.JJ

.Jl

1.00

.44

.67

.00

(7J-21)

Sourct: William H. Bruvold, Public Auitudts toward Community Wa.sltwoltr Rtdamation ond Rtuu Options (Davis: University of California, Water Reaourcea Center, Auauat, 1979), Contribution no. 19.

No us:
C WT =conventional waste treatment (secondary treatment concluded by disinfection).
AWT = advanced waste treatment (lecondary treatment followed by tome form of advanced waste treatment and concluded by disinfection).
Di.tchartt =diacharae to a at ream, river, bay or ocean without further planned reuae.
R~uu =some planned beneficial reuse for reclaimed water.
D~t"tofhumon contoctcateaoriea are defined a a followa: very hixh for inae~~tivc use such as drinkina and cookina; hith for body contact utca auch asawlmmina and laundry; moduattforaecondarycontact uaea auchaa food crop production and dairy
patturc irriaation; low for usea where human contact is incidental or remote, such as fodder crop production or aolf course hazard lakes; and nont where the pouibilily of human contact ia extremely remote •• in a deep bay or ouan ou1fal1.
FirurtJ in partnthtuJ under each option are re1ulta from the straw vote on that option. The percentaae of favorable rrspona.ct iJ aiven firu and undecided rtsponses are omitted.
Ov~rtl/1 sucuJJ rt~lio.r aiven at the bottom of the table repruent the number of auccessful uraw vole. obtained for uch of the aeven aeneral opliona reJHettnled by the columns of Table I.

ities for construction of wastewater treatment facilities,
and has produced a large, detailed compendium of
guidelines for communities applying for grants to construct wastewater systems. 4 Table 3 outlines the three
principal steps in the process of planning and constructing such a system as (I) option development and
selection; (2) development and approval of construction
plans; and (3) actual construction and operational testing
of the wastewater treatment facility. The following discussion focuses on step one, option development and
selection.
In a useful monograph on a community adoption of
water reuse systems, Kasperson, McCauley, and others5
report that step one is usually divided into three sequential phases. In the first phase, the technical planning
sector, comprised of city employees and consulting
engineers, selects a single wastewater treatment option
they consider best to meet the perceived goals and
preferences of significant components of the community
decisionmaking structure.
The option selected is then submitted to the local political decisionmakers, who test it against their understanding of the local water resources situation, public opinion
goals, local political goals, and the views of the state
agency. If the option survives this local political review, it
is then ready for presentation to the local voting public,
through public hearings, city council votes, and most
important, local bond issue elections.
Kasperson and McCauley said little about the public
ratification phase, because their report was prepared
before many major reclamation and reuse projects had
actually been adopted in the United States. This prompts
several questions about the ratification phase. How can
the public best be included in the adoption process? What
can be learned from theopresent study that would extend
the Kasperson and McCauley model of the adoption
process, and its facilitation?

outfall was voted down decisively. Equally significant was
the negative response to the three options proposing reuse
for drinking, each also being voted down decisively. In
short, the respondents strongly opposed conventional
treatment with disposal by discharge, and also strongly
opposed advanced treatment with reuse for drinking.
The most favored option involved advanced waste treatment and beneficial reuse for low-contact purposes, such
as golf course and greenbelt irrigation. Respondents consistently favored advanced waste treatment when coupled
with beneficial reuse for purposes involving a low degree
of human contact. Approval ratios also generally declined as proposed treatment and use levels decreased
from the most favored option.
Why did the results turn out this way? Earlier findings
had suggested only a simple linear relation between the
degree of proposed contact and extent of opposition, and
had not forecast the U-shaped opposition pattern reported here. The reasons for preferences (see Table 2)
provide useful insights into respondents' motivation.
Respondents were asked to give reasons for liking and
not liking the 20 options given, ten of which were liked
best and ten liked least. The reasons given most often
concerned the extent to which the option provided environmental protection, public health protection, and
water resource conservation. Together these three considerations comprise respondents' principal explanation
for both their positive and negative preferences. Level of
treatment, cost of treatment and control of development
were cited infrequently.
Apparently respondents favor wastewater treatment
and reuse options that (I) safeguard public health, (2)
protect the environment, and (3) conserve water. Conventional treatment followed by disposal met the public
health requirement, but failed the environmental protection and conservation requirements, and thus were
consistently voted down. Advanced waste treatment
followed by ingestive use met the conservation and
environmental protection requirements, but failed the
public health requirement, and thus were also consistently voted down. The option that seemed to meet an·
three requirements best-public health, environmental
protection, and conservation-involved advanced waste
treatment followed by beneficial reuse, but only for
purposes that entail low levels of human contact.

Public Involvement
in Wastewater Reclamation Planning

Three principal approaches to public involvement in
wastewater reclamation planning are considered here: (I)
involve the public heavily from the earliest stages of
planning all the way through to adoption; (2) seek public
involvement, but only after planning has been completed,
and at the point when approval of a bond issue is needed
to fund the project; and (3) a "middle ground"that would
involve the public after initial planning has identified the
major options, but well before the time to ratify funding
by a public vote. The pros and cons of each approach are
reviewed below.
l. On behalf of the first approach it can be argued that
the best time for public contribution to decisionmaking is
early in the process (stage one of the Kasperson and
McCauley model) to help ensure that planning proceeds

Facilitating Community Approval of Reuse Projects

What are the implications of these findings for ways of
facilitating actual community adoption of water reuse
projects? A major impact of the present research may lie
in what it suggests about community adoption procedures, in addition to the light it sheds on community
preferences for reuse options.
The State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB)
distributes federal and state funds to California commun84

TABLE 2
Considerations Most Frequently Cited in Each Community Survey for Options Liked Best and Least

Consideration
Treatment
Environment
Health
Cost
Conservation
Development

Most Cited Reason
for Preferring
the Best-Liked Option

Most Cited Reason
for Opposing
the Least-Liked Option

Overall
Best & Least

Adequate
treatment ............. 0

Inadequate
treatment ............. 0

0

Protects the
environment ........... 2

Does not protect
the environment ....... 2

4

Protects
public health .......... 3

Does not protect
public health .......... 3

6

Economic
advantage ............. 2

Economic
disadvantage .......... 0

2

Conserves
water ................. 2

Does not
conserve water ......... 5

7

Controls
development .......... .

Stimulates
development ........... 0

Totals

10

10

20

Source: Bruvold, Public Atlitudes ....
Note: Numbers in the body of the table referto the reasons most often cited by respondents for preferring the best-liked option and for opposing the
least-liked. For example, in Livermore. the local irrigation option was best liked because it controlled urban development and the discharge option
was liked least because it did not conserve water.

TABLE3
Schematic Outline Showing Community Adoption
of Wastewater Treatment and Reuse Projects

I.

1. Technical Component Planning

2.

2. Political Component Planning

Development
and Approval of
Construction
Plans

3. Public Sector Ratification

3.

Operational
Testing
Major steps formally required in
California (SWRCB, 1976)

Source: Bruvold, Public Altitudes . ...
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Blow up of Step I option
development and selection
( Kasperson et a!., 1974)

on a course that is acceptable to a majority. Democracy is
based in part on an assumption that governance is better
when there is active involvement of an informed populace. If this is true in principle, it would be improper to put
off or delay the community's participation.
The opposing argument is that the ordinary voter lacks
the technical expertise necessary to formulate options for
wastewater management or to judge which is best. In this
view, lack of technological expertise on the part of the
voting population poses very serious impediments to the
early involvement of voters in the planning process. Further, it may be argued that most people, even if capable of
understanding the basics of the technology, are neither
interested in nor have the time for systematic analysis and
assessment of options.
2. On behalf of the second approach-public involvement after planning is complete-such participation can
best come much later in the decisionmaking process,
when the option selected by technological experts is to be
ratified (e.g., a vote on a local bond issue). This allows
technological and professional experts to do the kinds of
planning and analysis that require their expertise. These
individuals select and develop options, decide which of
several possibilities is best, and then present the one
selected to the voting public for ratification. With only
one choice, the voters must simply approve or reject the
single option the technological experts and politicians
have selected. It may be argued that this approach
preserves democratic principles, while allowing technological personnel to do technological work.
One major problem with this approach, however, is
that it frequently results in conflict and failure. Most local
bond issues are at best hard to pass in an era of fiscal stress
and double-digit inflation. Moreover local bond elections
and attempts to finance advanced wastewater treatment
by other means can also lead to serious difficulties.6 Thus
when the technical experts and professional planners
choose wastewater treatment and reuse projects they
must be extremely careful to select those that have
substantial public approval. Otherwise the support
needed to finance construction and operation may not be
forthcoming. It can also be argued that a yes-or-no vote
on a single option chosen by experts weighs too heavily in
favor of technocratic expertise, and gives too limited a
role to democratic processes and participation. While
most voters admittedly are not expert enough to analyze
options, they may be quite able to understand the options
and the option analyses developed by the technical
experts, when this information is presented using clear,
non-jargon language.
3. A number of arguments can be advanced to support
the third approach, which attempts to balance technical
and democratic imperatives, while also helping ensure
greater success in the polling booths. Under this approach
the technical and political participants are to select a
small number of options for wastewater treatment and
reuse that (I) seem feasible for the area, and (2) deliber-

ately represent divergent or different combinations of
reclamation and reuse. Careful comparative analyses of
the options by the technical experts and planning professionals would be translated into lay language, and
presented to voters for their reaction and input, before
either deciding on the chosen option or going on to a
formal public ratification. While this procedure would
not require each voter to become expert in wastewater
reclamation and reuse, it would also not postpone public
involvement until the very last.
Arguments against this approach center on its practicality. Can it actually be done, and if so, how? Will it be
successful? The present study suggests two ways of
implementing this approach, permitting the technology
sector to assess risks and efficiency, while the public
sector evaluates safety and community benefits, as
recommended by Lowrance.7

Conclusions and Recommendations

The methodology underlying the present study is a
workable procedure for obtaining public reaction to
several options developed by technical experts. Thus a
carefully drawn sample of respondents can test the
opinion of the affected voting population, and can give
results that are reasonably accurate. The brief educational effort required by such a survey would not be
extensive, and care can be taken to make it factual, fair,
complete and systematic. The results of carefully done
.polls would be useful to the political decisionmakers
(shown on the right of Table 3) and could surely reach
more of the public than the present minimal involvement
in reviewing environmental impact reports. 8
Another way of using this methodology would involve
all voters in the decisionmaking process, after they had
been exposed to an informational campaign and debate
covering the several options developed by the professionals. Information on several wastewater treatment and
reuse options would be widely disseminated, followed by
an advisory referendum, perhaps conducted in connection with a local or county election. Each voter could be
sent information that carefully and systematically describes the treatment and use for three or four viable
options. Informed comments on environmental, health,
and economic impacts associated with each option would
be included. All of this would be done in lay language,
supported by simple maps and charts as needed. Position
statements on various options by interested groups could
also be included. The mailing could be followed by public
meetings, TV and radio coverage of debates;newspaper
articles, and the like, to arouse interest and supplement
the written information.
The advisory referendum could appear, possibly at the
end of the regular election ballot, asking each voter to
indicate "yes" or "no" to each option. The results should
be highly indicative of voter sentiment, being an ex pres-
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referendum are recommended as better ways of implementing the recommended planning approach.
Results of these participatory procedures should be: ( 1)
marked increase of chances of success in local bond elections; (2) increased confidence in public officials and their
technical planning consultants; and (3) increased citizen
participation in local political decisions. The processes
could possibly serve as models for citizen participation in
school bond issues, planning and zoning decisions, public
works improvements, and other similar matters requiring
voter ratification at a local or county election.
In summary, a two-step political review and ratification process is recommended. The first would assess
public opinion regarding several viable options, either by
a special poll or an advisory referendum. The second step
would involve final formal public ratification of the single
plan selected as best for the community by a decision
process that has already involved the technical and planning sectors, local political leaders and the voting public.

sion of voters actually participating in local elections.
This could then be considered by the local political
leadership in choosing the option to be presented for~
formal ratification. While either the poll or the advisory
referendum would cost money and complicate the planning process, they could be much less costly in money and
confidence than failed bond elections, or recall campaigns
brought against elected public officials by disgruntled
citizens.
The present study indicated that a majority of respondents would like to be involved in water-reuse option
selection in meaningful ways. Public participation
through public hearings is limited, because such hearings
are usually not well attended by citizens, and may be
dominated by various interest groups that do not necessarily represent the voting public. In short, public hearings, while essential, do not seem to provide an effective
vehicle for public participation in choosing options.
Accordingly either the special poll or the advisory
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system. The article then considers the effect of three sets
of state policy options on Delta water quality and quantity: (1) the first set of options involves flood protection
and levee enhancement in the Delta~ (2) the second,
ways of moving water through or around the Delta; and
(3) the third, legal and institutional changes affecting
water management and distribution.
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THE DELTA: CHARACTER AND USES
INTRODUCTION
Geography
This article is intended to give readers perspective on
Proposition 9 - the June 1982 referendum on the Peripheral Canal and associated facilities - and help place the
discussion in the broader context of the Delta and the
state's water system. Most of California's high-quality
water that is available for shipment flows into the Delta
through the Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers and their
tributaries, and the amounts of water exported are inextricably linked to Delta water quality. That is, water
quality (salinity) in the Delta and southward depends on
the quantity of freshwater in the Delta. The interdependence of the two prompts public concern about both.
There are no panaceas, no simple solutions to the complex problems involving water quantity and quality.
Satisfactory management of the ~tate's water depends on
the outcome of a series of policy decisions reached over
time, each influenced by considerations of politics, technology, and economics. The vote on Proposition 9 will
be a crucial decision in the series.
The following discussion first presents necessary
background on the Delta and its role in the state's water

As defined by statute, the Delta comprises almost
740,000 acres, and includes parts of Contra Costa, San
Joaquin, Sacramento, Solano, and Yolo counties. 1 The
natural flow of freshwater is from Central Valley rivers
through Delta channels and canals into San Francisco
Bay. At high tide, however, the incoming saltwater holds
the freshwater in the Delta. Moreover, if the flow of
fresh river water into the Delta is low, saltwater enters
the Delta, reducing its water quality.
The Delta occupies a crucial site: 70 percent of the
state's water originates to its north, while 80 percent of
the demand is from south of the Delta. 2 The situation is
further complicated because water supply and demand
are seasonally out of phase, and even more severely
mismatched in dry years. Supply is greatest in winter,
when demand is lowest, and may fluctuate substantially
from year to year. When free-flowing supplies are
lowest, demand is highest for summer irrigation,
although this seasonal need is reasonably constant from
year to year.

The California Policy Seminar, administered by the Institute of Governmental Studies on the Berkeley campus, is a
Universitywide program that supports research on future policy problems the state may face. The Seminar is chaired by the
University PresidenL Its members include the Governor, the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, and the Speaker of the
Assembly, plus appointees from the faculty, the associated students, and the Assembly, Senate, and executive branches of
governmenL The commissioned research represents the latest in academic thought about major state policy questions. This
CAI.JR>RHIA POLICY SEMINAR

issue of the Public Affairs Repon summarizes and interprets other work by the authors.
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PROPOSITION 9
If ACA 90 takes effect, it will place into the State
Constitution procedural barriers designed to forestall any
legislative efforts to reduce the Delta water quality or fish
and wildlife protections set forth in SB 200. Specifically,
the article requires:

California's June 1982 ballot will include Proposition
9, entitled "Water Facilities Including the Peripheral
Canal, • asking voters to approve or reject Senate Bill 200
(SB 200). SB 200 was passed in the summer of 1980,
and would have taken effect on January 1, 1981, had it
not been delayed by a voters' petition requiring it to be
placed on the ballot. Proposition 8 (ACA 90), approved
by voters in November 1980, will have no force or effect
unless the voters approve SB 200 in the forthcoming
referendum.
SB 200 would authorize (1) construction of the Peripheral Canal around the Delta, (2) relocation of the Contra Costa Canal, (3) construction of the Glenn or Colusa
Reservoir, and the Los Vaqueros Reservoir, for offstream storage, and (4) enlargement of the East Branch
Aqueduct in southern California (see Figure 1 and Figure 2).
In addition to these authorizations, SB 200 also:

(1) that the State Water Project (SWP) must
meet State Water Resources Control Board
water quality standards to protect the
beneficial uses of water in the Delta, Suisun
Marsh, and San Francisco Bay; (2) that the
SWP must provide water releases in case the
Federal Government fails to operate the
Central Valley Project in compliance with
such standards; (3) that the Department of
Water Resources, before constructing the
··Peripheral Canal, must enter into a permanent agreement with the Department of
Fish and Game to restore and maintain Delta
fish and wildlife resources to their historic
levels (1922-1967). (California, Department
of Water Resources, The California State
Water Project - Current Activities and Future
Management Plans, Bulletin 132-80, October
1980, p. 10.)

requires agreements to ensure protection of
Delta water quality and fish and wildlife
within the Delta; agreements to ensure
implementation of additional surface and
ground water storage (San Joaquin Valley
and Los Angeles Basin); and water conservation and reclamation programs to meet the
water needs of the SWP through year 2000.
It also authorizes, separate from the SWP:
(1) the Mid-Valley Canal to help stop falling
ground water levels on the east side of the
San Joaquin Valley, and (2) undefined facilities to transport water to Alameda, Contra
Costa, San Joaquin, San Francisco, and San
Mateo counties. (California, Department of
Water Resources, The California Scare Water
Project - Current Activities and Future
Plans.
Bulletin
132-81,
Management
November 1981, p. 4.)

Thus, if and when it becomes effective, ACA 90 is
designed to preserve water quality rights of users within
the Delta from legislative intervention. The article does
not affect administrative modifications - e.g., the
definition of "historic fish levels" - already allowed under
SB 200. However, it does give protection to the wild and
scenic rivers of northern California. A later vote of the
people could change any of these stipulations, and protection of North Coast rivers could also be changed by a
two-thirds vote of the Legislature.

Agriculture

packed in small sheds scattered throughout the Delta and
then shipped out by truck.

Two-thirds of the statutory Delta, known as the
"Delta lowlands," is at elevations from five feet above sea
level to 20 feet below. Eighty percent of this reclaimed
marsh is in agriculture, 9 percent is in open waterways,
10 percent is in native vegetation, and 1 percent is
residential. It includes 61 islands currently surrounded
by 1, 100 miles of flood protection levees. The lowlands
have been zoned for agriculture by the five counties having jurisdiction, with minimum parcel size varying from
five acres in Contra Costa County to 80 acres in
Sacramento and Solano counties. Agriculture is the only
industry in the Delta lowlands, agricultural produce being

Population and Recreational Use
There are four incorporated cities (total population
98,560 in 1980) in the "Delta uplands": Antioch,
Pittsburg, Brentwood, and Tracy. The lowlands have
only one incorporated town (Isleton, population 930) and
about 10 villages. A 1975 Department of Commerce
special census reported about 11,000 people living in the
lowlands. 3
The Delta has more than 700 miles of navigable
waterways, with small resorts on 24 of the islands, and
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FIGURE 1
Proposed Delta Facilities
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two islands have recreational housing (Bethel Island and
Discovery Bay). A 1978 survey by the California Department of Water Resources (DWR) estimated that over 7
million people use the Delta area, boating and fishing
being the prime attractions for two-thirds of them. In
1978 approximately $70 million was spent in the area for
recreation. 4 That same year the five Delta counties had
82,282 registered pleasure boats served by 150 marinas
inside the Delta, and additional pleasure craft also used
the Delta waterways. 5

Control Board (SWRCB), the United States Bureau of
Reclamation (Central Valley Project - CVP), the US
Army Corps of Engineers, the State Reclamation Board,
and the Sacramento-Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board. 9 The Contra Costa County Water District currently uses Delta water from the Contra Costa
Canal, whose intake is in the western Delta at Rock
Slough.

SWAMPLAND RECLAMATION
AND THE LEVEES

Transportation and Utilities

•

History of Delta Development

While parts of the Delta seem remote, it has vital
transportation and utility uses. A 1975 inventory of 56
islands protected by "non-project levees," i.e., levees
maintained by local interests only, found 37 to have public roads, including major state highways (routes 4, 12,
and 160). Sixteen islands are crossed by aqueducts or
pipelines, 18 by power transmission lines, and 11 by railroads. Fifteen islands have gas wells, and McDonald
Tract provides underground storage for both domestic
and Canadian gas. 6

Before 1850, the swampy Delta islands were mostly
used to graze cattle. Swampland reclamation was legalized and encouraged by the federal ·Arkansas Act" of
1850, granting title of swamp and overflow lands to certain states, on condition that proceeds from their sale
would be used to assist in reclamation. California's 1861
"Swampland Act" allowed the state to offer patents to
those who would drain and reclaim river-bottom lands. 10
By 1930 the Delta had been fully reclaimed for intensive
agriculture, the shallow natural channels having been
dredged to build levees on the natural ridges and create
new islands.
Many of today's levee problems are a result of this
early construction by private initiative, about half of the
old levees being built on peat soils, and most without
adequate stable foundations. While they hold, these
levees protect the islands and low-lying tracts from flooding caused by heavy river runoff, high tides from the
ocean, and waves driven by strong winds. In the 1920s,
federal flood control projects rehabilitated levees (known
as "project levees") along the Sacramento and San
Joaquin rivers, using appropriate engineering design standards.

Fish and Wildlife
The Department of Water Resources characterizes
the Delta as a unique and varied environment that is
important to the survival of a large segment of
California's fishery. Migratory fish, including salmon,
steelhead, shad, sturgeon, and striped bass, move
through the Delta on their upstream spawning runs.
About half of the striped bass spawn in the Delta itself,
and young fish of all species use Delta channels as a nursery before moving through San Francisco Bay to the
ocean. 7 In the process, the Delta's small young fish suffer
high mortality from pumping at water intakes used by
water agencies, utilities, and industries. Pumping also
kills some larger fish and causes "normal" water flows to
reverse, confusing fish that are trying to reach the ocean.
Fish that survive the pumps now provide significant
opportunities for sports fishing in canals and reservoirs
south of the Delta.
The Delta also provides an ideal environment for
over 200 species of birds, including five major species
(ducks, geese, and pheasants, which are hunted as game,
as well as sandhill cranes and swans, which are protected). There are 39 species of mammals, 19 of reptiles,
and 8 of amphibians 8 Preservation of this habitat for fish
and wildlife depends on adequate water quality and continued plant growth on the Delta's levees and farmlands.

The Delta Levees
The levees were originally constructed for flood protection only, whereas today they are necessary not only
to protect reclaimed agricultural land, and transportation
and utility facilities, but also to maintain high water quality, provide a desirable fish habitat, offer recreational
amenities, and serve as channels for water transfer.
Levees are necessary for high-quality water because each
additional flooded island means that the SWP must
release more freshwater from northern reservoirs to keep
saltwater out of the Delta and compensate for increased
evaporation. When Andrus-Brannan islands flooded in
1972, 300,000 acre feet of water was released from
Shasta and Oroville reservoirs to compensate for the
freshwater covering the island. This release was necessary to maintain the water quality for export 11
Levee maintenance is in a variety of hands. Maintenance for the Sacramento Deep Water Ship Channel and

Agencies Involved
Numerous governmental agencies make decisions
affecting the Delta, including 6 local water districts, 50
levee districts, 5 county governments, the DWR, the
State Water Project (SWP), the State Water Resources
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certain river levees is a federal responsibility. The Port
of Stockton has an agreement with the federal government for the latter to repair and restore levees along the
Stockton Deep Water Ship Channel and San Joaquin
River - this represents about 10 percent of Delta levees.
In addition, districts controlling 15 percent of the private
levees have agreements with the federal government to
maintain their levees to US specifications. These are
called "project levees."
The remaining 75 percent of the Delta island levees
are called "non-project levees, • which are maintained by
the landowners or by special districts created for that purpose. The utilities and railroads that cross the Delta pay
a local district tax for levee maintenance, and in addition
the three railroad companies maintain their own rights·
of-way. The state has no jurisdiction or responsibility for
these non-project levees, although the districts can ask
for state assistance during emergencies, and in case of a
disaster they are usually eligible for state and federal
financial assistance. 12
In 1980, the estimated value of land and improvements within these districts was over $1 billion. The districts could levy "approximately $4 million per year for
levee maintenance... we believe that in many years,
expenditures have been substantially less... [and] there
appears to be an inadequate level of local commitment
for (non-project) levee maintenance." 13 A 1980 inspec·
tion of non-project levees by the DWR rated levees of 4
islands very poor, 28 as poor, and 20 as fair. 14

Since Delta levees are necessary to the continued
availability of high-quality water, levee protection
becomes a crucial issue. In 1969, the Legislature asked
the DWR to formulate a plan for improved Delta flood
protection. The May 1975 DWR report proposed specific
levee improvements to provide 100-year flood protection
(i.e., a flood recurrence interval on the average of about
once in 100 years) for 8 islands with urban development,
18
and 50-year flood protection elsewhere. A 1976 act
(Chapter 1302, Statutes of 1976) directed the DWR to
review and complete feasibility plans for the improvements, including recommendations on: construction,
cost-sharing, land use, zoning, flood control, recreation,
fish and wildlife habitat, and aesthetic values. The DWR
final report is expected in the summer of 1982. The US
Army Corps of Engineers joined the DWR in this study.
In 1980 the DWR estimated the cost of complete rehabilitation of the Delta levees on 55 islands at between $800
million and $1 billion. 19

THE STATEWIDE WATER EXCHANGE
AND DELTA WATER QUALITY

The Water Exchange
Whereas the Delta was once only a drainage estuary
and a natural conduit to the sea for California's two
major rivers, increased statewide demand for water has
converted the Delta from a largely seasonal freshwater
source for local use, into the center of an immense water
exchange. In other words, the Delta currently operates
as a year-round "river" for water being shipped from
northern to southern California.
The SWP and federal CVP currently use the existing
channels and rivers to transport water through the Delta
to facilities near Tracy, where it is pumped into the two
canals that take it to the San Joaquin, Livermore, and
Santa Clara valleys, southern Alameda County, and
southern California. The SWP moves about two-fifths 2.2 million acre feet (MAF) per year - and the CVP
moves about three-fifths - 3.1 MAF - of the water
20
exported from the Delta.

Delta Island Flooding
Flooding of Delta islands is mainly attributable to
increased hydrostatic pressure on already weak levees.
Many of the islands' interiors are below water level, as a
result of land subsidence due to soil erosion and compaction. In order for crops to grow, the islands' groundwater levels must be lowered further. Ditches are dug to
collect the ground water, and pumps lift the drainage
water up into the canals, causing an increase in water
pressure on the canal side of the levees. The levees are
also undermined and punctured by burrowing rodents,
wave action in the wake of boats, and, in certain channels, scouring caused by the increased water velocities
due to the SWP and CVP pumping.
All six islands and tracts that flooded in 1980 had
non-project levees. These six total 30,956 acres of land,
valued at $45,849,000. 15 Four of the islands flooded during winter high-water stages, and two flooded under normal summer cunditions. State and federal aid of over
$40 million has been spent repairing the levees, pumping
out the water, and repairing the flood damage. 16 This
work is expensive; pumping costs on one island alone
were three times the land's appraised value. 17 On the
other hand, a failure to reclaim flooded islands could also
be costly, us many engineers fear that if one island is left
flooded, the resulting wind and wave action could hasten
the flooding of neighboring islands with poor levees.

When the CVP was built, a short "Delta
Cross Channel" was installed to connect the
Sacramento River to the Mokelumne River
delta channels.
(This allows a certain
amount of Sacramento River water to flow
into the central Delta.) The CVP export
pumps (near Tracy) then sucked down
southern Delta water levels and thereby provided a gradient to draw water through that
channel and across the central Delta to the
pumps. When the SWP added its pumps it
further reduced southern Delta water levels,
but the capacity of the Cross Channel was
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not augmented, so water is now sucked down
the Sacramento River around Sherman
Island bringing salt from the bay. 21

ISSUES AND CONCERNS:
WATER QUALITY, QUANTITY,
FISH PROTECTION, AND COST

Thus part of the water moving south toward the pumps.
flows through the western Delta in a direction counter to
normal flow.
Withdrawals of Delta water by the CVP and SWP
have tended to exceed the amounts originally planned for
the state water facilities. 22 This is a source of serious concern, because the quality of the water pumped depends
entirely on the quality of the water in the Delta.
Increased pumping has caused severe water-quality problems due to salinity intrusion from San Francisco Bay, as
well as scouring of the channels, and reduced tidal flushing of the· southern Delta. It has also contributed to
drastic depletion of the estuary's fish resources. The
problems caused by the recent three-year drought underscored the Delta ecosystem's fragility and the need for
careful water quality management

All the current water issues cannot be treated here,
nor are all possible solutions presented. Furthermore,
each suggested solution implies sets of trade-offs among
agricultural, municipal, industrial, environmental, and
wildlife water needs. Each solution also involves
different combinations of physical and political risks,
costs, financing methods, benefits, and beneficiaries.
California's water concerns are much too diverse and its
water industry too complex to deal with adequately in the
space available here. Nevertheless, we believe that the
discussion provides a way to analyze and compare solutions proposed for some of the major water issues confronting the state.
The solutions discussed below deal with the main
issues of water quality, water quantity, fish protection,
and cost Currently, the SWP and CVP water contract
deliveries for the year 2000 indicate a 50 percent increase
in volume over 1980. 24 Delivery of this increased amount
of water would reduce Delta water quality unless compensating measures are initiated, e.g., developing additional water supplies or adopting selected institutional
options. On the other hand, if additional water supplies
are limited, some institutional and technological changes
could encourage better use and stretch existing supplies.
A reduction of water export would allow the maintenance
of relatively high water quality in the Delta.
Californians are concerned about how the vote on
Proposition 9 will affect the future distribution of water,
and what the implications will be for additional water
development For example, agriculture now uses 85 percent of the state's developed water, whereas municipal
uses take only 9 percent, and industrial uses about 6 percent Will it be possible for agriculture .to maintain or
increase its already large share of the state's water, or
will urban needs for more water cut into farm allocations?
There is real concern about who will ultimately control California's water. Farmers north of the Delta
speculate that their access to local surface water for irrigation may be curtailed as increasing amounts of water
are shipped south, or are impounded in new reservoirs.
Many Delta farmers fear that the demands of southern
California users will control Delta water quality, especially in times when freshwater is in short supply.
Further, since various state agencies have conflicting
priorities, and the federal government also has its own
criteria for the water it controls, many people believe
legally established Delta water-quality standards are politically vulnerable to administrative changes.
The need to protect the fish that use the Delta is a
major influence on the quality and quantity of water
shipped south. Many recreationists worry, however, that
the present laws are not strict enough, and that under
drought conditions fish protection and Delta water quality

Delta Water Quality
In August 1978, the SWRCB adopted (1) the Water
Quality Control Plan for the Sacramento-San Joaquin
Delta and Suisun Marsh (called the Delta Plan), and (2)
the Water Right Decision 1485 (D-1485). 23 In effect.
decision D-1485 states that the criterion for Delta water
quality should be "pre-project" conditions, i.e., as if neither the CVP nor SWP existed. The Delta Plan included
water-quality control and use of water rights in a single
set of water-quality standards to be reviewed in 1988.
The plan is intended to protect beneficial uses of Delta
and Suisun Marsh water, and deals primarily with water
flows as they relate to salinity intrusion.
The beneficial uses noted in the plan include: agriculture on both peat and mineral soils (recognizing
differences between the Delta's northern interior and
western and southern portions); municipal and industrial
uses, including water exported to the San Francisco Bay
Area, to the San Joaquin Valley, and to the Los Angeles
basin; and fish and wildlife. The standards are set and
can be changed by the SWRCB. As noted above,-SB 200
also sets forth certain guarantees designed to protect
Delta water quality, requirements which - resulting from
the adoption of ACA 90 in 1980 - cannot be altered by
the Legislature. These guarantees will come into force
only if Proposition 9 is approved and SB 200 takes effect.
The US Bureau of Reclamation, the SWRCB, and the
DWR are now engaged in negotiation, discussion, and
litigation over (1) the extent to which federal water projects are subject to state water-quality regulatio~ (2)
how much levee work the Army Corps of Engineers is
responsible for - this depends on whether Delta levees
are primarily for flood protection or for reclamation; and
(3) the proper allocation of levee and water-quality control costs among state and local Delta water agencies.
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standards would get a low priority. On the other hand,
agriculturalists fear that in water-short years environmental protection laws will give the maintenance of good
water quality for fish a higher priority than supplying
high-quality irrigation water for farmland.
Increasing competition for public funds and growing
resistance to tax-supported water development have
raised equity questions about who pays for and who
benefits from protecting water quality, and developing
more water. The public pays a large portion of the cost,
and we are all beneficiaries. Landowners protecting their
levees in the Delta also provide some of the benefits we
all share. In short, determining appropriate, equitable
roles for public and private contributions to water-project
financing is complex, and made even more so by the
increasing number of interests that share in decisionmaking about water development and use.
The fiscal pressures and issue-conflicts are aggravated
by the fact that future water development will be more
and more expensive. The era of cheap water is over.
Not only are construction and energy costs rising, but so
are the costs of simply maintaining current Delta waterquality standards. Deteriorating levees, increasing risk of
flooding, and ineffective drainage add to the escalating
costs. For instance, over $40 million in public funds was
required to repair Delta flood damage in 1980, not counting funds from individuals, utilities, and the railroad. 25
The discussion now turns to several policy options
that have been suggested to help California resolve some
of these complicated and difficult water issues.

different levels of landowner responsibility for protecting
their property from flooding, and corresponding roles in
land protection for state and/or federal aid.

First Set of Options:
Alternatives for Flood Protection
and Levee Maintenance

(1) The status quo is one alternative. Delta landowners would continue to bear most of the protection costs,
with little state participation, no major new protection
facilities built, and no changes in institutional rules.
Local districts would continue the current low level of
funding for levee maintenance and repair. Federal agencies would deal mostly with navigation and channel
maintenance, and provide monetary help only after catastrophic floods. The state would help coordinate emergency relief. 26 Finally, rates of pumping by the CVP and
the SWP would attempt to keep pace with the growing
commitments to water contractors.
While this option has worked in the past, its continuation in the face of limitations on future supplies
means further degradation of levee structures and water
quality. Certain kinds of fish will decrease and perhaps
disappear, particularly the striped bass. Delta agriculture
will either literally "farm itself into flooding" through
further soil subsidence and levee erosion, convert to less
remunerative crops (this has already happened on many
islands), or shift from agriculture to other forms of business, e.g., seasonal recreation. Recreational boating will
increase, and boat wakes will hasten the breach of some
weaker levees. Loss of some islands ...ill enlarge the
open water areas, perhaps leading to further levee damage from wind and waves.
The status quo option will lead to increased public
costs. Sooner or later urban users of Delta water - from
Contra Costa County to the Metropolitan Water District
of Southern California - would have to install expensive
new water treatment facilities to safeguard public health.
Utility companies using the islands would have to shore
up their structures, or develop alternative routes in which
to relocate severely threatened facilities. Local governments would suffer tax-revenue declines if floodthreatened property were reassessed downward or
removed from the tax rolls. Further, costs to state and
federal governments would rise if flooding forced releases
of additional freshwater from limited upstream facilities
to dilute the resulting intrusion of saltwater from the
ocean. Finally, the status quo could also cost taxpayers
more than $1 billion, if it were later decided to "save" the
Delta by rehabilitating levees and pumping drowned
27
islands dry.

These options concern decisions on Delta levee
maintenance, and on who pays. Research indicates that
the formation of lakes by flooding of Delta islands would
call for larger freshwater releases than are now required
to maintain the SWP and Delta water quality levels.
Complying with these demands would reduce the supplies of water available for the entire system, and
increase the need for costly water releases to maintain
quality standards. The following options contemplate

(2) This option differs from the previous one only in
that the federal government would severely reduce the
amount of aid provided for flood relief. Thus, relief
would be available only if benefits greatly exceeded costs.
Governmental responsibility for channel maintenance
and navigation facilities would continue. Under this
option, each landowner or district would be solely
responsible for their own flood-prevention programs and
protection standards.

THREE SETS OF POLICY OPTIONS
Three sets of policy options are outlined, all relating
to Delta water quality and use. The first set of options
would protect the islands and levees from flooding. The
second relates to the movement of water around and
through the Delta en route to the San Francisco Bay
Area, the San Joaquin Valley, and southern California.
The third involves institutional and legal changes in the
State Water Project. Some options are mutually
exclusive, while others could be combined.
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quality of both Delta water and transported water. But
all of them would require upstream storage facilities to
meet SWP and CVP projected demand. None of the
options would deal with lana subsidence.

Most of the consequences noted for the first alternative would also apply to this one. In addition, the strict
limitations on public relief funds would increase the
probability of flooded islands being left as unreclaimed
lakes. Clearly, if reclamation costs exceed the value of
the flooded land, as has been the case recently, individual
landowners would have little incentive to rehabilitate
their flooded islands.
Moreover, further water degradation could mean that
society's loss would greatly exceed the sum of individual
landowner's losses. Examples of such losses from pumping low-quality water include increased repairs of water
distribution facilities, reduced yields from irrigation, and
greater expenditures required to protect pubhc health.
Finally, as under the first alternative, a later decision to
salvage the Delta could easily cost $1 billion or more. 28

(1) The status quo alternative has already been discussed, and the problems of continuing water transport
considered. CVP and SWP pumping near Tracy moves
almost 6 MAF of water out of the Delta annually, creating reverse flows and causing stagnation and high salinity
in the South Delta, confusing many migratory fish, and
threatening to force water systems drawing from the
Delta to use more expensive purification methods. 31
(2) The next alternative in this group is a • nonisolated" Through-Delta facility, i.e., the one currently pro-

posed by the Central Delta Water Agency. 32 Water would
be taken from the Sacramento River near Walnut Grove
and transported into the Delta interior, through improved
channels of the Mokelumne River system. A pump
located near Clifton Court Forebay would draw the water
south, through improved and widened channels in the
Central Delta, and around Victoria Island. Pumps would
send some of this water east into the southeastern Delta,
and move some north toward the Contra Costa Canal
intake.
Fish screens would be needed at the intake from the
Sacramento River, and before Clifton Court Forebay.
Since this would be a non-isolated facility, fish and water
could circulate into the branch canals, because the pumps
would create a southward-flowing current. This option
would require upgrading of some levees adjacent to
selected channels. Total cost estimates for the facility
range from $330 to $545 million in 1981 dollars. 33 (The
cost of fish screens is difficult to predict because
appropriate techniques and designs are still being
developed, but cost estimates range from $100 to $150
million.)
Supporters claim this option would reduce flood
potential (because some levees would be strengthened),
while providing for water shipments south. It would also
eliminate much political uncertainty about the availability
of sufficient freshwater in the Delta because export water
contractors are interested in high-quality water. Furthermore, they claim that costly relocation ($17 million in
1979 dollars) of the Contra Costa Canal's present water
intake would be unnecessary. J.4 On the other hand,
opponents say the Through-Delta facility would cost
more than the Peripheral Canal, continue degradation of
the fisheries, jeopardize water exports, and harm the
scenic qualities of the lower Mokelumne River. 35 They
also suggest that operation and maintenance costs would
be much higher than those for the Peripheral Canal.
Finally, they argue that this type of option was fully
reviewed and rejected in previous studies that led to the
selection of the Peripheral Canal alternative..
The Delta's levees and islands comprise part of a
large saltwater barrier that protects the quality of the

(3) The final alternative under this set of options
would mandate public and private cost sharing of land protection, including levee operation, maintenance, and
emergency relief. This would require agreement on levee
protection standards, on who would do the work, and on
how costs would be shared. Once an emergency was
declared, flood recovery help would come from federal
and state sources, without considering the program's
costs and benefits. Maintenance of channel and navigation aids would continue as a federal responsibility.
This alternative would minimize or eliminate most of
the previously mentioned losses of freshwater, agricultural land, and water quality. On the other hand, it could
increase individual levee assessments, and even increase
the Delta's share of funds taken from the state's general
tax fund. Total federal Delta expenses could be reduced
from what they are today, however, if improved levees
reduced the incidence of flooding.
With more public dollars invested in levee protection,
increased access and augmented recreational facilities will
be required throughout the Delta. 29 An improved levee
system could have a positive influence on fish protection.
Total costs of levee rehabilitation would remain the
same, i.e., about $I billion. 30
This alternative would do nothing to inhibit land subsidence, nor would it guarantee minimum water quality
levels, in the face of increased pumping by the CVP
and/or SWP. Finally, it would not protect water quality
from possible degradation during periods of low flow or
drought.

Second Set of Options:
Ways of Transporting Water South
The second set of policy options involves ways of
moving CVP and SWP water around or through the
Delta, including (1) the status quo, (2) a "non-isolated"
Through-Delta facility, and (3) an "isolated" facility, e.g.,
the Peripheral Canal. These options involve differences
in quantities of water moved, and the impacts on the
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plete if all SB 200 environmental requirements are met.
Completion could be postponed if these requirements are
not met. The cost for the canal alone has been estimated
at $680 million in 1981 dollars. 37
The Peripheral Canal as designed by the DWR and
described in SB 200 could handle about twice as much
water as the present arrangements deliver. Readers
should note, however, that this additional water would be
available only if the rest of the. upstream facilities in SB
200 were built. Estimates of the cost of these facilities
vary, but would certainly be several billions of dollars.
Proponents of the canal claim that many years and
millions of dollars have been spent on studies for the
State Waier Plan, leading to the selection of the Peripheral Canal alternative. They say that rejection of the
canal alternative would waste the time and dollars already
spent and cause additional costly delays to completion of
the plan. They add that the canal alternative provides an
achievable balance between environmental concerns in
the Delta and long-run commitments to ship water south.
Opponents claim that in spite of all the efforts and
studies, the Peripheral Canal is not a good choice, given
the present package of environmental safeguards. Some
critics claim either that the canal might not be completed,
or that all the available extra water would be used to
meet the environmental requirements. Critics also maintain that the canal is too large and expensive as presently
designed. They argue that if the supporting facilities of
SB 200 are not built, there will be no reason for the canal
to be so large. Other critics tnaintain that no matter what
the entitlement arrangements are, southern California
does not need all the water that the Peripheral Canal
could deliver.
If the Peripheral Canal were built, the quality of
water transferred south would be high. It would no
longer depend on the quality of water in the Delta,
because the canal would draw high-quality water from the
Sacramento River at Hood. During periods of low flow,
the canal could be used to increase water-quality levels in
the Delta by releasing water from any of its 14 valves.
This should alleviate problems that fish have with lowquality water and reverse flows, and could lead to an
increase in their survival rate, despite some deaths from
the diversion pumps drawing water from the Sacramento
River. The released water could flush the south Delta,
helping remove stagnant water and poor-quality San
Joaquin River water.
But recreationists, Delta farmers, and municipal and
industrial water users who draw directly from the Delta
waterways fear that the SB 200 guarantees to maintain
minimum water-quality standards will not be observed.
An isolated canal could reduce the state and federal
government incentives to improve Delta levees, thus
shifting initiative and responsibility for levee operation
and maintenance to Delta landowners and local districts.
In addition, the isolated canal might reduce federal aid
granted in times of flood, because federal CVP water
would not be affected.

exported water. Accordingly, the non-isolated canal
would focus state attention on the levees, whose preservation would be essential to the maintenance of high
water quality. Fish losses due to stream-flow reversals
around Sherman Island would decline. Recreationists
would continue to enjoy a Delta with many channels and
protected sloughs.
This facility could be completed within four years of
approval. Although the environmental safeguards of
Proposition 8 would not apply, D-1485 water-quality
standards would prevail, since they do not depend on any
water transport alternative.

(3) The final alternative under this set of options is
an • isolated" water transfer facility, e.g., the Peripheral
Canal, as provided for in SB 200. This option differs
from the previous one in that the canal would bypass the
Delta. Its key feature would be a large ditch through
which up to 80 percent of the upstream storage released
into the Sacramento River could be shunted around the
Delta. for shipment south. This percentage would vary
with actual stream-flow and time of year.
The shunted water could be available for pumping by
both the CVP and the SWP. The CVP would, however,
be restricted from using the canal unless it agrees to
Delta water-quality standards set by the SWRCB. Ot has
also been suggested that the SWRCB might order the
Department of Water Resources to permit federal use of
the canal so as to protect fish in the Delta from the
reverse-flow phenomenon discussed above.) The DWR
states that the Peripheral Canal could provide between
500,000 and 700,000 acre feet of extra water for transportation south without degrading Delta water quality.
This would really be "saved water," because the canal
would render unnecessary releases into the Sacramento
River to offset saltwater intrusion due to reverse stream
flows in its western portion. To increase water delivery
above these amounts - 500,000 to 700,000 acre feet additional upstream reservoirs would be needed (e.g.,
those authorized by SB 200), regardless of the alternative
chosen to transport water in or around the Delta.
Planning for the Peripheral Canal was based on the
assumption that the SWP and the CVP would both use it,
and would also coordinate their efforts to control Delta
water quality. Currently, while there is no formal agreement about water-quality standards, there is tacit coordination between the CVP and the SWP about pumping
from the Delta. In the absence of a formal future agreement, however, SB 200 would require the SWP water
releases to compensate for any failure by the CVP to
meet SWRCB standards for the Delta.
The canal would be 42 miles long, approximately 10
feet above ground, 400 to 500 feet wide, and 20 to 30
feet deep. It would require 94 miles of road, 6,500 acres
of right-of-way, siphons to bypass 4 rivers, large fish
screens and 6 pumping units at the intake, and 14 release
facilities. 36 It would take approximately ten years to com-
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Third Set of Options:
Institutional Change
Relating to Water Use

increase the supply of usable water in California. Proponents claim that this option could yield hundreds of
thousands of acre feet of water at prices competitive with
the cost of developing new water supplies. Under
present regulatioss, reclamation would not reduce any
entitlement under the State Water Plan, but it could
reduce the demand for the SWP-delivered water.

The final set of policy options are institutional and
regulatory changes affecting users of SWP water. Similar
federal changes could be made for CVP water users.
Water demand could be reduced, and/or supplies
stretched, by such measures as conservation, water pricing, water rights transferability, reclamation, conjunctive
use, and drainage. Reducing the amount of water actually used would enhance the quality of Delta water, and
of water transported south.

(6) Cor!iunctive use, i.e., the combined management
and use of ground and surface water, is another way to
reduce surface water use. While this option is now used
in many water basins, there are some which do not
require it. Individual users currently have little personal
incentive to recharge water basins also used by others, or
to conserve water in a basin (except in responding to
their qwn pumping costs). If there were different controls on ground water use, the need to transport expensive surface water to recharge basins could be reduced.
As things now stand, most ground water users can pump
out unlimited amounts of water, paying only the costs of
pumping, and not paying any possible costs of recharging
the basin.

(1) More positive encouragement of conservation
measures is one way to reduce the demand for water.

•

Conservation could be mandated in ways that leave water
agencies and users free to choose their preferred conservation techniques, e.g., lining ditches, improving irrigation technology, or raising runoff water quality standards.
(2) A revision in water pricing is another possible
change. Water agencies have traditionally priced water so
that it is feasible for users to buy it, instead of pricing it
so as to meet costs. Present water pricing gives inadequate incentives for water conservation. Thus an
individual who reduces water use does not reap the
resulting benefits as economic savings, which instead
accrue to the entire system.
If users were charged the total added cost of delivering any "new" water, instead of an averaged cost for both
"new" and "old" water, people would probably make decisions on water use more favorable to conservation. Such
a pricing system would require identifying uses of new
and old water. It would also involve equity considerations between new and old users of water. For example,
would it be fair and feasible to charge new water users
higher rates than old users?

(7) Drainage has a major effect on Delta water quality. Accordingly, tjfiuent standards established for water
that drains into the Delta is another possible institutional
change. If more water is supplied to the San Joaquin
Valley, drainage needs will be increased. This would, in
turn, add to the water-quality problems of the Delta and
the Bay Area. Freshwater releases are the only way now
available to cope with such problems in the Delta. Other
proposals that could help solve drainage problems include
requiring settling or evaporation ponds, regulating treatment of drain water, or even reversing the Valley Drain
so that it flows southward into the Tulare Sink.

SUMMARY

(3) Free market advocates suggest the sale of
developed water on an open market basis, with prices cover-

Each person voting on Proposition 9 in June will
presumably be strongly influenced by what he or she considers to be the most likely water transport alternative if
the proposition loses and the Peripheral Canal is
defeated. This article has dealt with alternatives for
moving water south, and for coping with Delta environmental problems of water quality, fish and wildlife, as
well as meeting existing contracts for state water.
On the other hand, if Proposition 9 passes, the state
will be given clear authority to complete the State Water
Plan. In either case, the people of California will still
have the responsibility of deciding among Delta levee
protection alternatives, and on institutional changes
which apply to water issues.
The Delta is a key water-transfer facility for CVP and
SWP withdrawals. Consequently the state's water users
are increasingly concerned about the Delta's dependability as a source of high-quality water, and as a major
recreational and environmental resource.

ing total costs. Under foreseeable conditions of restricted
water supplies and increasing demand, different users
could bid up the price for water until they got what they
wanted, or were priced out of the market To establish
an open market, California would have to change existing
water law and the system of water rights presently in
effect.
(4) Water-use efficiency could be increased by making water rights transferable. That is, water users would
be able to buy water rights from others, and transfer
them to new locations. Under a transfer system, those
directly involved would be better off economically, or
else they would not trade. Nevertheless, these actions
may not lead to the best long-run resource use.
(5) Mandated reclamation is another option that could
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enable more water to be handled than is posstb1e-no1f.
Official agency opinions conflict, however, on which
alternative will be the more expensive way to provide
essentially the same amounts of export water.
Institutional changes could help solve the waterquality problems by reducing the amount of water actually used, or "stretching" it to make it go farther. Moreover, any of these institutional changes could be implemented along with options chosen from the other groups:
levee maintenance and repair, and water transport.
The June 1982 vote to either affirm or repeal SB 200
cannot begin to resolve all the complex and politically
sensitive water issues. No matter how the referendum is
decided, a crucial question will remain unanswered: Can
the Delta's water quality be maintained (or perhaps even
enhanced) without prohibitive costs, while still assuring
adequate supplies and an equitable distribution of
California's water?

Three sets of policy options that would influence
Delta water quality have been reviewed: (1) levee
maintenance and repair, (2) water-transport, and (3)
selected institutional and regulatory changes. (Some of
these options can be combined.)
The existing Delta levees are deteriorating. Effective
protection for fish and the environment is also declining.
Further Joss of islands to flooding will lower water quality. Offsetting these negative effects will require the
release of more freshwater into the Delta. There is no
easy way out: all the available options - even maintaining the status quo - will be increasingly expensive.
The present system and the proposed Through-Delta
facility both rely more heavily on maintaining Delta
water quality than does the Peripheral Canal. As a
result, the political vulnerability of Delta water quality
will increase if voters approve the Peripheral Canal and it
is built. Proponents of both the Through-Delta and Peripheral canals claim they will improve fish protection, and
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Introduction

"Acid rain" is a popular term describing
precipitation-rain, snow, fog, mist, dew, dust-whose
acid content has been increased by human activity. It is
generally attributed to the burning of fossil fuels such as
coal, oil, and natural gas, in power plants, industrial facilities, and automobiles, producing emissions of sulfur
oxides and nitrogen oxides. These oxides then undergo
acid-forming chemical transformations in the atmosphere, and are transported-often substantial ci.isulnces
from the emission sources-and deposited as "acid rain. • .
Acid rain was first recognized as a serious problem in
the Scandinavian countries. As early as 1955, increasing
acidity was being noted in southern Norway and
Sweden.l The problem was soon widely acknowledged as
fish populations in many Scandinavian lakes and streams
were reduced or eradicated. Concern over acid rain in
the United States began mounting in the 1960s with the
loss of trout populations from sensitive Adirondack lakes
of northern New York state.2 The effect of acid rain on
forests, grasslands, and croplands is now also a real concern, with the possibility of significant economic loss due
to lowered productivity. 3

Acid Precipitation in California

California was long assumed to be relatively free of
acid rain. Winds blowing across the state from the
Pacific Ocean are free of the industrial pollutants that
blow across the northeast; there are no large, coal-fired
power plants in the state; and the Central Valley and
desert areas contain alkaline soils, which are a source of
dust particles that could neutralize acid rain.
But two projects sponsored by the California Air
Resources Board (CARB) studied the chemical composition of the state's rain, using samples collected in 1978
and 1979, demonstrating that precipitation was acidic in
both northern and southern California. 4 A network of
eight stations in northern California, from urban areas to
the Tahoe Basin, was set up to record seasonal variations
in the acidity of rain and snow. The pooled data showed
an average pH of 4.9-measured on the pH scale that
defines unpolluted rain as pH 5.6.5 (On the pH scale each
decrease of 1.0 represents a ten-fold increase in acidity,
with the neutral point at 7.0.) Rainfall in urban areas
such as Los Angeles and the Bay Area was found to be
particuiarly acidic, the pH of some storms being as low as
2.89, about the same pH as vinegar. These results concerned CARB officials, who, in January, 1981, convened
a symposium on the effects or' acid precipitation. 6 It was
agreed that California faces potential ecosystem damage
from acid rain, including forest, fish, and agricultural
crop loss. The principal sources of the acids were not
positively identified, but likely candidates are the urban
population centers with their automobiles, refineries, and
oil-fired power plants.
The High Sierra Watersheds

Fortunately, California recognized the potential problem before its natural resources were damaged. So far,
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water users. Accordingly, we watched particularly for
changes in levels of toxic metals in the microcosm systems receiving acid treatment.

scientists are unsure how acid rain may affect the state's
ecosystems. From observations in other parts of the
world, however, we know that the small headwater lakes
of the Sierra Nevada-being relatively unable to neutralize acids-are good systems to study in looking for early
.
signs of deterioration.
Subalpine lakes on the western slope are especially
susceptible because their small volumes, limit~d
watershed areas, location in granitic basins, and thm
watershed soils all contribute to a lack of buffering capacity, or ability to neutralize acid. 7 These sensitive lakes
constitute an early warning system that may reflect the
effects of increasing California air pollution.
A large volume of California's precipitation falls as
snow on the western slope of the Sierra, as east-moving
weather systems pass over California's population centers
and then drop much of their precipitation. Studies of
acid snowfall in Canada and. Norway have noted that pollutants were concentrated in the part of the snow that
melts first in the spring. 8 If that also happens in California, then the acid and associated ions may flow out in a
concentrated pulse, harming the lakes and streams that
receive the meltwater. The biological activity of these
especially vulnerable mountain lakes could be seriously
damaged by such acid pulses.
Measurement of pH alone is not likely to provide the
most useful information for anticipating chemical and
biological changes in the lakes. Before a significant pH
drop is observed, there is a gradual loss of buffering
capacity.
Consequently periodic measurements of
buffering capacity are particularly important. A drop in a
lake's buffering capacity is an early warning of impending
change in the pH and the lake's biological character.
Buffering capacity can be partially renewed by natural
geological and biological processes. 9 It is important to
measure the rate of renewal of buffering capacity, as this
provides a useful measure of the resistance of the lake
and its surrounding watershed to acidification.
Our research project collected data on the sensitivity
of these subalpine lakes. A brief summary of our experimental approach and results is given here. (For complete
details concerning analytical techniques, sampling
methods, and analysis of experimental error, the
interested reader is referred to the final research
report).IO
The first step in studying selected aquatic systems of
the Sierra Nevada was to record the existing chemical
and biological conditions of lakes likely to be most
vulnerable, thus providing a baseline estimate of the systems' health. In a controlled laboratory setting, we also
studied possible changes caused by increasingly acidic
precipitation. These laboratory experiments were conducted with simulated lake systems (called microcosms),
to which acid was added. The resulting chemical and biological changes were then compared with the conditions
of other lake microcosms used as controls, which
received no acid. Observations made elsewhere suggest
that lakes affected by acid rain have elevated concentrations of such elements as lead, zinc, cadmium, iron,
aluminum, and manganese.ll Large concentrations of
such metals could damage water quality and biological
populations. Enhanced metal concentrations may also
flow downstream and endanger the health of downstream

Water-Quality Studies in the Sierra Nevada
Twenty-six lakes located at elevations of 5000 feet to
9000 feet on the western slope of the Sierra Nevada were
sampled during the spring, summer, and fall of 1980 and
1981. Many are located in the subalpine zone (basins
with few trees and thin soils), in national parks, national
forests, and wilderness areas. As noted earlier, baseline
data were obtained on pH, buffering capacity (measured
by the amount of material available to neutralize .acid),
and on concentrations of trace metals such as alummum,
cadmium, copper, iron, lead, manganese, and zinc. 12 Calcium and magnesium, components of some of the most
common natural buffering materials in lakes and soils,
were also measured. Phytoplankton species (microscopic
plant life) were identified and individuals counted to provide an indication of the biological state of the system.
The pH of all lakes sampled between June and
October was in the neutral range, pH 6-8. Alkalinity of
the Sierra lakes, or the amount of material available to
neutralize acid, was very low, measured at 10 ~q/liter
(micro-equivalents per liter) to 500 ~eq/liter. By comparison, a well-buffered aquatic system has an alkalinity
of more than 1,000 ~eq/liter. These data are summarized in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Figure 3, plotting pH
versus alkalinity, shows low alkalinities in Sierra lakes
over a range of pH values. (Note: For comparison, data
were also collected on two lower-elevation reservoirs,
Briones and Isabella. These showed both high pH and
alkalinity, and are represented in Figure 3 by the square
symbols.)
Wide regional variations in lakewater metal conce~
trations were found, with relatively high levels of alu~I
num (40 to 250 micrograms per liter) being recorded m
some Sierra lakes.I3 Aluminum is toxic at high concentrations, and is easily leached by acids into lakewater
from watersheds and sediments. In areas plagued by
chronic lake acidification, fish kills have been directly
attributed to aluminum toxicity. 14
The combination of near-neutral pH, low alkalinity,
and availability of alumina minerals in soils and sediment, indicates that many Sierra lakes are susceptible. to
acid-rain damage. These characteristics are shared With
lakes found to be sensitive in other parts of the world.
Our study provides a limited data base on the chemical and biological characteristics of a group of vulnerable
Sierra lakes. In the future, field monitoring of selected
lakes needs to be continued regularly, to watch for gradual changes in lakewater chemistry that could warn of
ecosystem acidification. Especially important is monitoring of lakewater chemistry during snowmelt, when the
lakes may be most vulnerable to acid stress.
Experimental Studies of Lake Acidification
When the field survey found the Sierra Nevada lakes
susceptible to acid rain, we then sought to determine how
acidification might affect these aquatic systems.
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Over a number of years vulnerable lakes may gradually lose the ability to buffer acid because the buffering
capacity may be partially used up during the successive
snowmelt acid pulses. These subtle changes in lake
chemistry may not become obvious until a lake's alkalinity is exhausted, producing a sudden pH drop. Figure 6
charts the exhaustion of buffering capacity in an experiment using water and sediments from Briones Reservoir.
Here, acid was added at weeks 0, 2, and 4, depressing the
pH to 4 each time. In each instance the pH begins a
recovery towards the baseline, but the alkalinity remains
depressed (between 0 and 150 ~J.eq/Iiter). Moreover, pH
and alkalinity recovery is weaker following each successive acid addition.
These pH and alkalinity changes after acidification are
only some of the complex chemical reactions caused by
such stress. Acid can also cause the release of metals,
from sediment and suspended particles. For example,
Figures 7-9 summarize the levels of dissolved aluminum,
iron and manganese released during the Mosquito Lake
microcosm experiment.l6
Phytoplankton
and
zooplankton
populations
responded to acid in various ways. Generally the counts
of ·individuals and numbers of species decreased in the
acid-stressed systems, although the magnitude of the
effect was more pronounced on zooplankton populations
than on phytoplankton populations. In some cases acid
did not cause a decrease in the populations, but instead
suppressed the population blooms observed in the
unacidified controls. (Because nitric acid supplies the
nitrate ion, a nutrient for algae, some scientists have
speculated that acidification might enhance algal growth.
Indeed, for one species-a filamentous green alga-a
bloom was encouraged in the acidified microcosms of
Tenaya Lake.) 17

Although field experiments in which lakes and streams
were artificially acidified have been performed elsewhere,
we concluded that laboratory microcosm research, not
-involving damage to natural lakes, was more appropriate
for studying Sierra lakes' vulnerability to acid precipitation.I5
The microcosms used to simulate the lakes and test
their probable response to acid rain were 18-liter plastic
tanks, filled with water and sediment collected in the
field, and maintained under controlled light and temperature conditions. By using these small replicas of the lake
ecosystems, we were able to study the effect of altering
acidity. Controllable variables such as temperature, light,
and aeration were matched approximately to the levels
observed in the actual lakes. Chemical and biological
interactions in the lakewater determined the nutrient and
metal concentrations, and changes in the plankton populations .
The lakes simulated included a well-buffered Bay
Area reservoir (Briones), and two high-altitude, subalpine Sierra lakes (Mosquito Lake, west of Ebbetts's Pass,
and Tenaya Lake in Yosemite National Park). Nitric acid
(HNO 3) was added to stress the systems because of the
high relative concentration of the nitrate anion in precipitation falling in California. It was assumed that it would
be easier to interpret changes in a microcosm that had
been subjected to increases in a single acid anion.
In each experiment, microcosms were studied under
various conditions. For greater statistical reliability three
replicates of each condition were set up for the Sierra
lake experiments and two were set up for each condition
to be studied in the Briones Reservoir experiment.
Because lake sediments are sources of both potentially
toxic metals and of buffering agents, microcosms were
set up with and without lake sediments. Some of the
microcosms were stressed with enough acid to bring the
system down to pH 4, an acidified state. Following this
one-time acid addition, resembling the acid stress
observed in Scandinavia and the Adirondacks during
snowmelt, several variables were measured weekly over a
seven-weeks experimental period: (1) pH, (2) alkalinity,
(3) metal concentrations in the water, and (4) phytoplankton and zooplankton (animal life of the plankton)
species and numbers. To demonstrate that inadvertent
metal contamination did not occur in the laboratory, distilled water controls were set up in parallel with the lake
microcosms, and metal concentrations were measured
weekly in these controls.

Summary of Experimental Results
In summary, these experiments have identified some
of the variables that change significantly during
acidification. Large decreases in pH cause significant
increases of certain metals that are toxic at high concentrations. The acidified systems also exhibited significant
biological effects, with some species being favored over
others. By monitoring these variables in real lakes,
changes in ecosystems due to acidic deposition can be
identified. Admittedly in these experiments the lake
microcosms were acidified suddenly, while in the field
this process may take years or decades. Nevertheless,
the diagnostic variables identified can help in recognizing
early signs of lake damage due to acidification.
Acid-induced biological and chemical changes can
progressively alter freshwater lake systems. The greatest
threats to Sierra lakes are (1) loss of the already small
buffering capacity, leading to chronic lake acidification,
(2) toxic effects of increased acidity on organisms, and
(3) indirect and synergistic toxic effects on organisms,
including man, due to metals leached from watershed
soils or sediment because of increasingly acid rainfall and
snowmelt.

Chemical and Biological Changes
Due to the comparative lack of buffering materials in
the water and sediment, the Sierra lake microcosms
recovered slowly or not at all after they were treated with
acid (see Figure 4, Mosquito Lake, and Figure 5, Tenaya
Lake). The Mosquito Lake systems recovered slightly-the pH increased to about 5. This could be attributed to
the buffering capacity of the fine-grained organic sediments. These sediments are characteristic of lowerelevation lakes in forested basins and have a greate:
buffering capacity than the coarse-grained gravel sediments of high-elevation lakes such as Tenaya.
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Recommendations: Monitoring, Research, and Regulation

The sensitive Sierra lakes will almost inevitably
deteriorate if they are exposed to acid rain. Their chemistry and biology will change as their buffering capacity is
depleted.
Changes in these sensitive systems due to acid rain
may also serve as a warning of more gradual, imperceptible changes that may be taking place in other ecosystems
further downstream. Accordingly, California should not
defer policy decisions on acid rain until the Sierra lakes
have in fact been damaged and changes have begun to be
observed. More research is needed on pollution pathways, deposition, and effects, but there is already enough
information to justify formulating environmental regulations to protect all of California's natural resources from
acid-rain damage.
The most pressing priority is a network of precipitation sampling stations to detect variations in the pH and
chemical composition of rain, snow, fog, mist, and dry
deposition. Anions, principally sulfate and nitrate, and
other important atmospheric constituents such as
ammonium, alkaline agents, and trace metals, should be
monitored on a year-round, storm-by-storm (or event)
basis to identify sources of air pollutants and seasonal
trends.
We can now only guess at possible sources and pathways of pollution affecting acidity of precipitation in California. Without better understanding of the atmospheric
pathways of pollutant dispersal, it will be difficult to make
informed policy decisions about power plant siting. We
know that the mountain lakes are sensitive to acid deposition, but we do not yet know how to predict the
amount of acid deposition that will reach the Sierra
Nevada from fossil-fuel power plants located at alternative sites within the state. Monitoring the chemistry of
precipitation provides insight into the atmospheric pathways for pollutant dispersal from existing sources, but
provides little direct information about the consequences
of locating new sources in areas where there are now no
sources of pollution. Developing the ability to predict
these consequences will require the combined research
skills of atmospheric chemists and meteorologists. Such
an interdisciplinary effort is currently in progress at the
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory.
Another pressing priority for California is a Jakemonitoring network in the Sierra Nevada. Water quality
is important because these lakes are used for recreation,
fishing, and as sources of agricultural and municipal
water supplies. Without monitoring, important changes
in lakewater chemistry could go undetected until the
lakes are damaged.
Large changes in pH, alkalinity and dissolved metals
have been observed when snowmelt enters adversely
affected Adirondack and Scandinavian lakes. Any monitoring scheme should emphasize the snowmelt period to
see if similar changes in water chemistry occur in California. Studying snowpack chemistry may also alert us to
changes in the precipitation chemistry in the Sierra
Nevada where most of the precipitation falls as snow.
Because acidification can cause increased toxic metal concentrations in the water, it is also important to monitor

background metal levels, and to identify the major
sources of toxic metals in California's waters.
Studies are needed of other biological effects of lake
acidification that are likely to extend beyond damage to
the plankton populations observed in the experiments
described here. Microbe-mediated nutrient cycles, soil
building processes, and forest and fish productivity in
Sierra watersheds could also be altered and perhaps
harmed by acidification.
The California Air Resources Board appears to be
taking the lead in studying and regulating precursors of
acid rain, such as sulfur dioxide or nitrogen oxide emitted during fossil-fuel combustion. In the future, California agencies responsible for regulating energy production
and for protecting aquatic resources should cooperate in
studying and regulating potential causes of acid rain. In
addition to the California Air Resources Boar~ other
agencies that might participate include the California
Energy Commission, the Department of Fish and Game,
and the Water Quality Control Board. Federal concern
with acid rain in California prompted the National
Atmospheric Disposition Program (NADP) to install a
number of monitoring stations in the state. Federal and
state officials should be encouraged to cooperate in
expanding networks to monitor both precipitation and
lakewater quality.
Despite uncertainties about acid rain and its effects in
California, existing data cin be used for informed regulation of fossil-fuel burning processes and for siting fossilfuel burning facilities. For example, available evidence
points to mobile sources-principally automobiles-as a
major contributor to acid deposition in California, especially in the urban areas. Although the evidence has not
yet been thoroughly analyzed, southern California
mobile-source pollution may even be a significant contributor to acid rain in the Rocky Mountains. IS In light of
these findings, and those on the Sierra lakes' susceptibility to acid inputs, we recommend against weakening
present automotive nitrogen oxide emission standards.
Moreover, stricter future standards may be warranted
after we learn more about atmospheric pathways and lake
vulnerability.
An improved understanding of the Sierra lakes' vulnerability can help policy makers formulate siting criteria
that will avoid, or at least limit, the adverse effects of
fossil-fuel combustion on water supplies. The effects of
acid rain will probably be most severe in high-altitude
lakes with predominantly granitic bedrock and sparse
vegetation, in central· and southern-Sierra regions.
Accordingly, decisions about where to locate large,
fossil-fuel burning facilities should be made in light of
what is known about atmospheric transformation of pollutants, and the deposition and effects of acidic compounds in these sensitive regions. Meteorological information on the movement of air masses and pollutants in
California can suggest where acid might be deposited,
and these areas can be monitored. This information can
be used in making decisions about where to build power
plants or large industrial facilities. In this way, vulnerable areas could be protected from pollution.
State environmental assessment procedures do not
currently require that new facilities be evaluated in terms
of their potential contribution to acid rain. There is a
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The California Legislature recognized the importance
of the acid-rain problem by creating the Assembly Select
Committee on Acid Precipitation to evaluate existing evidence on acid deposition and recommend legislation. In
February 1982, Assembly Bill 2752 was introduced, proposing the Kapiloff Acid Deposition Act, designed to
finance and implement a coordinated monitoring and
research effort administered by the California Air
Resources Board. This legislation was passed by the California Legislature, and signed by the Governor in Sep-

tember 1982. This act is a reasonable first step toward
controlling acid deposition and limiting its deleterious
effects. It authorizes not only monitoring and research to
define the extent and nature of the problem in California, but also calls for an analysis of possible control strategies,
including
emission-control
technologies,
alternative-energy policies, and air-quality management
strategies. This kind of research and analysis can lay the
groundwork for effective future regulation.
Delay in regulation, after the extent of the problem is
recognized, could mean loss of the valuable goods and
services society derives from healthy ecosystems. 19 Many
ecological effects are either irreversible or very costly to
remedy. Now that we know something about the sensitivity of the Sierra aquatic systems, these data should be
used in regulatory decision making. The potential for
significant damage should not be ignored until damage
has occurred. Even if some of the initial regulations
should later prove to be too strict, it would be easier to
modify regulations than to restore damaged ecosystems.
Through a reasoned consideration of (1) the best
scientific information on the subject, and (2) the
economic impact of possible regulations, public policy
makers can attempt to formulate regulatory strategies to
protect ecosystem quality. Resolution of the scientific
and economic uncertainties should result in more
effective policies for control of acid-rain damage.

FIGURE 1

FIGURE 2

Distribution of Sierra Lakes plfs
Measured in 1980-81 (n=26)

Distn'bution of Sierra Lakes Alkalinities
Measured in 1980-81 (n=26)

precedent, however, for requiring specific impacts to be
evaluated (e.g., impacts of projectS on energy consumption).
Environmental impact · reporting for new
refineries, and for petroleum or coal-fired electric generating plants, could thus be required to include full discussion, using the best available scientific information, of
the facility's probable contribution to acid deposition, and
of the possible impact the acid deposition will have on
the state's sensitive ecosystems. The analyses might
include information on emissions, meteorological trends,
and existence of sensitive ecosystems downwind of proposed new sources. We believe that such environmental
impact reporting ought to be required in California.

Conclusion
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FIGURE 3

FIGURE 4
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Changes in pH of Microcosms (simulated lake
systems), the Mosquito Lake Experiment
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Levels of Dissolved Aluminum Measured During
the Mosquito Lake Experiment
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Levels of Dissolved Manganese Measured During
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1. See the report by E. Barret and G. Brodin, 'The Acidity of
Scandinavian Precipitation," Tel/us, 1: 251-257 0955), for a discussion of some of the early data collected on acid rain
occurrence in Scandinavia.

2. See, for example, U S Department of Interior, Office of
Water Research Technology, C.L. Schofield. Acid Snowmelt
E;ffects on Water Quality and Fish Survival in the Adirondack Mountains of New York State, ReseNch Programs Technical
Comprehensive Report No. A-072-NY. (1977).

3. For a complete discussion of possible effects of acid rain
on forests, crops, and soils, see the symposium volume E;ffects of
Acid Precipitation on. Terrestrial Ecosystems, T.C. Hutchinson and
M. Havas, eds. (New York: Plenum Press, 1980).
4. See, for example, J. McColl, A Sllrllf!Y of Add Precipitation
in Nonhern California, Firtal Report #A 7-149-30 to the California
Air Resources Board (February 19, 1980); and J.J. Morgan and
H.M. Liljestrand, Measurement and interpretation of Acid Rainfall
in the Los Angeles Basin, Final Report to the California Air
Resources Board (February 29, 1980).

107

5. The pH scale measures the acidity or alkalinity of solutions, in a range from 0-14, with decreasing numbers indicating
increasing acidity, and larger numbers signifying higher alkalinity. Because the pH scale is logarithmic, each unit decrease
corresponds to a ten-fold increase in acid content. Distilled
water with a pH of 7 is considered neutral. Precipitation is often
considered acid if its pH is below 5.6, the normal value for
unpolluted precipitation in equilibrium with atmospheric carbon
dioxide (C0 2 ).

14. For a general discussion of the aluminum leaching
phenomenon, see C.S. Cronan and C.L. Schofield, "Aluminum
Leaching Response to Acid Precipitation: Effects on HighElevation Watersheds in the Northeast, • Science, 204:304-306
(April 20, 1979).
15. See two articles in D.S. Shriner, et al., Atmospheric Sulfur
Deposition E~vironmental Impact and Health E;ffects (Ann Arb~r,
Michigan: Ann Arbor Science Publishers, Inc., 1980). In this
volume, stream acidification experiments in Hubbard Brook
Experimental Forest are described in R.J. Hall and G. Likens,
"Ecological Effects of Whole-Stream Acidification." Canadian
experiments with lake acidification are described in D.W.
Schindler, "Ecological Effects of Experimental Whole-Lake
Acidification."

6. See the forthcoming report, "Proceedings of the California
Symposium on Acid Precipitation" (Sacramento: California Air
Resources Board, 1982).
7. Buffering capacity is the ability of a lake to recover by
neutralizing acid that enters the lake basin as rain, snowmelt or
dry deposition. The normal pH of Sierra lakes is near neutrality,
(pH7) but the lakes have a very low buffering capacity (alkalinity) of only 10-500 ~eq/liter (micro-equivalents per liter). A
lake's alkalinity is defined as the amount of material available to
neutralize any added acid. A well-buffered system typically has
an alkalinity greater than 1000 ~eq/liter. Studies of the alkalin·
ity of Sierra lakes by Professor J. Melack of U.C. Santa Barbara
also demonstrate the low alkalinity of these systems. (See the
Proceeding of the American Water Resources Association, lnrernational Symposium on Hydrometeorology, Denver, Colorado (June
13-17, 1982).

16. Points on the graphs of metal concentrations vs. time
represent the mean (.X) of the replicate tanks. These values
have standard deviations of 10 to 15 percent in most cases.
Differences in the mean concentrations between treatments and
controls are significant at the 99 percent confidence level.
17. Data on changes in zooplankton and phytoplankton
populations are included in K. A. Tonnessen, "Potential for
Aquatic Ecosystem Acidification in the Sierra Nevada, California," in the Proc. Symp. Acid Prectpltation: Aquatic E;ffects. G.
Hendrey, ed. (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Ann Arbor Science Publishers, 1983).

8. See, for example, D.S. Jeffries, C.M. Cox, and PJ. Dillon, "Depression of pH in Lakes and Streams in Central Ontario
during Snowmelt." J. Fish.. Res. Board Can. 36:640-646 (1979),
for a discussion of this concentration effect in Canada. Similar
observations in Norway are described in, M. Johannessen and A.
Henriksen, "Chemistry of Snow Meltwater: Changes in Concentration During Melting," Water Resources Research 14(4):615-619
(August 1978).

18. The similarity of precipitation composition on the
western slope of the Colorado Rockies and that of the L.A.
Basin is discussed in J. Harte, G.P. Lockett, and R.A. Schneider,
"Acid Precipitation and Surface-Water Vuinerability on the
Western Slope of the High Colorado Rockies" (submitted for
publication to EnVIron. Sci. Techno/.) Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Berkeley, CA.

9. Tnese processes include the weathering of rocks and biological production, which can yield acid-neutralizing products.

19. Goods derived from healthy ecosystems include fish,
lumber, and agricultural crops. Services include the regulation
of air quality; the maintenance of water quality, storage, and
flow; the moderation of climate; the maintenance of a genetic
1ibrary" for future generations; the cycling of essential nutrients
within and between soil and water; and the breakdown of toxic
wastes to harmless products. For a full discussion of these
goods and services, along with an evaluation of the ways energy
technologies can degrade them, see J. Harte and A. Jassby,
"Energy Technologies and Natural Environments: the Search for
Compatability," Annual Review ofEngergy, 3: 101-146 (1978).

10. See K. A. Tonnessen, "The Potential Effects of Acid
Deposition on Aquatic Ecosystems of the Sierra Nevada, California," Ph.D. dissertation, Energy and Resources Group, U.C.
Berkeley, 1983 (in preparation).
11. For a review of data on increases in trace-metal concentrations in acidified lakes, see the report of the National
Research Council of Canada, Acidification in Caood1an Aquatic
EnVIronment: Scientific Critena for Assess1ng the E;ffects of Acidic
Deposition on Aquatic Ecosystems, NRCC Report No. 18475, pp.
189-192 (1981).

12. Water samples were collected at mid-day at three stations
in each lake (the shore, the mid-lake surface, and the maximum
depth at which a standard black and white disk, called a secchi
disk, can be seen by an observer). Some lakes were sampled in
two consecutive years; others were studied once. Standard
methods were used for all chemical measurements: the lake pH
was measured using a Sargent-Welch pH meter with glass, combination electrode; alkalinity determinations were made by Gran
titration with 0.01 jJ HCI. Trace-metal concentrations were
measured by atomic-absorption spectrophotometry.
13. A ~gil (microgram per liter) is equal to a part per billion
on a weight-of-metal per weight-of-water basis.
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